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Chapter 1
Introduction
Digital communications have evolved to become an essential part of everyday life since the
groundbreaking work on information theory of Shannon in 1948 [17]. Coding theory is a major
tool that enables one to realize the goal of having control over efficiency and reliability in a
communication situation. High efficiency and high reliability are conflicting goals. To obtain
high reliability, one often has to sacrifice efficiency. For instance, a channel coding strategy,
consisting of codebook generating, encoding and decoding processes, generally introduces re-
dundancy in a message to combat against noise in a channel so that a sender can transmit
a message with high reliability. The introduced redundancy leads to low efficiency. A large
amount of scientific work has been dedicated to analyzing and synthesizing different coding
strategies so that the efficiency and the reliability can optimally be traded off to attain a set
goal.
As digital communications become widely used, different constraints are imposed on the design
of communication systems according to different user requirements. The demand to commu-
nicate sensitive messages calls for techniques that maintain the secrecy of the message in an
efficient and reliable communication. Under certain circumstances, not only the message has
to be kept secret, but also the communication itself has to be inconspicuous, which is known
as covert communication.
1.1 Covert Communication
The covert communication scenario usually involves three parties: a sender, a recipient and
an adversary. The sender is interested in covertly sending a message to the recipient with
high efficiency and reliability through a channel while keeping the message unknown to the
adversary. The goal of a system designer is to device a coding strategy that enables the optimal
tradeoff between the three objectives.
A commonly used approach to maintain the secrecy of the message is to use key encryption,
which transforms the message into a cryptogram unintelligible to the adversary, but decryptable
with a key by the recipient to obtain the original message. If the adversary does not gain any
1
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knowledge about the message from observing the cryptogram, the encryption algorithm then
achieves the perfect secrecy. An example of the perfect secrecy encryption algorithm is the well-
known one-time-pad algorithm. However, the perfect secrecy is impractical for the requirement
that the length of the key must be at least the same as the length of the message, but it can
serve as an upper bound on the level of secrecy quantified by equivocation. For practical
reasons, computational security becomes a criterion for security of encryption algorithms.
An alternative approach to enhance the level of secrecy took by Wyner in [20] is to make
an assumption that the adversary observes a degraded version of what the recipient observes
through a wiretap channel. Assuming this wiretap channel model, a coding strategy without
key can be used to encode the message by transforming it into a codeword so that the perfect
secrecy can be achieved asymptotically.
The two approaches of attaining secrecy without any adaptation do not however provide the
covert communication since the communication is not concealed by any mechanism albeit the
transformation of the message. The second approach of using the wiretap channel model
is taken in this thesis to be investigated and extended for the covert communication in an
information theoretic framework.
1.2 Information Theoretic Framework and
Challenges
A close examination of the wiretap channel model introduced by Wyner under the information
theoretic framework reveals the fundamental ideas of coding strategies serving as a bedrock
shared by the proofs of the achievabilities of channel capacities of the broadcast channel intro-
duced by Cover in [4] and the dirty-paper channel introduced by Costa in [3]. The concept of
code partitioning is used in the broadcast channel to transmit multiple messages to multiple
recipients simultaneously in an efficient way. It is used in the dirty-paper channel to eliminate
the effect of an interference known in advance as side information to the sender in a message
transmission through a channel with interference. In the wiretap channel model, it is used to
confuse the adversary to maintain the secrecy of the message from the sender intended for the
recipient.
The code-partitioning concept exhibits a strong potential to be used in the covert communica-
tion due to its capability to confuse the adversary and mitigate the interference in the channel
if it is known in advance to the sender. The challenge is to formulate a model suitable for
the covert communication and apply the code-partitioning strategy to obtain a set of possi-
ble tradeoffs between efficiency, reliability and secrecy. A further challenge is to provide an
implementation for the model.
To meet the challenges, we proposed an extension of the wiretap channel model to Gaussian
wiretap channel with side information by taking advantage of the side information about the
covert communication channel available to the sender in advance. We also investigate the role
of side information when it is available to the adversary based on another variant of the wiretap
channel, namely, the wiretap channel II.
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis
We begin taking on the challenges by developing necessary information theoretic tools around
the Asymptotic Equipartition Properties of sequences of independent identically distributed
random variables in Chapter 2. The concept of code partitioning is described for the broadcast
channel, the wiretap channel, the wiretap channel II, the Gaussian wiretap channel (another
variant for the wiretap channel) and the dirty-paper channel in Chapter 3. The uses of the
concept are compared and contrasted.
In Chapter 4, a new communication model is obtained by combining the Gaussian wiretap
channel and the dirty-paper channel introduced in Chapter 3, and the code partitioning is
employed to derive an achievable region. The new model is called Gaussian wiretap channel
with side information for it consists of an additive white Gaussian noise main channel with
additive white Gaussian interference and an additive white Gaussian noise wiretap channel.
An appropriate level of interference can serve as a covert communication channel.
The implementation of the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information model as a system
for information embedding in an image is proposed in Chapter 5. The image is used as a covert
communication channel for transmission of a message intended for the recipient and to be kept
secret from the adversary. Furthermore, it corresponds to the interference in the model, which
is available to the sender in advance while the noise in the wiretap channel is used as a key
given to the sender and the recipient beforehand. The system is implemented by enhancing
the message secrecy of the watermarking scheme proposed by Eggers et. al in [8]. With an
appropriate key, a high level of secrecy can be attained as shown in simulations.
The side information about the interference in the main channel in the Gaussian wiretap
channel with side information is given to the sender in advance and can be used in the encoding
process to mitigate the effect of the interference on the message transmission as in the case
of the dirty-paper channel. However, if some side information is available to the adversary,
the question of how it affects the secrecy of the message arises. In Chapter 6, we investigate
this situation for the wiretap channel II described in Chapter 3. The model under this new
circumstance is called wiretap channel II with side information since a part of the uncoded
message is available to the adversary as side information, and it can be used to help his decoding
for the message. The coset coding method with linear block codes used by Ozarow and Wyner
in [16] to prove the capacity of the wiretap channel II is assumed in proving an achievable
region for the wiretap channel II with side information. Moreover, some characteristics of
good finite-length codes are derived for the model. Chapter 7 provides concluding remarks and
possible directions for further research on the topic.
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Chapter 2
Asymptotic Equipartition
Properties
Basic definitions of information theoretic terms for discrete and continuous random variables
and sequences are provided in this chapter for the development of tools crucial for understand-
ing the code-partitioning concept and for the analysis of the Gaussian wiretap channel with
side information (GWCSI) and the wiretap channel II with side information (WT2CSI). The
tools are developed around the Asymptotic Equipartition Properties (AEP) of sequences of
independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. The coding technique based on
the AEP and a jointly typical decoder commonly used in the achievability proof of channel
capacity is outlined for its frequent use in the thesis.
2.1 Basic Definitions
As usual, the measure of uncertainty of a random variable is entropy. The logarithm is of
base 2 while the natural logarithm of x is denoted by ln(x). When we deal with Gaussian
random variables, it is more convenient to use nat as a unit of information, where 1 nat is
log(e) bits (about 1.44 bits). The definition of entropy of a discrete random variable and the
definitions of joint entropy, conditional entropy and mutual information of a pair of discrete
random variables are given below.
Definition 2.1 The entropy H(X) of a discrete random variable X with probability mass
function p(x) is defined as
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x).
Definition 2.2 The joint entropy H(X,Y ) of a pair of discrete random variables (X,Y ) with
joint probability mass function p(x, y) is defined as
H(X,Y ) = −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log p(x, y).
5
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Definition 2.3 The conditional entropy H(Y |X) of a pair of discrete random variables (X,Y )
with joint probability mass function p(x, y) and conditional probability mass function p(y|x) is
defined as
H(Y |X) = −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log p(y|x).
Definition 2.4 The mutual information I(X;Y ) of a pair of discrete random variables (X,Y )
with joint probability mass function p(x, y) and marginal probability mass functions p(x) and
p(y) is defined as
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
.
The corresponding definitions of differential entropy, joint differential entropy, conditional dif-
ferential entropy and mutual information for continuous random variables are defined in the
same ways by replacing the summations with integrations and (joint /conditional) probability
mass functions with (joint /conditional) probability density functions. Note that we use the
same notation for both entropy and differential entropy, and we must take special care when
differential entropy is infinite and keep in mind that entropy is non-negative while differential
entropy can be negative.
For a discrete memoryless channel whose input is XN and output is Y N with transition prob-
ability p(yN |xN ) =∏Ni=1 p(yi|xi), the capacity of the channel is defined below.
Y N
-
­
®
ª
©
- DMC
XN
Figure 2.1: The discrete memoryless channel with input XN and output Y N .
Definition 2.5 The channel capacity of a discrete memoryless channel whose input is X and
output is Y is defined as
C = sup
p(x)
I(X;Y )
where the supremum is taken over all possible input probability mass functions p(x).
From the above definitions, the relations among entropy, conditional entropy and mutual in-
formation listed below can be derived: (See [6].)
H(X,Y ) = H(X) +H(Y |X) (2.1)
= H(Y ) +H(X|Y ) (2.2)
H(X,Y ) = H(X,U, Y )−H(U |X,Y ) (2.3)
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) (2.4)
= H(Y )−H(Y |X) (2.5)
= H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y ) (2.6)
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Lemma 2.1 Let (XN , Y N ) be a pair of random vectors such that
p(xN , yN ) =
N∏
i=1
p(xi, yi).
Then I(XN ;Y N ) = NI(X;Y ).
Proof: If XN and Y N are discrete, by the definition of mutual information,
I(XN ;Y N ) =
∑
(xN ,yN )∈XN×YN
p(xN , yN ) log
p(xN , yN )
p(xN )p(yN )
=
N∑
i=1
∑
(xN ,yN )∈XN×YN
p(xN , yN ) log
p(xi, yi)
p(xi)p(yi)
=
N∑
i=1
∑
(xi,yi)∈X×Y
p(xi, yi) log
p(xi, yi)
p(xi)p(yi)
= NI(X;Y ).
If XN and Y N are continuous, replace the summations with the integrations yielding the same
result. ¥
2.2 Gaussian Random Variables and Sequences
In this section, the definitions and the information theoretic properties are applied to Gaussian
random variables (sequences) since they will be used in Chapter 4.
Differential Entropy.
For a zero-mean σ2X -variance Gaussian random variable X ∼ N (0, σ2X) with probability density
function
p(x) =
1√
2piσ2X
exp
{
− x
2
2σ2X
}
,
H(X) = −
∫
X
p(x) ln p(x) dx
= −
∫
X
p(x)
[
− x
2
2σ2X
− 1
2
ln(2piσ2X)
]
dx
=
1
2
+
1
2
ln(2piσ2X)
=
1
2
ln(2pieσ2X) nats (2.7)
=
1
2
log(2pieσ2X) bits. (2.8)
Note that H(X) < 0 if 2pieσ2X < 1. Furthermore, differential entropy of a Gaussian random
variable depends on its variance, and it can theoretically be infinite. However, we only consider
8 CHAPTER 2. ASYMPTOTIC EQUIPARTITION PROPERTIES
power-limited Gaussian random processes; consequently, differential entropies considered here
are bounded from above.
Joint Differential Entropy.
For a pair of Gaussian random variables (X1, X2) ∼ N (0,K) with means zero and covariance
matrix K and probability density function
p(x) =
1
2pi
√|K| exp
{
− 1
2
xTK−1x
}
,
H(X1, X2) = −
∫
X1,X2
p(x) ln p(x) dx
= −
∫
X1,X2
p(x)
[
− 1
2
xTK−1x− 1
2
ln((2pi)2|K|)
]
dx
= −
∫
X1,X2
p(x)
[
− 1
2
xTK−1x
]
dx+
1
2
ln((2pi)2|K|)
=
1
2
E
[∑
i,j
Xi(K
−1)i,jXj
]
+
1
2
ln((2pi)2|K|)
=
1
2
[∑
j
∑
i
Kj,i(K
−1)i,j
]
+
1
2
ln((2pi)2|K|)
=
1
2
[∑
j
(KK−1)j,j
]
+
1
2
ln((2pi)2|K|)
=
2
2
+
1
2
ln((2pi)2|K|)
=
1
2
ln((2pie)2|K|) nats.
Similarly, for a Gaussian random vector (X1, X2, . . . , XN ) ∼ N (0,K) with probability density
function
p(x) =
1
(
√
2pi)N |K|1/2 exp
{
− 1
2
xTK−1x
}
,
H(X1, . . . , XN ) =
1
2
ln((2pie)N |K|) nats. (2.9)
Conditional Differential Entropy.
The conditional entropy H(Y |X) of a pair of continuous random variables (X,Y ) with joint
probability density function p(x, y) and conditional probability density function p(y|x) is de-
fined as
H(Y |X) = −
∫
X,Y
p(x, y) log p(y|x) dy dx.
It can be expressed in terms of joint differential entropy and differential entropy, when all the
terms are finite, H(X|Y ) = H(X,Y )−H(Y ). In particular,
H(X|Y ) = 1
2
ln
[
(2pie)|KXY |
σ2Y
]
nats (2.10)
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when X and Y are jointly Gaussian with covariance matrix KXY .
Mutual Information.
The mutual information I(X;Y ) of a pair of continuous random variables (X,Y ) with joint
probability density function p(x, y) and marginal probability density functions p(x) and p(y)
is defined as
I(X;Y ) =
∫
X,Y
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
dy dx.
The mutual information between two Gaussian random variables X and Y – with a covariance
matrix KXY , and |KXY | = σ2Xσ2Y (1 − %2), where % = E[XY ]/(σXσY ) is the correlation
coefficient – is I(X;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y ) when all the terms are finite; hence,
I(X;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y )
(1)
=
1
2
ln
[
(2pieσ2X)(2pieσ
2
Y )
(2pie)2|KXY |
]
=
1
2
ln
[
σ2Xσ
2
Y
|KXY |
]
=
1
2
ln
[
1
1− %2
]
nats
=
1
2
log
[
1
1− %2
]
bits. (2.11)
(1) follows from equations (2.7) and (2.9).
In particular, for Y = X + η, where η ∼ N (0, σ2η) is independent of X, X and Y are jointly
Gaussian with correlation coefficient
% =
E[XY ]
σXσY
=
E[X(X + η)]
σXσY
=
E[X2]
σXσY
=
σX
σY
,
and the mutual information between X and Y becomes
I(X;Y ) =
1
2
ln
[
1
1− (σ2X/σ2Y )
]
=
1
2
ln
[
σ2Y
σ2Y − σ2X
]
=
1
2
ln
[
σ2X + σ
2
η
σ2η
]
nats. (2.12)
=
1
2
log
[
σ2X + σ
2
η
σ2η
]
bits. (2.13)
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However, if X and Y are independent, |KXY | = σ2Xσ2Y , which implies that I(X;Y ) = 0.
Additive White Gaussian Noise Channel.
Considering an Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel model with the input-output
relation: Y N = XN + ηN , where input XN is drawn i.i.d. according to N (0, σ2X), and noise
ηN , independent of the input, is drawn i.i.d. according to N (0, σ2η) as depicted in Figure 2.2,
we can see that the channel is memoryless, and the output sequence is i.i.d. according to
N (0, σ2X + σ2η).
Y N
-
?
-
XN h
ηN
Figure 2.2: The Additive White Gaussian Noise Channel (AWGN) with noise η ∼ N (0, σ2η).
Since XN , Y N , ηN are i.i.d. and the channel is memoryless,
p(xN , yN ) =
N∏
i=1
p(xi, yi),
and Lemma 2.1 can be applied, resulting in
I(XN ;Y N ) = NI(X;Y )
(1)
=
N
2
ln
[
σ2X + σ
2
η
σ2η
]
nats.
(1) follows from equation (2.12).
Now, for the AWGN depicted in Figure 2.2, if the average power of the input is limited to a
constant P so that σ2X ≤ P , the channel capacity is defined as
C = sup
p(x):E[X2]≤P
I(X;Y ) (2.14)
where the supremum is taken over all possible input probability density functions p(x) that
satisfy the power constraint. Using the proof outlined in section 2.5, it is shown in [6] that the
capacity of a P average-power-limited AWGN channel is achievable, where the capacity is
CAWGN =
1
2
log
[
P + σ2η
σ2η
]
. (2.15)
In the next section, the Asymptotic Equipartition Properties, which are crucial for the proving
technique outlined in section 2.5, are described.
2.3 Asymptotic Equipartition Properties
The Asymptotic Equipartition Properties (AEP) are concerned with the behaviors of sequences
whose components are generated independently according to a probability distribution. It is a
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direct consequence of the Weak Law of Large Numbers (WLLN); therefore, sequences or sets
of sequences that are long enough exhibit these properties. (For the WLLN, see Theorem A.1
in Appendix A.) A sequence generated independently according to a probability distribution
can be classified into the one that is typical and the one that is non-typical. The definition of
typicality is given below. Here, we mainly use the AEP of continuous-alphabet sequences and
will only consider the continuous case. For a set T ⊆ RN , the volume of the set T is denoted
by |T | and defined as
|T | =
∫
T
dx1 dx2 . . . dxN .
Definition 2.6 The set TNX (²) of typical sequences x
N with respect to probability density func-
tion p(x) is the set
TNX (²) =
{
xN ∈ XN : | − 1
N
log p(xN )−H(X)| < ²
}
,
where p(xN ) =
∏N
i=1 p(xi).
A sequence xN is said to be ²-typical with respect to function p(x) if xN ∈ TNX (²). The
probability that a typical sequence occurs is bounded in Lemma 2.2.
Lemma 2.2 If xN ∈ TNX (²) with respect to probability density function p(x), then
2−N [H(X)+²] < p(xN ) < 2−N [H(X)−²]. (2.16)
Proof: From the definition of typical set TNX (²), we see that
| − 1N log p(xN )−H(X)| < ²
−² < − 1N log p(xN )−H(X) < ²
H(X)− ² < − 1N log p(xN ) < H(X) + ²
2−N [H(X)+²] < p(xN ) < 2−N [H(X)−²]
¥
Lemma 2.2 implies that the typical sequences in TNX (²) are roughly equally likely. Furthermore,
if N , the length of the sequences, is large enough, probability that a sequence generated
independently according to the probability density function p(x) is in the typical set TNX (²) is
close to one as shown in Lemma 2.3.
Lemma 2.3 For any ² > 0 and ²1 > 0, there exists an integer N such that Pr{XN ∈ TNX (²)} >
1− ²1.
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Proof: Let X ′ = − log(p(X)) with variance σ2X′ . Applying the WLLN (Theorem A.1) to X ′,
Pr
{∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
X ′i −
∫
X
− log(p(x))p(x) dx
∣∣∣∣ < ²} > 1− σ2X′N²2
Pr
{∣∣∣∣ 1N
[ N∑
i=1
− log p(Xi)
]
−H(X)
∣∣∣∣ < ²} > 1− σ2X′N²2
Pr
{∣∣∣∣ 1N
[
− log(
N∏
i=1
p(Xi))
]
−H(X)
∣∣∣∣ < ²} > 1− σ2X′N²2
Pr
{∣∣∣∣− 1N log(p(XN ))−H(X)
∣∣∣∣ < ²} > 1− σ2X′N²2
Pr
{∣∣∣∣− 1N log(p(XN ))−H(X)
∣∣∣∣ < ²} > 1− ²1,
for N > σ2X′/(²
2²1). ¥
The concept of typicality of a sequence can be extended to joint typicality of two sequences.
Associated with the joint typicality, the joint AEP can be derived for a set of pairs of jointly
typical sequences. These properties are the core of the idea used in the proof of the achievability
of AWGN channel capacity outlined in section 2.5.
Definition 2.7 The set TNX,Y (²) of a jointly typical pair (x
N , yN ) with respect to joint prob-
ability density function p(x, y) and marginal probability density functions p(x) and p(y) is the
set
TNX,Y (²) =
{
(xN , yN ) ∈ XN × YN :
| − 1
N
log p(xN )−H(X)| < ², (2.17)
| − 1
N
log p(yN )−H(Y )| < ², (2.18)
| − 1
N
log p(xN , yN )−H(X,Y )| < ²
}
, (2.19)
where
p(xN , yN ) =
N∏
i=1
p(xi, yi).
Based on the definition of the jointly typical set, various properties of members of the set and
the set can be obtained. Lemma 2.4 bounds the probability, joint probability and conditional
probability of the members of the set. Lemma 2.5 indicates that the probability that a pair of
sequences (xN , yN ) is in the jointly typical set TNX,Y (²) is close to one for sufficiently large N .
Finally, the volume of a jointly typical set is estimated in Lemma 2.6.
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Lemma 2.4 If (xN , yN ) ∈ TNX,Y (²) with respect to probability density function p(x, y) and
marginal probability density functions p(x) and p(y) , then
2−N [H(X)+²] < p(xN ) < 2−N [H(X)−²],
2−N [H(Y )+²] < p(yN ) < 2−N [H(Y )−²],
2−N [H(X,Y )+²] < p(xN , yN ) < 2−N [H(X,Y )−²],
2−N [H(Y |X)+2²] < p(yN |xN ) < 2−N [H(Y |X)−2²].
Proof: Use the definition of the joint typicality as in the proof of Lemma 2.2. ¥
Lemma 2.5 For any ² > 0 and ²1 > 0, there exists an integer N such that Pr{(XN , Y N ) ∈
TNX,Y (²)} > 1− ²1.
Proof: Apply the proof of Lemma 2.3 with X ′ = − log(p(X)), X ′ = − log(p(Y )), and
X ′ = − log(p(X,Y )) to the conditions (2.17), (2.18), and (2.19), respectively, and select N
large enough so that all three conditions are satisfied. ¥
Lemma 2.6 For any ² > 0, there exists an integer N such that (1 − ²)2N [H(X,Y )−²] <
|TNX,Y (²)| < 2N [H(X,Y )+²]
Proof:
1 =
∫
XN×YN
p(xN , yN ) dxN dyN
>
∫
TN
X,Y
(²)
p(xN , yN ) dxN dyN
(1)
>
∫
TN
X,Y
(²)
2−N [H(X,Y )+²] dxN dyN
= |TNX,Y (²)|2−N [H(X,Y )+²]
|TNX,Y (²)| < 2N [H(X,Y )+²],
and
1− ² (2)< Pr{(XN , Y N ) ∈ TNX,Y (²)}
=
∫
TN
X,Y
(²)
p(xN , yN ) dxN dyN
(3)
<
∫
TN
X,Y
(²)
2−N [H(X,Y )−²] dxN dyN
= |TNX,Y (²)|2−N [H(X,Y )−²]
|TNX,Y (²)| > (1− ²)2N [H(X,Y )−²].
(1) follows from Lemma 2.4. (2) follows from Lemma 2.5 for ²1 = ² and sufficiently large N .
(3) follows from Lemma 2.4. ¥
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Lemma 2.5 indicates the probability of a pair of sequences generated i.i.d. according to the
joint probability density function p(x, y) being in TNX,Y (²), which is used to calculate a part of
probability of error in the proof outlined in section 2.5. The other part of the probability of
error is calculated based on Lemma 2.7 stated below.
Lemma 2.7 Let (X˜N , Y˜ N ) be a pair of length-N sequences such that
p(x˜N , y˜N ) =
N∏
i=1
p(x˜i, y˜i),
with marginal probability density functions p(x˜) and p(y˜). If XN and Y N are two independent
i.i.d. sequences of random variables with the marginal probability density functions p(x˜) and
p(y˜), respectively, then
Pr{(XN , Y N ) ∈ TN
X˜,Y˜
(²)} < 2−N [I(X˜;Y˜ )−3²] (2.20)
Pr{(XN , Y N ) ∈ TN
X˜,Y˜
(²)} > (1− ²)2−N [I(X˜;Y˜ )+3²], (2.21)
for sufficiently large N .
Proof:
Pr{(XN , Y N ) ∈ TN
X˜,Y˜
(²)} =
∫
TN
X˜,Y˜
(²)
p(xN , yN ) dxN dyN
(1)
=
∫
TN
X˜,Y˜
(²)
p(xN )p(yN ) dxN dyN
=
∫
TN
X˜,Y˜
(²)
p(x˜N )p(y˜N ) dxN dyN
(2)
>
∫
TN
X˜,Y˜
(²)
2−N [H(X˜)+²]2−N [H(Y˜ )+²] dxN dyN
(3)
> (1− ²)2N [H(X˜,Y˜ )−²]2−N [H(X˜)+²]2−N [H(Y˜ )+²]
= (1− ²)2−N [−H(X˜,Y˜ )+H(X˜)+H(Y˜ )+3²]
(4)
= (1− ²)2−N [I(X˜;Y˜ )+3²]
and
Pr{(XN , Y N ) ∈ TN
X˜,Y˜
(²)} (5)<
∫
TN
X˜,Y˜
(²)
2−N [H(X˜)−²]2−N [H(Y˜ )−²] dxN dyN
(6)
< 2N [H(X˜,Y˜ )+²]2−N [H(X˜)−²]2−N [H(Y˜ )−²]
= 2−N [−H(X˜,Y˜ )+H(X˜)+H(Y˜ )−3²]
(7)
= 2−N [I(X˜;Y˜ )−3²]
(1) follows from the independence of XN and Y N . (2) and (5) follow from Lemma 2.4. (3)
and (6) follow from Lemma 2.6 for sufficiently large N . (4) and (7) follow from equation (2.6).
¥
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Lemma 2.7 gives an estimate of the probability of two sequences generated independently of
each other being jointly typical when each of the sequences is generated i.i.d. according to
the corresponding marginal probability density function associated with the jointly typical set
TN
X˜,Y˜
(²).
2.4 AEP of Gaussian Sequences
In this section, we consider the AEP of Gaussian sequences and draw some characteristics of a
typical Gaussian sequence, a set of pairs of jointly typical Gaussian sequences and its members.
Lemma 2.8 indicates that a typical Gaussian sequence has average power approximately equal
to the variance of the governing distribution. Consequently, a constraint on the average power
of a typical Gaussian sequence can be imposed by specifying the governing distribution as
shown in Lemma 2.9
Lemma 2.8 If XN is a sequence of random variables i.i.d. according to N (0, σ2X), and xN ∈
TNX (²) for any ² > 0, then ∣∣∣∣∣ 〈xN , xN 〉Nσ2X − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ < 2² ln(2).
Proof: From Definition 2.6,
² >
∣∣∣∣∣− 1N log p(xN )−H(X)
∣∣∣∣∣
(1)
=
∣∣∣∣∣− 1N
N∑
i=1
log p(xi)− 1
2
log(2pieσ2x)
∣∣∣∣∣
(2)
=
1
ln(2)
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
[
x2i
2σ2x
+
1
2
ln(2piσ2x)
]
− 1
2
ln(2pieσ2x)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
ln(2)
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
x2i
2σ2x
− 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
ln(2)
∣∣∣∣∣ 〈xN , xN 〉2Nσ2x − 12
∣∣∣∣∣
2² ln(2) >
∣∣∣∣∣ 〈xN , xN 〉Nσ2x − 1
∣∣∣∣∣
(1) follows from equation (2.8). (2) follows from the definition of the Gaussian probability
density function. ¥
Lemma 2.9 Let XN be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables X ∼ N (0, σ2X). If xN ∈ TNX (²),
for any ² > 0, and σ2X ≤ P1+2² ln(2) , then 1N
∑N
i=1 x
2
i ≤ P .
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Proof: Since xN ∈ TNX (²), applying Lemma 2.8 to xN yields∣∣∣∣∣ 〈xN , xN 〉Nσ2X − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ < 2² ln(2)
〈xN , xN 〉
N
< σ2X [1 + 2² ln(2)]
(1)
≤ P
1 + 2² ln(2)
[1 + 2² ln(2)]
1
N
N∑
i=1
x2i ≤ P.
(1) follows from the assumption on σ2X . ¥
The result of Lemma 2.8 is known as the sphere hardening effect, which has a geometrical
interpretation that normalized vector xN = xN/
√
N lies in the shell bounded by the solid lines
depicted in Figure 2.3 if xN is a typical Gaussian sequence.
xN
Sphere of radius σX
Figure 2.3: The locations of normalized typical Gaussian sequences.
An analogue of Lemma 2.8 for a pair of jointly typical Gaussian sequence is given in Lemma
2.10 below.
Lemma 2.10 Let (XN , Y N ) be a pair of sequences of random variables i.i.d. according to joint
probability density function p(x, y), and marginal probability density functions p(x) ∼ N (0, σ2X),
and p(y) ∼ N (0, σ2Y ) , i.e.,
p(x, y) =
1
2piσXσY
√
1− %2 exp
{
− 1
2(1− %2)
[
x2
σ2X
− 2%xy
σXσY
+
y2
σ2Y
]}
,
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where % = E[XY ]/(σXσY ) is an associated correlation coefficient. If (x
N , yN ) ∈ TNX,Y (²) for
any ² > 0, then ∣∣∣∣∣ 〈xN , xN 〉Nσ2X − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ < 2² ln(2),∣∣∣∣∣ 〈yN , yN 〉Nσ2Y − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ < 2² ln(2),∣∣∣∣∣ 〈xN , yN 〉N%σXσY − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ < ( 3%2 − 1)² ln(2).
Proof: The first two inequalities follows from applying Lemma 2.8 to the conditions (2.17)
and (2.18), respectively. Considering the condition (2.19) with |KXY | = σ2Xσ2Y (1 − %2), we
have
² >
∣∣∣∣∣− 1N log p(xN , yN )−H(X,Y )
∣∣∣∣∣
(1)
=
∣∣∣∣∣− 1N
N∑
i=1
log p(xi, yi)− 1
2
log((2pie)2|KXY |)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
ln(2)
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
[
1
2(1− %2)
(
x2i
σ2X
− 2%xiyi
σXσY
+
y2i
σ2Y
)
+ ln(2piσXσY
√
1− %2)
]
− ln(2pieσXσY
√
1− %2)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
ln(2)
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
[
1
2(1− %2)
(
x2i
σ2X
− 2%xiyi
σXσY
+
y2i
σ2Y
)]
+ ln(2piσXσY
√
1− %2)− ln(2pieσXσY
√
1− %2)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
ln(2)
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
[
1
2(1− %2)
(
x2i
σ2X
− 2%xiyi
σXσY
+
y2i
σ2Y
)]
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
(1− %2) ln(2)
∣∣∣∣∣ 12N
N∑
i=1
x2i
σ2X
+
1
2N
N∑
i=1
y2i
σ2Y
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
%xiyi
σXσY
− (1− %2)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
(1− %2) ln(2)
∣∣∣∣∣
[
〈xN , xN 〉
2Nσ2X
− 1
2
]
+
[
〈yN , yN 〉
2Nσ2Y
− 1
2
]
−
[
%〈xN , yN 〉
NσXσY
− %2
]∣∣∣∣∣.
(1) follows from equation (2.9) for two random variables. Applying Lemma 2.8 to the last
inequality above, we have∣∣∣∣∣%〈xN , yN 〉NσXσY − %2
∣∣∣∣∣ < (1− %2)² ln(2) + 2² ln(2)∣∣∣∣∣ 〈xN , yN 〉N%σXσY − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ < ( 3%2 − 1)² ln(2).
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¥
In Lemma 2.11 and Lemma 2.12, a special setup, in which UN = XN+αV N for a real constant
α, and XN and V N are independent Gaussian sequences, is considered. This setup will be
useful in the coding strategy used to mitigate an interference in the channel as employed in
Chapter 4.
Lemma 2.11 Let XN and V N be two independent sequences of i.i.d. random variables X ∼
N (0, σ2X), and V ∼ N (0, σ2V ), respectively. Let UN = XN + αV N for a constant real number
α. If (uN , vN ) ∈ TNU,V (²), for any ² > 0, then uN − αvN = xN ∈ TNX (2²), and
∣∣∣∣∣ 〈xN , vN 〉N
∣∣∣∣∣ < ² ln(2)α [3σ2X + 2α2σ2V ].
Proof: Since XN and V N are two independent sequences of i.i.d. Gaussian random variables,
UN is a sequence of i.i.d. Gaussian random variables drawn according to N (0, σ2X + α2σ2V ).
(See [7] and [10].)
Applying the condition (2.19) under the assumption that (uN , vN ) ∈ TNU,V (²) to obtain
²
(1)
>
∣∣∣∣− 1N log p(uN , vN )−H(U, V )
∣∣∣∣
(2)
=
∣∣∣∣− 1N log p(uN , vN )−H(V )−H(U |V )
∣∣∣∣
(3)
=
∣∣∣∣− 1N log p(uN , vN )−H(V )−H(X)
∣∣∣∣
2²
(1)
>
∣∣∣∣− 1N log p(uN , vN ) + 1N log p(vN )−H(X)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣− 1N log p(uN |vN )−H(X)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣− 1N log p(xN )−H(X)
∣∣∣∣.
(1) follows from Definition 2.7. (2) follows from equation (2.2). (3) follows from the indepen-
dence between X and V .
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To show the second part of the Lemma, we begin with the fact that xN ∈ TNX (2²). By Lemma
2.8,
4² ln(2) >
∣∣∣∣∣ 〈xN , xN 〉Nσ2X − 1
∣∣∣∣∣
4σ2X² ln(2) >
∣∣∣∣∣ 〈uN − αvN , uN − αvN 〉 −Nσ2XN
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 〈uN , uN 〉+ α2〈vN , vN 〉 − 2α〈uN , vN 〉 −Nσ2XN
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 〈uN , uN 〉+ α2〈vN , vN 〉 − 2α〈xN , vN 〉 − 2α2〈vN , vN 〉 −Nσ2XN
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
[
〈uN , uN 〉 −Nσ2U
N
]
−
[
α2〈vN , vN 〉 −Nα2σ2V
N
]
−
[
2α〈xN , vN 〉 −Nσ2U +Nα2σ2V +Nσ2X
N
]∣∣∣∣∣.
Applying Lemma 2.8 to the first two terms in the sum to obtain
4σ2X² ln(2) + 2σ
2
U ² ln(2) + 2α
2σ2V ² ln(2) >
∣∣∣∣∣
[
2α〈xN , vN 〉 −Nσ2U +Nα2σ2V +Nσ2X
N
]∣∣∣∣∣
2² ln(2)[2σ2X + σ
2
U + α
2σ2V ]
(4)
>
∣∣∣∣∣
[
2α〈xN , vN 〉
N
]∣∣∣∣∣
² ln(2)
α
[3σ2X + 2α
2σ2V ] >
∣∣∣∣∣ 〈xN , vN 〉N
∣∣∣∣∣.
(4) follows from the fact that σ2U = σ
2
X + α
2σ2V . ¥
Note that the second part of Lemma 2.11 implies that the normalized versions of the vectors
xN and vN are almost orthogonal.
Lemma 2.12 Let XN and V N be two independent sequences of i.i.d. random variables X ∼
N (0, σ2X), and V ∼ N (0, σ2V ), respectively. Let UN = XN + αV N for a constant real number
α. If (uN , vN ) ∈ TNU,V (²), for any ² > 0, and σ2X ≤ P1+4² ln(2) , then 1N
∑N
i=1 x
2
i ≤ P .
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Proof: Applying Lemma 2.11 to the pair (uN , vN ) implies that xN ∈ TNX (2²). Applying
Lemma 2.8 to xN with 2² yields∣∣∣∣∣ 〈xN , xN 〉Nσ2X − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ < 4² ln(2)
〈xN , xN 〉
N
< σ2X [1 + 4² ln(2)]
≤ P
1 + 4² ln(2)
[1 + 4² ln(2)]
1
N
N∑
i=1
x2i ≤ P.
¥
2.5 Achievability of the AWGN Channel Capacity
The proof of the achievability of the average power constraint AWGN channel given in [6] is
outlined here. It uses the random coding strategy with joint typicality decoding. The channel
is depicted in Figure 2.2 with the average power constraint on the input:
1
N
N∑
i=1
x2i ≤ P.
The coding strategy is described below:
1. Generating the codebook. Generate a codebook consisting of 2NR codewords Xc with
each element i.i.d. according to a normal distribution with variance P/(1 + 2² ln(2)),
where R is the rate of transmission. Uniquely associate a message w with the codeword
Xc(w). Distribute the codebook to the sender and the recipient.
2. Encoding. To send a message w, transmit the codeword Xc(w) in the codebook.
3. Decoding. The recipient looks for a codeword in the codebook that is jointly typical
with the received vector. If there is one and only one such codeword, declare it to be
the transmitted codeword. Otherwise, declare an error. An error is also declared if the
codeword does not satisfy the power constraint.
A jointly typical decoder is not optimal in term of minimizing the probability of error, but it is
simple to analyze and achieves all rates below capacity. The decoder works based on the AEP
of long sequences of i.i.d. random variables. We note that there are two types of error that can
occur in the above process. The first type of error occurs when the codeword does not satisfy
the power constraint, and the second type of error occurs during the decoding process. The
decoding error may happen when the decoder cannot identify the transmitted codeword from
the received vector or when a wrong codeword is identified as the transmitted codeword.
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In the achievability proof of the channel capacity, the probability distribution governing the
input to the channel is chosen to be the channel capacity achieving distribution, which is the
Gaussian distribution in case of AWGN channel. In this way, the channel capacity is achieved.
To cope with the error events in the coding process, the channel is utilized repeatedly N
times. When N is allowed to be sufficiently large, WLLN comes into effect, and the sequences
considered in the coding scheme are very likely to be typical sequences. Lemma 2.3 and Lemma
2.9 are used to bound the probability of error of the first type. Lemma 2.5 and Lemma 2.7
are used to bound the probability of error of the second type. Given a required probability of
error, the length of the sequences N is bounded from below via the four lemmas.
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Chapter 3
Code Partitioning and Its
Applications
3.1 Introduction
In a basic scenario of digital communication, a channel code is designed to achieve a reliable
communication between a sender and a recipient at a high rate. The code described in section
2.5 of the previous chapter is, for instance, designed for a reliable communication via the
AWGN channel with average input power constraint between a sender and a recipient at the
rate close to the channel capacity. As the communication scenario becomes more sophisticated,
the coding strategy must be adapted accordingly.
In this chapter, we investigate the concept and the roles of code partitioning in three situations:
the broadcast channels in section 3.2, the wiretap channels in sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, and
the dirty-paper channel in section 3.6. The uses of the code-partitioning concept in the three
situations are subsequently compared and contrasted in section 3.7. This concept will be used
in the coding strategy for the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information to be introduced
in Chapter 4.
3.2 Broadcast Channels
The broadcast channels, introduced in [4] by Cover, involves one sender and multiple recipients.
The sender is interested in simultaneously and reliably sending multiple messages to multiple
recipients at high rates via a broadcast channel, which takes one input and produces multiple
outputs, each of which corresponds to a recipient. For simplicity, the two-recipient discrete-time
memoryless broadcast channel defined in [5] is considered and simply referred to as broadcast
channel.
The broadcast channel consists of an input alphabet X and two output alphabets Y1 and Y2
23
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and probability transition function p(yN1 , y
N
2 |xN ) such that
p(yN1 , y
N
2 |xN ) =
N∏
i=1
p(y1i, y2i|xi).
Assuming that the decoding at the two recipients are done independently, only the knowledge
of the marginal distributions, p1(y1|x) and p2(y2|x), are required.
Y N1
-
- -
-
­
®
ª
©
­
®
ª
©
encoder
XN
Y N2
(S1, S2)sender recipient 1
recipient 2
p1(y
N
1 |xN)-
p2(y
N
2 |xN)
Figure 3.1: The broadcast channel.
Let (S1, S2) be a pair of independent messages, with S1 intended for recipient 1 and S2 intended
for recipient 2, selected uniformly over {1, 2, . . . , 2NR1}×{1, 2, . . . , 2NR2}. The message pair is
encoded into a codeword XN as the input of the broadcast channel using an (N, (2NR1 , 2NR2))
code for the broadcast channel with independent messages. Hence, R1 and R2 are the rates of
transmission to recipients 1 and 2, respectively. Recipient 1 decodes Y N1 as Sˆ1, and recipient
2 decodes Y N2 as Sˆ2. An error occurs if at least one of the recipients decodes incorrectly, i.e.,
Pe =
∑
(s1,s2)∈S1×S2
Pr{(S1, S2) = (s1, s2)}Pr{Sˆ1 6= s1 or Sˆ2 6= s2}.
A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable for the broadcast channel if there exists a sequence
of (N, (2NR1 , 2NR2)) codes with Pe → 0 as N →∞, and the capacity region of the broadcast
channel is the closure of the set of all achievable rates.
The coding strategy known as time-sharing strategy makes use of two codes: C1 designed for
channel p1(y1|x) and C2 designed for channel p2(y2|x), and time slot allocation to the two
recipients. In the time slots allocated to recipient 1, the code C1 is used to encode S1, and in
the time slots allocated to recipient 2, the code C2 is used to encode S2. By varying the time
slot allocation and the codes, an achievable region for the this strategy can be derived.
An alternative coding strategy for superimposing messages via code partitioning was proposed
by Cover in [4] to enlarge the achievable region associated with the time-sharing strategy. The
use of the code partitioning for broadcast channel is most salient in the degraded case of the
broadcast channel, whose transition probability can be expressed as
p(y2|x) =
∑
y1∈Y1
p(y1|x)p˜(y2|y1). (3.1)
Two elucidating examples of degraded broadcast channels are given here to illustrate the use
of the code partitioning to superimpose messages.
Binary Symmetric Broadcast Channel [4].
Let the input alphabet be X = {0, 1} and the output alphabets for recipients 1 and 2 be
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Y1 = {0, 1} and Y2 = {0, 1}, respectively. Let channel 1 be noiseless and channel 2 be a binary
symmetric channel with cross-over probability p. The corresponding channel capacities are
C1 = 1 bit per transmission and C2(p) = 1 − h(p) bits per transmission, where h(p) is the
binary entropy function. The binary symmetric broadcast channel is a degraded broadcast
channel since the condition (3.1) is satisfied.
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Figure 3.2: The binary symmetric broadcast channel.
The rate pair (R1, R2) = (C2(p), C2(p)) can be achieved using a standard (2
N [C2(p)−²], N) code
for channel 2 while the pair (1, 0) can be achieved with no coding. By time-sharing the two
strategies, the rate pairs on the straight line connecting the two points can be achieved, i.e.,
the points (t1C1, t2C2(p)) can be achieved for all {t1, t2} such that t1, t2 ≥ 0 and t1 + t2 = 1.
The code-partitioning strategy based on a good code selected from a randomly generated
ensemble of codes and a minimum distance decoding rule can be used to enlarge the achievable
rate region. The idea is to have two kinds of messages. A common message is communicated
to both recipients 1 and 2 while an additional message is communicated to only recipient 1.
In this way, the message intended for recipient 1 contains both the common message and the
additional message whereas the message intended for recipient 2 contains only the common
message.
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Figure 3.3: The codebook for the degraded broadcast channel
The strategy uses an auxiliary code Caux and a satellite code Csat. The auxiliary code is
designed for a BSC with cross-over probability pq¯+ p¯q to be used at rate C2(pq¯+ p¯q)−², where
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0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1 p¯ = 1− p, and C2(pq¯ + p¯q) is the capacity of the channel. Based on the auxiliary
code, the satellite code is designed so that all the vectors with Hamming distance qN from an
auxiliary codeword are grouped into a partition, where N is the length of the codewords. There
consequently are 2N [C2(pq¯+p¯q)−²] partitions in the satellite code, and each partition contains(
N
qN
)
satellite codewords. Each auxiliary codeword is uniquely assigned to a common message,
and each satellite codeword in a partition is uniquely assigned to an additional message.
To send a pair of messages, use the common message to select an auxiliary codeword uN , and
use the additional message to select a satellite codeword xN in the partition associated with the
common message. Transmit the selected satellite codeword xN through the broadcast channel.
Recipient 2 receives the vector yN2 and perceives it as the auxiliary codeword passing through
2 BSCs. The first one is the virtual BSC with cross-over probability q, resulting from the noise
introduced by translation of the auxiliary codeword to the satellite codeword specified by the
additional message. The second one is the BSC with cross-over probability p in the broadcast
channel. Recipient 2 can reliably decode for the common message because the auxiliary code is
designed for the cascaded channel. Recipient 1 receives the transmitted satellite codeword as
yN1 without error and therefore can decode for both the common message and the additional
message.
Since the indices to the auxiliary codewords and the satellite codewords can be selected in-
dependently, the rates R1 = C2(pq¯ + p¯q) + log[
(
N
qN
)
]/N − ² ≈ C2(pq¯ + p¯q) + h(q) − ² and
R2 = C2(pq¯ + p¯q)− ² can be simultaneously achieved.
Gaussian Broadcast Channel [4].
The Gaussian variant of the broadcast channel is the case, in which channels 1 and 2 in the
broadcast channel contain AWGN with means zero and variances N1 and N2, respectively.
Without loss of generality, let N1 < N2. Let there be an average power constraint on the
transmission power given by
1
N
N∑
i=1
x2i ≤ P,
where xN is an input sequence. Channels 1 and 2 thus have the capacities of C1 =
1
2 log(1 +
P/N1), and C2 =
1
2 log(1 + P/N2), respectively. The Gaussian broadcast channel is also
a degraded broadcast channel. The rate pairs (C1, 0), (C2, C2) and the pairs resulting from
time-sharing the two codes are achievable by the same arguments used in the binary symmetric
broadcast channel.
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Figure 3.4: The Gaussian broadcast channel.
The achievable rate region of the Gaussian broadcast channel produced by the time-sharing
strategy can also be enlarged by the use of the code-partitioning strategy as follows. Let’s
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distribute power q¯P to the transmission of the common message intended for both recipients
1 and 2 and qP to the transmission of the additional message intended for recipient 1; hence,
recipient 2 perceives the power qP as additional noise power added to N2, where q and q¯ are
constants to be specified such that q + q¯ = 1.
Let Caux be an auxiliary code designed for an AWGN channel with average input power
constraint q¯P and noise variance qP+N2 at rate C2(q¯P, qP+N2)−², where C2(q¯P, qP+N2) is
the capacity of the AWGN channel. Let Csat be a satellite code designed for the second AWGN
channel with average input power constraint qP and noise variance N1 at rate C1(qP,N1)− ²,
where C1(qP,N1) is the capacity of the second AWGN channel.
To send a pair of messages, use the common message to select an auxiliary codeword uN in
Caux, and use the additional message to select a satellite codeword xN in Csat. Transmit
uN + xN through the broadcast channel. Recipient 2 receives the vector yN2 and perceives it
as the auxiliary codeword passing through two AWGN channels. The first one is the virtual
AWGN channel with noise power qP , resulting from the noise introduced by the addition of
xN to uN . The second one is the AWGN channel with noise power N2.
Recipient 2 can reliably decode the received vector yN2 for u
N and the common message because
the auxiliary code is designed for the cascaded channel. Similarly, recipient 1 can reliably
decode the received vector yN1 for u
N because N1 < N2 and subsequently decode the vector
yN1 − uN for xN and the additional message. Hence, recipient 2 can reliably decode for the
common message at rate
R2 =
1
2
log
[
1 +
q¯P
qP +N2
]
− ².
Recipient 1 can reliable decode for both the common and the addition messages at rate
R1 =
1
2
log
[
1 +
q¯P
qP +N2
]
+
1
2
log
[
1 +
qP
N1
]
− 2².
Varying the power distribution factor q yields the rate pairs dominating the time-sharing rate
pairs.
The capacity region for the degraded broadcast channel, proved by Bergmans in [1] and [2] by
Gallager in [11], coincides with the regions in the above two cases. The capacity region of the
general broadcast channel is still unknown.
3.3 Wiretap Channel
Communication through a wiretap channel is another interesting situation, in which the code-
partitioning strategy can be used, though in a different way for a different purpose from those
in the broadcast channel. The wiretap channel was introduced and investigated by Wyner in
[20]. In this communication model, a message is communicated through a discrete memoryless
main channel subjected to a wiretapper observing the output of the main channel through
another discrete memoryless wiretap channel. A system designer seeks to encode the message
so that it can be transmitted reliably at a high rate to a recipient and is kept secret from the
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wiretapper. This model can be thought of as a type of broadcast channel with a different design
objective of maximizing the rate to the recipient and minimizing the rate to the wiretapper,
as opposed to maximizing the two rates. The secrecy of the message is measured by using the
concept of equivocation.
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Figure 3.5: The wiretap channel.
Let SK ∈ SK be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables representing a message with entropy
H(SK) = KH(S) to be encoded as XN ∈ XN , which is the input to the main channel.
Y N ∈ YN is the output of the main channel received by the intended recipient and is observed
by the wiretapper through the wiretap channel as ZN ∈ ZN , where S,X,Y,Z are finite sets.
Let sˆK ∈ SK be the message decoded by the recipient from Y N . The rate of communication
to the recipient is defined as H(SK)/N , and the equivocation to the wiretapper is defined
as ∆ = H(SK |ZN )/K. When the equivocation is H(SK)/K, the perfect secrecy is achieved,
which means that SK and ZN are independent, and the wiretapper is not better off in detecting
the message SK given the observation ZN . A rate-equivocation pair (R, d) is said to be
achievable if, for all ² > 0, there exists an encoder-decoder pair for which
H(SK)
N
≥ R− ²
H(SK |ZN )
K
≥ d− ²
Pe ≤ ²,
where
Pe = Pr{SˆK 6= SK}.
Denoting the capacity of the main channel by CM = suppX I(X;Y ) and the capacity of the
combined (main-wiretap) channel by CMW = suppX I(X;Z), Wyner proved that the capacity
region is
R¯ =
{
(R, d) : 0 ≤ R ≤ CM , 0 ≤ d ≤ H(S
K)
K
,Rd ≤ H(S
K)
K
Γ(R)
}
,
where
Γ(R) = sup
pX∈P(R)
I(X;Y |Z),
P(R) = {pX : I(X;Y ) ≥ R for R ≥ 0}.
The coding strategy that is used to prove the region is illustrated for the rate-equivocation
pair (Cs, H(S
K)/K) here, where Cs is the maximum achievable rate in perfect secrecy =
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max(R,H(SK)/K)∈R¯R. To begin, design a code C
1 that achieves the capacity of the main
channel so that there are 2N [CM−²] codewords for a given ² > 0. Then partition the code
C1 into subcodes so that each subcode can be used for communication through the combined
channel at rate CMW − ². There are 2N [Cs−²] subcodes, where Cs = CM − CMW .
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Figure 3.6: Coloring the codewords. R,G,B,O,Y represent the colors red, green, blue, orange
and yellow, respectively.
We can uniquely assign a color to each subcode so that all the codewords in the same subcode
has the same color. Let each color represent a message for the intended recipient. To send a
message, the encoder randomly selects one of 2N [CMW−²] codewords in the subcode associated
with the message to be transmitted. The recipient can reliably detect the codeword; thereby
identifying the color or the codeword and the message. The wiretapper can also reliably detect
the transmitted codeword provided the knowledge of the subcode because each subcode is a
code for the combined channel. However, the subcode being used cannot then be identified by
the wiretapper for all the subcodes are possible given the wiretapper’s observation resulting in
the perfect secrecy of the message. An example of the code based on this coding strategy is
given for a special case of the wiretap channel in the next section.
3.4 Wiretap Channel II
The wiretap channel II is a special case of the wiretap channel with a more powerful wiretapper
in that the main channel is noiseless (XN = Y N ), and the wiretapper can examine a size-
µ subset of the codeword components of his choice. For the choice of a subset τ c of the
components of a codeword, Zµ = XNτc , where τ
c ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}, |τ c| = µ and XNτc is the
length-µ vector containing components of XN indexed by the members of τ c, and members of
τ c are always in an increasing order.
Ozarow and Wyner examined this situation, in which all the random variables have binary
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alphabets in [16] by redefining the equivocation to be
∆ = min
τc:|τc|=µ
H(SK |Zµ).
The minimization in the definition of the equivocation reflects the best that the wiretapper can
do. A system designer tries to find a coding scheme that provides an optimal tradeoff between
the rate of transmission and the equivocation. In this case, the code-partitioning strategy is
used together with group codes to prove the rate-equivocation capacity region for the channel
given the wiretapper’s capability parameter µ.
The coding strategy makes use of a K ×N binary parity-check matrix AK×N to send a K-bit
message using an N -bit codeword. To send a message sK , the encoder solves the simultaneous
equations sT = AxT for a set of possible xT and randomly selects one of the solutions to
be transmitted, where sT = (sK)T , and xT = (xN )T . The intended recipient calculates sK
from yN and A without error because the main channel is noiseless. The set of solutions to
sT = AxT is a partition of length-N vectors in the N -dimensional space corresponding to the
message sK and a color as described in the previous section.
We now illustrate the partitioning of a code for communicating 2-bit information using 3-bit
codewords. Let a code C1 = {000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, 111}, and colors red, green, blue,
and yellow correspond to information 00, 01, 10 and 11, respectively. Let’s partition the code
C1 by using the matrix A so that the subcode corresponding to a message sK1 is the set of
solution to sT1 = Ax
T . For
A =
[
1 0 1
0 1 1
]
,
and the corresponding partition is
color message codewords
red 00 000, 111
green 01 010, 101
blue 10 011, 100
yellow 11 001, 110
Hence, there are four subcodes. The red, green, blue and yellow subcodes respectively are
{000, 111}, {010, 101}, {011, 100}, {001, 110}. When the message to be sent is 11, the encoder
randomly selects either 001 or 110 to be transmitted over the noiseless channel, and the recipient
correctly decodes for the message. If the wiretapper observes the first two positions of the
transmitted codeword, there are two possible messages (00 and 11) corresponding to 1 bit of
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uncertainty about the message. A theoretical analysis of the uncertainty is given in Chapter
6.
Given the parameter µ, a triple (R,α, d) is achievable if, for all ² > 0 and all integers N0 > 0,
there exists an encoder-decoder pair with parameters N ≥ N0, K ≥ (R − ²)N , µ ≥ (α− ²)N ,
∆ ≥ (d − ²)K, and Pe ≤ ². The capacity region was given by the set of (R,α, d) such that
0 ≤ R,α ≤ 1, and
0 ≤ d ≤
{
1, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1−R,
1−α
R , for 1−R ≤ α ≤ 1.
3.5 Gaussian Wiretap Channel
The Gaussian wiretap channel is another variant of the wiretap channel. The main and the
wiretap channels are AWGN channels with i.i.d. noise distributions η1 ∼ N (0, σ2η1) and η2 ∼
N (0, σ2η2), respectively. The message SK ∈ SK has finite alphabet. The input XN to the main
Y N
h
- -
-
?
?
-
-
encoder
ηN2
ηN1
XN
ZN
sender
SK
wiretapper
h recipient
Figure 3.8: The Gaussian wiretap channel.
channel has continuous alphabet with an average power constraint:
1
N
N∑
i=1
E[X2i ] ≤ P.
The capacities of the main channel and the combined channel CM and CMW respectively are
CM =
1
2
log
[
1 +
P
σ2η1
]
CMW =
1
2
log
[
1 +
P
σ2η1 + σ
2
η2
]
.
Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman modified the definition of the equivocation so that ∆ =
H(SK |ZN )/H(SK) and proved the capacity region of the Gaussian wiretap channel in [14].
The achievability part was proved by time-sharing two codes respectively achieving the rate-
equivocation pairs (CM , Cs/CM ) and (Cs, 1), where Cs = CM − CMW . The first code is
designed to achieve the capacity of the main channel as if the wiretapper is absent. The second
code is selected from a code ensemble with the following properties to ensure that almost all
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codes in the ensemble achieve the pair (Cs, 1) and satisfy the average power constraint, where
² > 0:
1. each code in the ensemble has message rate Cs − ²;
2. components of each codeword are i.i.d. random variables with distribution N (0, P − α),
where α > 0 is chosen so that
• CM (α) = 12 log(1 + (P − α)/σ2η1) > CM − ²;
• CMW (α) = 12 log(1 + (P − α)/(σ2η1 + σ2η2)) > CMW − ².
The capacity of the channel was proved to be the set of rate-equivocation pairs (R, d) satisfying
the conditions:
R ≤ CM
d ≤ 1
Rd ≤ Cs.
3.6 Dirty-paper Channel
Unlike the broadcast channels and the wiretap channels, the dirty-paper channel usually in-
volves one sender and one recipient without any wiretapper. The sender wishes to send a
message to a recipient through an AWGN channel with i.i.d. noise η1 ∼ N (0, σ2η1) and additive
i.i.d. interference V ∼ N (0, σ2V ). With the complete knowledge of the interference sequence
V N in advance, the sender seeks to encode his message into an appropriate codeword for the
channel. This is a special case of the channel with random parameters investigated in [12] by
Gel’fand and Pinsker.
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Figure 3.9: The dirty-paper channel.
In [3], Costa proposed a coding scheme that compensates for the interference so that it, when
known in advance to the encoder, does not degrade the rate of transmission. The capacity of
the dirty-paper channel is
Cdirty =
1
2
log
[
1 +
P
σ2η1
]
.
The capacity is achieved by making use of an auxiliary random variable U ∼ N (0, P +α2σ2V ),
where α is a real number. The codebook in the coding scheme consists of 2N [Cdirty−²] bins,
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each of which contains 2N [I(U ;V )+²/2] auxiliary codewords uN generated i.i.d. from U . Each
bin is associated with a message. To send a message sK , the encoder looks for an auxiliary
codeword in the bin associated with the message that is jointly typical with the interference
vN . The corresponding codeword is calculated as xN = uN − αvN to be transmitted. The
recipient observes yN = xN + vN + ηN1 and looks for an auxiliary codeword u
N that is jointly
typical with yN . The recipient declares the bin containing the auxiliary codeword uN as the
detected message. For sufficiently large N , the message can be communicated reliably at the
rate close to the capacity.
In this situation, the auxiliary codeword is used to convey the message and sufficient informa-
tion about the interference to the recipient so that he can detect the message reliably. The
binning in this codebook is similar to the color assignment in the codebook for the wiretap
channel: that is each bin corresponds to a color (message); however, the selection of code-
word in this situation depends on the interference as opposed to being random in the wiretap
channel.
3.7 Remarks
Even though the broadcast, wiretap and dirty-paper situations posses different communication
objectives, the code-partitioning strategy can be used in different ways to attain the goals. The
purposes and the usages of code partitioning are tabulated in Table 3.1. This coding strategy
will be used to prove an achievable rate-equivocation region for the Gaussian wiretap channel
with side information in the next chapter.
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Channel Usage of code partitioning Codeword
Broadcast • An auxiliary codeword representing
the center of a cloud is used as an in-
dex to a code partition.
• Each codeword is a satellite associ-
ated with a center of a cloud.
• The partition index is a common
message to both recipient 1 and re-
cipient 2.
• The satellite codewords associated
with the same cloud tend to stay close
together.
• The distance between a satellite
codeword and its cloud center is an
additional noise for recipient 2.
Wiretap • A subcode (partition) index is asso-
ciated with a color.
• The codewords, associated with the
message, not being transmitted are
used to confuse the wiretapper.
• Each partition index represents a
message to the recipient.
• The codewords associated with the
same message tend to spread out.
Dirty Paper • A subcode (partition) index is asso-
ciated with a color.
• The codewords associated with the
message being transmitted are used
to convey information about the in-
terference to the recipient.
• Each partition index represents a
message to the recipient.
• The codewords associated with the
same message tends to spread out.
Table 3.1: Comparison of the code-partitioning uses for different channels.
Chapter 4
Gaussian Wiretap Channel with
Side Information
4.1 Introduction
The Gaussian wiretap channel (GWC) is extended to the Gaussian wiretap channel with side
information (GWCSI) in this chapter. For the analysis of the two models, we introduce leakage
functions and propose three modes of operation of a perfect-secrecy coding strategy based on
the code-partitioning concept. The interference-free mode is used for the GWC and used as
the foundation for the camouflage and the high-power modes developed for the GWCSI. The
camouflage and the high-power modes play crucial roles in the proof of an achievable region
for the GWCSI.
4.2 Gaussian Wiretap Channel
Although the capacity region of the GWC was proved in [14], a specific encoding-decoding tech-
nique was not provided. In this section, we introduce the interference-free mode of operation,
which includes codebook generating, encoding and decoding processes.
4.2.1 Model Description
Let SK be a finite-alphabet message and Xc be the codeword generated from S
K by an
encoding process with an average power constraint P . Let Y N = Xc+η
N
1 , and Z
N = Y N +ηN2
be outputs of the main channel and the wiretap channel, where ηN1 and η
N
2 are sequences
of independent random variables identically distributed according to N (0, N1) and N (0, N2),
respectively. Hence, the capacities of the main channel and the combined channel respectively
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are:
CM =
1
2
log
[
P +N1
N1
]
CMW =
1
2
log
[
P +N1 +N2
N1 +N2
]
,
and the secret capacity is defined as
Cs = CM − CMW = 1
2
log
[
(P +N1)(N1 +N2)
N1(P +N1 +N2)
]
.
The recipient decodes the output of the main channel Y N for SˆK at rate K/N with probability
of error
Pe = Pr{SˆK 6= SK}
and equivocation H(SK |ZN )/H(SK). We say that the rate-equivocation pair (R, d) is achiev-
able if, for a given ² > 0, there exists an encoder-decoder pair such that
H(SK)
N
≥ R− ²
H(SK |ZN )
H(SK)
≥ d− ²
Pe ≤ ².
4.2.2 Leakage Function
The mutual information I(X;Y ) is the average information rate from an input X to an output
Y through a channel p(Y |X). In the GWC, there are one input X and two outputs: Y at the
recipient and Z at the wiretapper. I(X;Y ) is the average information between the encoder and
the recipient while I(X;Z) is that between the encoder and the wiretapper. Hence, I(X;Z)
can be defined as the leakage function for the GWC, which corresponds to average information
leakage rate from the main channel through the wiretap channel.
4.2.3 Interference-free Mode
The design of the interference-free mode of operation is based on the code-partitioning concept
introduced in Chapter 3, the leakage function and the jointly typical decoder. The interference-
free mode is defined by codebook generating, encoding and decoding processes. The main
idea is to partition a code designed for the main channel so that each partition is a code
for the combined (main-wiretap) channel, which can be used to communicate at the average
information leakage rate.
To describe the interference-free mode, we make use of random variables X˜, Y˜ and Z˜ to de-
termine the sizes of the codebook and the partitions. Now, the random variables involved are
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defined as follows:
X˜ ∼ N (0, P ), Y˜ ∼ N (0, P +N1), Z˜ ∼ N (0, P +N1 +N2)
X ∼ N (0, P ′), Y ∼ N (0, P ′ +N1), Z ∼ N (0, P ′ +N1 +N2)
Xc represents the output of the codeword selection process,
where P ′ = P (1 + 2δ ln(2))−1 < P and δ > 0.
Let X˜N , Y˜ N , Z˜N be sequences of i.i.d. Gaussian random variables X˜, Y˜ and Z˜, respectively.
Given an ² > 0, let δ be a constant associated with the encoding and decoding processes, and
ξ be a constant associated with the wiretapper’s decoding process to be specified later. Then,
the interference-free mode can be described as follows:
1. Generating the codebook. Generate 2N [I(X˜;Y˜ )−2²] sequences xN according to the dis-
tribution p(xN ) =
∏N
i=1 p(xi), and p(xi) ∼ N (0, P ′) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. Place
the sequences xN randomly into bins so that each bin contains 2N [I(X˜;Z˜)−²] sequences,
creating 2N [I(X˜;Y˜ )−I(X˜;Z˜)−²] bins. Index each bin by j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2NR}, where R =
I(X˜; Y˜ )− I(X˜; Z˜)− ². The codebook is given to the sender and the recipient.
2. Encoding. To send a message j, the sender randomly selects a sequence xc in bin j such
that xc ∈ TNX (δ) to be transmitted.
3. Decoding. To decode the received sequence for the message, the recipient finds a sequence
xc in the codebook that is jointly typical with the received sequence y
N , i.e., (xc, y
N ) ∈
TNX,Y (δ). Declare the index to the bin, in which the sequence is found as the received
message.
4. Wiretapper’s decoding. The wiretapper receives a sequence zN and finds a sequence xc in
the codebook that is jointly typical with the received sequence, i.e., (xc, z
N ) ∈ TNX,Z(ξ).
Declare the index to the bin, in which the sequence is found as the received message.
5. Probability of error. An error occurs in the coding process when a message j is to be
transmitted and one or more of the following events occurs.
• EX(j): in the encoding process, there is no sequence xc in bin j that satisfies the
power constraint.
• EY 1(j): in the decoding process, there is no sequence xc in the codebook that is
jointly typical with the received sequence.
• EY 2(j): in the decoding process, a sequence xc in bin i 6= j is jointly typical with
the received sequence.
Note that this mode of operation is an analogue of the coding strategy used in the wiretap
channel for the Gaussian wiretap channel . In Theorem 4.1, we prove the achievability of the
rate-equivocation pair (Cs, 1) for the GWC using the interference-free mode.
Theorem 4.1 Given the interference-free mode to be used in the Gaussian wiretap channel
with average power constraint P , for any ² > 0, there exists an integer Nmin such that, for
38 CHAPTER 4. GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH SIDE INFORMATION
                                                      
2N [I(X˜;Z˜)−²] codewords per bin
2N [I(X˜;Y˜ )−2²] codewords per codebook
Number of bins = 2N [I(X˜,Y˜ )−I(X˜;Z˜)−²]
Figure 4.1: The codebook in the interference-free mode for the Gaussian wiretap channel.
N ≥ Nmin,
H(SK)
N
≥ 1
2
log
[
(P +N1)(N1 +N2)
N1(P +N1 +N2)
]
− ²
H(SK |ZN )
H(SK)
≥ 1− ²
Pe ≤ ².
Proof: This proof consists of three main parts: proof of the rate, proof of the probability of
error, and proof of the equivocation.
Proof of the Rate. Given ² > 0, the number of messages that can be sent is the number of bins
in the codebook: 2H(S
K) = 2NR = 2N [I(X˜;Y˜ )−I(X˜;Z˜)−²]. Hence, by the design of the codebook,
R ,
H(SK)
N
= I(X˜; Y˜ )− I(X˜; Z˜)− ²
=
1
2
log
[
P +N1
N1
]
− 1
2
log
[
P +N1 +N2
N1 +N2
]
− ²
=
1
2
log
[
(P +N1)(N1 +N2)
N1(P +N1 +N2)
]
− ².
Proof of the probability of error. The probability of error is bounded by the probabilities of
the events: {EX(1)}, {EY 1(1)|EX(1)C}, and {EY 2(1)|EX(1)C}, each of which can be bounded
by ²/3 in the following steps.
Let’s denote the kth codeword in bin j by xc(j, k), where k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2N [I(X˜;Z˜)−²]} and the
randomly selected codeword to be transmitted, given a message j, by xc(j, k
∗).
Pe
(1)
≤
2NR∑
j=1
Pr{SK = j}[Pr{EX(j)}+ Pr{EY 1(j)|EX(j)C}+ Pr{EY 2(j)|EX(j)C}]
(2)
= Pr{EX(1)}+ Pr{EY 1(1)|EX(1)C}+ Pr{EY 2(1)|EX(1)C}.
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(1) follows from the union bound (See Appendex A). (2) follows from the fact that error events
don’t depend on the message j. We now consider the three terms in the summation separately.
Pr{EX(1)}. By Lemma 2.3 with ²1 = ²/3 and a given δ > 0, there exists an integer L0 such
that Pr{Xc ∈ TNX (δ)} > 1 − ²/3 for N ≥ L0, which implies that Pr{EX(1)} ≤ ²/3 for given
² > 0, δ > 0 and N ≥ L0 based on Lemma 2.9.
Pr{EY 1(1)|EX(1)C}. By Lemma 2.5 with ²1 = ²/3 and a given δ > 0, there exists an in-
teger L1 such that Pr{(Xc, Y N ) ∈ TNX,Y (δ)} > 1 − ²/3 for N ≥ L1, which implies that
Pr{EY 1(1)|EX(1)C} ≤ ²/3 for given ² > 0, δ > 0 and N ≥ L1.
Pr{EY 2(1)|EX(1)C}. By the code generating process, Xc(1, k∗) and Xc(i, k) are independent,
and so are Y N and Xc(i, k) for (i, k) 6= (1, k∗). By inequality (2.20), Pr{(Xc(i, k), Y N ) ∈
TNX,Y (δ)} < 2−N [I(X;Y )−3δ] for (i, k) 6= (1, k∗). Hence,
Pr{EY 2(1)|EX(1)C} (3)<
∑
(i,k)6=(1,k∗)
2−N [I(X;Y )−3δ]
= (2N [I(X˜;Y˜ )−2²] − 1)2−N [I(X;Y )−3δ]
< 2−N [I(X;Y )−3δ−I(X˜;Y˜ )+2²]
≤ ²/3
when
I(X;Y )− I(X˜; Y˜ )− 3δ + 2² > 0,
and
N [I(X;Y )− I(X˜; Y˜ )− 3δ + 2²] ≥ log
[
3
²
]
N ≥ L2 = 1
I(X;Y )− I(X˜; Y˜ )− 3δ + 2² log
[
3
²
]
.
(3) follows from the union bound.
The two conditions above impose restrictions on δ and N , respectively. To obtain the restric-
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tions, define gLHS(δ) = I(X;Y )− I(X˜; Y˜ ), and gRHS(δ) = 3δ − 2². Then,
gLHS(δ)
(4)
=
1
2
log
[
P (1 + 2δ ln(2))−1 +N1
N1
]
− 1
2
log
[
P +N1
N1
]
=
1
2
log
[
P (1 + 2δ ln(2))−1 +N1
P +N1
]
gLHS(0) = 0
lim
δ→∞
gLHS(δ) =
1
2
log
[
N1
P +N1
]
< 0
dgLHS(δ)
dδ
=
[
1
2 ln(2)
][
P +N1
P (1 + 2δ ln(2))−1 +N1
][
−P
P +N1
]
(1 + 2δ ln(2))−22 ln(2)
=
−P (1 + 2δ ln(2))−2
P (1 + 2δ ln(2))−1 +N1
=
−P (1 + 2δ ln(2))−1
P +N1(1 + 2δ ln(2))
< 0 because P,N1, δ > 0.
(4) follows from equation (2.13). From the facts that gLHS(0) = 0, gRHS(0) = −2² < 0, and
gLHS(δ) is a monotonically decreasing continuous function converging to a negative number
while gRHS(δ) is a monotonically increasing continuous function approaching∞ as δ increases,
it follows that there exists a δ0 > 0 such that gLHS(δ0) = gRHS(δ0) by the continuity of the
functions [13]. See an example in Figure 4.2.
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−0.04
−0.02
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δ0 
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← gRHS(δ)
↓ 
 gLHS(δ)
Figure 4.2: Calculating δ0 for P = 1, N1 = 1 and ² = 0.02.
Thus, gLHS(δ)−gRHS(δ) = I(X;Y )−I(X˜; Y˜ )−3δ+2² > 0 for 0 < δ < δ0, and Pr{EY 2(1)|EX(1)C}
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≤ ²/3 for δ < δ0, and N ≥ L2, and
Pe ≤ ²/3 + ²/3 + ²/3 = ²
for δ < δ0, and N ≥ max{L0, L1, L2}.
Proof of the equivocation. This part of the proof is done in three steps:
1. show that H(SK |ZN ) = N [I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)]−H(Xc|SK , ZN );
2. show that I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) ≥ R(1− ²/2);
3. show that H(Xc|SK , ZN )/RN ≤ ²/2.
Combining the above three steps,
H(SK |ZN )
H(SK)
=
N [I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)]−H(Xc|SK , ZN )
RN
≥ 1− ²/2− H(Xc|S
K , ZN )
RN
≥ 1− ²/2− ²/2
= 1− ².
Proceeding to the first step,
H(SK |ZN ) (5)= H(SK , ZN )−H(ZN )
(6)
= H(SK , Xc, Z
N )−H(Xc|SK , ZN )−H(ZN )
(7)
= H(Xc, Z
N ) +H(SK |Xc, ZN )−H(Xc|SK , ZN )−H(ZN )
(8)
= H(Xc|ZN )−H(Xc|SK , ZN )
(9)
≥ H(Xc|ZN )−H(Xc|Y N )−H(Xc|SK , ZN )
= [H(Xc|ZN )−H(Xc)] + [H(Xc)−H(Xc|Y N )]−H(Xc|SK , ZN )
(10)
= I(Xc;Y
N )− I(Xc;ZN )−H(Xc|SK , ZN )
(11)
= [H(Y N )−H(Y N |Xc)]− [H(ZN )−H(ZN |Xc)]−H(Xc|SK , ZN )
(12)
= [H(Y N )−H(ηN1 )]− [H(ZN )−H(ηN1 + ηN2 )]−H(Xc|SK , ZN )
(13)
= I(XN ;Y N )− I(XN ;ZN )−H(Xc|SK , ZN )
(14)
= N [I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)]−H(Xc|SK , ZN ),
where (5), (6) and (7) follow from identities (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3). (8) follows from the fact
that the secret message sK is known given a codeword xc. (9) follows from the fact that
H(Xc|Y N ) ≥ 0. (10), (11) and (13) follows from equations (2.4) and (2.5). (12) follows from
the fact that Xc, η
N
1 , and η
N
2 are independent. (14) follows from Lemma 2.1.
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In step 2, apply equation (2.13) to I(X;Y ) and I(X;Z) to obtain
I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) = 1
2
log
[
P ′ +N1
N1
]
− 1
2
log
[
P ′ +N1 +N2
N1 +N2
]
=
1
2
log
[
(P ′ +N1)(N1 +N2)
N1(P ′ +N1 +N2)
]
.
Hence,
1
2
log
[
(P ′ +N1)(N1 +N2)
N1(P ′ +N1 +N2)
]
≥ R(1− ²/2)
(P ′ +N1)(N1 +N2)
N1(P ′ +N1 +N2)
≥ 2R(2−²)
P ′ +N1 ≥ N1(P
′ +N1 +N2)
N1 +N2
2R(2−²)
P ′
[
1− N1
N1 +N2
2R(2−²)
]
≥ N12R(2−²) −N1
P ′ =
P
1 + 2δ ln(2)
≥ N1(N1 +N2)
[
2R(2−²) − 1
N1 +N2 −N12R(2−²)
]
1 + 2δ ln(2) ≤ P
N1(N1 +N2)
[
N1 +N2 −N12R(2−²)
2R(2−²) − 1
]
for
δ ≤ δ1 = 1
2 ln(2)
{
P
N1(N1 +N2)
[
N1 +N2 −N12R(2−²)
2R(2−²) − 1
]
− 1
}
.
For the above condition to be valid, δ1 must be positive, which requires that
P
N1(N1 +N2)
[
N1 +N2 −N12R(2−²)
2R(2−²) − 1
]
> 1
P [N2 +N1 −N12R(2−²)] > N1(N1 +N2)[2R(2−²) − 1]
PN2 − PN1[2R(2−²) − 1] > N1(N1 +N2)[2R(2−²) − 1]
PN2 > N1(P +N1 +N2)[2
R(2−²) − 1].
The behavior of the right-hand side term in the above inequality depends on R(2 − ²) =
[I(X˜; Y˜ )− I(X˜; Z˜)− ²](2− ²), which is parabolic in ². When ² = 0 or 2 + I(X˜; Y˜ )− I(X˜; Z˜),
R(2− ²) = [I(X˜; Y˜ )− I(X˜; Z˜)− ²](2− ²)
= 2[I(X˜; Y˜ )− I(X˜; Z˜)]
= log
[
(P +N1)(N1 +N2)
N1(P +N1 +N2)
]
,
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which makes
N1(P +N1 +N2)[2
R(2−²) − 1] = N1(P +N1 +N2)
[
(P +N1)(N1 +N2)
N1(P +N1 +N2)
− 1
]
= (P +N1)(N1 +N2)−N1(P +N1 +N2)
= PN1 + PN2 +N
2
1 +N1N2 − PN1 −N21 −N1N2
= PN2.
For ² ∈ (0, 2+ I(X˜; Y˜ )− I(X˜; Z˜)), R(2− ²) < 2[I(X˜; Y˜ )− I(X˜; Z˜)], and PN2 > N1(P +N1 +
N2)[2
R(2−²)−1] as required. Note that, for ² ≥ 2+I(X˜; Y˜ )−I(X˜; Z˜), I(X˜; Y˜ )−I(X˜; Z˜)−² < 0,
1− ² < 0, ² > 1, and there is nothing to prove.
In step 3, the wiretapper’s decoding process is considered. In the wiretapper’s decoding process,
the wiretapper must select a parameter ξ for the joint typical decoder. If ξ 6= δ, the set
TNX (δ) 6= TNX (ξ), and the decoder is not reliable. Hence, the wiretapper should select ξ = δ,
and that is what we will assume in the following analysis.
Firstly, the entropy of the codeword conditioned on bin j and the wiretapper’s observation
H(Xc|SK , ZN ) is related to the probability of error PB in the wiretapper’s bin-decoding process
through random variable χ defined as
χ =
{
1 if ψ(ZN ) 6= Xc
0 if ψ(ZN ) = Xc
,
where ψ(ZN ) is the wiretapper’s decoding function. In the bin-decoding process, the wiretap-
per detects the codeword based on the knowledge of the bin, from which the codeword was
selected, and the observation from the wiretap channel.
The probability of error in the wiretapper’s bin-decoding process is then bounded using the
union bound resulting in constraints on δ and N .
Now, the entropy of the codeword conditioned on bin j and the wiretapper’s observation ZN
44 CHAPTER 4. GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH SIDE INFORMATION
is related to the probability of error in the bin-decoding process.
H(Xc|SK , ZN ) = H(χ,Xc|SK , ZN )−H(χ|Xc, SK , ZN )
= H(χ|SK , ZN ) +H(Xc|χ, SK , ZN )−H(χ|Xc, SK , ZN )
(15)
≤ H(χ|SK) +H(Xc|χ, SK , ZN )
=
2NR∑
j=1
Pr{SK = j}[H(χ|SK = j)
+p(χ = 0|SK = j)H(Xc|ZN , SK = j, χ = 0)
+p(χ = 1|SK = j)H(Xc|ZN , SK = j, χ = 1)]
(16)
=
2NR∑
j=1
Pr{SK = j}[h(PB) + (1− PB)H(Xc|ZN , SK = j, χ = 0) +
PBH(Xc|ZN , SK = j, χ = 1)]
(17)
≤
2NR∑
j=1
Pr{SK = j}[h(PB) + PB log(2N [I(X˜;Z˜)−²] − 1)]
(18)
= h(PB) + PB log(2
N [I(X˜;Z˜)−²] − 1)
≤ h(PB) + PBN [I(X˜; Z˜)− ²]
≤ h(PB) + PBNI(X˜; Z˜)
H(Xc|SK , ZN )
RN
≤ h(PB) + PBNI(X˜; Z˜)
RN
≤ ²/2,
for N ≥ L3 = 2h(PB)/{R² − 2PBI(X˜; Z˜)}, and PB < R²/2I(X˜; Z˜), where h(PB) is the
binary entropy function. (15) follows from the fact that H(χ|SK , ZN ) ≤ H(χ|SK) and
H(χ, |Xc, SK , ZN ) = 0. (16) results from letting PB = p(χ = 1|SK = j). (17) follows
from the fact that H(Xc|ZN , SK = j, χ = 0) = 0 and H(Xc|ZN , SK = j, χ = 1) is less than
log of the number of incorrect codewords in the bin. (18) follows from the fact that PB is
independent of the message.
To bound PB , define the following events associated with the wiretapper’s bin-decoding process:
• EZ1(j): in the wiretapper’s bin-decoding process, there is no sequence xc in bin j that is
jointly typical the received sequence zN .
• EZ2(j): in the wiretapper’s bin-decoding process, a sequence xc(j, k) 6= xc(j, k∗) is jointly
typical with the received sequence zN for k 6= k∗.
An error in wiretapper’s bin-decoding process occurs when at least one of the events EZ1(j)
and EZ2(j) occurs when there is no encoding error. Then, the probability of wiretapper’s
bin-decoding error given the secret message is
PB = p(χ = 1|SK = j)
≤ Pr{EZ1(j)|EX(j)C}+ Pr{EZ2(j)|EX(j)C}
= Pr{EZ1(1)|EX(1)C}+ Pr{EZ2(1)|EX(1)C}.
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The two probabilities, Pr{EZ1(1)|EX(1)C} and Pr{EZ2(1)|EX(1)C}, are evaluated as follows:
Pr{EZ1(1)|EX(1)C}. By Lemma 2.5 with ²1 = R²/6I(X˜; Z˜), there exists an integer L4 such
that Pr{(Xc, ZN ) ∈ TNX,Z(δ)} > 1−R²/6I(X˜; Z˜) for given ² > 0 and δ > 0 and N ≥ L4, which
implies that Pr{EZ1(1)|EX(1)C} ≤ R²/6I(X˜; Z˜) for given ² > 0 and δ > 0 and N ≥ L4.
Pr{EZ2(1)|EX(1)C}. By the code generating process Xc(1, k∗) and Xc(1, k) are independent,
and so are ZN and Xc(1, k) for k 6= k∗. By inequality (2.20), Pr{(Xc(1, k), ZN ) ∈ TNXZ(δ) <
2−N [I(X;Z)−3δ] for k 6= k∗. Hence,
Pr{EZ2(1)|EX(1)C} ≤
∑
k 6=k∗
2−N [I(X;Z)−3δ]
≤ (2N [I(X˜;Z˜)−²] − 1)2−N [I(X;Z)−3δ]
< 2−N [I(X;Z)−3δ−I(X˜;Z˜)+²]
≤ R²/6I(X˜; Z˜),
when
I(X;Z)− I(X˜; Z˜)− 3δ + ² > 0,
and
N [I(X;Z)− I(X˜; Z˜)− 3δ + ²] ≥ log
[
6I(X˜; Z˜)
R²
]
N ≥ L5,
where
L5 =
1
I(X;Z)− I(X˜; Z˜)− 3δ + ² log
[
6I(X˜; Z˜)
R²
]
.
Now, let gLHS(δ) = I(X;Z)− I(X˜; Z˜), and gRHS(δ) = 3δ − ². We then have that
gLHS(δ)
(19)
=
1
2
log
[
P (1 + 2δ ln(2))−1 +N1 +N2
N1 +N2
]
− 1
2
log
[
P +N1 +N2
N1 +N2
]
=
1
2
log
[
P (1 + 2δ ln(2))−1 +N1 +N2
P +N1 +N2
]
gLHS(0) = 0
lim
δ→∞
gLHS(δ) =
1
2
log
[
N1 +N2
P +N1 +N2
]
dgLHS(δ)
dδ
=
−P (1 + 2δ)−1
P + (N1 +N2)(1 + 2δ)
< 0 because P,N1, N2, δ > 0.
(19) follows from equation (2.13). From the facts that gLHS(0) = 0, gRHS(0) = −² < 0, and
gLHS(δ) is a monotonically decreasing continuous function converging to a negative number
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while gRHS(δ) is a monotonically increasing continuous function approaching∞ as δ increases,
it follows that there exists a δ2 > 0 such that gLHS(δ2) = gRHS(δ2) by the continuity of the
functions [13]. Thus, gLHS(δ)− gRHS(δ) = I(X;Z)− I(X˜; Z˜)− 3δ+ ² > 0 for 0 < δ < δ2, and
PB ≤ Pr{EZ1(1)|EX(1)C}+ Pr{EZ2(1)|EX(1)C}
≤ R²/6I(X˜; Z˜) +R²/6I(X˜; Z˜)
= R²/3I(X˜; Z˜)
< R²/2I(X˜; Z˜),
for 0 < δ < δ2, and N ≥ max{L4, L5}, and H(Xc|SK , ZN )/(RN) ≤ ²/2 when N ≥ L3; hence,
the rate-equivocation pair (Cs, 1) is achievable for 0 < δ < min{δ0, δ1, δ2}, and N ≥ Nmin =
max{L0, L1, L2, L3, L4, L5}. ¥
By Lemma 4.13, time-sharing the code in the interference-free mode with the a capacity achiev-
ing code (without the wiretapper) for the main channel achieves all the rate-equivocation pairs
in the region R ≤ CM , d ≤ 1, and Rd ≤ Cs, where CM is the capacity of the main channel,
and Cs = CM − CMW , and CMW is the capacity of the combined channel as shown in [14].
Lemma 4.13 [14] Let R1d1 = R2d2 = c, a constant. Assume R1 > R2 and hence d1 < d2.
If the points (R1, d1) and (R2, d2) are achievable, then by time-sharing any point (R, d) with
R2 ≤ R ≤ R1, d1 ≤ d ≤ d2, and Rd = c is achievable.
4.3 Gaussian Wiretap Channel with Side Information
The Gaussian wiretap channel model is extended to the Gaussian wiretap channel with side in-
formation. We propose the camouflage and the high-power modes by extending the interference-
free mode to take into account the effect of the interference in the channel. The rate-equivocation
pairs achieved by these two strategies and the result of time-sharing codes in Lemma 4.13 lead
to an achievable region for GWCSI.
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Figure 4.3: The Gaussian wiretap channel with side information.
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4.3.1 Model Description
GWCSI is extended from GWC by adding an interference in the main channel. The interference
is modelled as a sequence V N of i.i.d. random variables such that V ∼ N (0, Q), independent
of the noises and the codeword. We assume that the whole sequence of the interference is
known to the encoder before the secret message transmission. We note that the main channel
of GWCSI is the same as the dirty-paper channel investigated in [3]. The modes of operation
will be given based on the leakage function, defined in the following section, for GWCSI.
4.3.2 Leakage Function
Gel’fand and Pinsker proved the capacity region for the channel with random parameters in
[12] by using an auxiliary random variable U to convey information about the message and
the interference to the recipient. The average information rate between the encoder and the
recipient is I(U ;Y ) − I(U ;V ), which can be interpreted as the average rate of information
about the message and the interference at the recipient less the average rate of information
about the interference contained in the auxiliary random variable U .
The dirty-paper channel investigated by Costa in [3] is a special case of the channel with random
parameters in that the interference and the noise are modelled as independent sequences of
i.i.d. Gaussian random variables. In the coding strategy proposed by Costa, an auxiliary
random variable U = X + αV is also used to convey the information about both the secret
message and the interference to the recipient, where α is a real number.
In the GWCSI model, the main channel is the same as the dirty-paper channel while the
combined channel is a physically degraded version of the main channel. If we use an auxiliary
random variable U to convey the secret message and the interference to the recipient, then
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;V ) is the average information rate between the encoder and the recipient, and
I(U ;Z) − I(U ;V ) is that between the encoder and the wiretapper. Consequently, I(U ;Z) −
I(U ;V ) can be considered as the average information leakage rate to the wiretapper. Note that
when there is no interference in the main channel, and the auxiliary random variable U = X,
I(U ;Z)− I(U ;V ) reduces to I(X;Z) as defined in the GWC case.
Calculating the Leakage Function for GWCSI
Similar to the coding strategy for the dirty-paper channel, the camouflage and high-power
modes make use of an auxiliary random variable U = X + αV to carry information about
the secret message and the interference. The two modes of operation are defined by codebook
generating, encoding and decoding processes. In the description of the two modes, we will need
the following random variables:
U˜ ∼ N (0, P + α2Q), Y˜ ∼ N (0, P +Q+N1), Z˜ ∼ N (0, P +Q+N1 +N2)
U ∼ N (0, P ′ + α2Q), Y ∼ N (0, P ′ +Q+N1), Z ∼ N (0, P ′ +Q+N1 +N2)
U = X + αV
Uc represents the output of the auxiliary codeword selection process,
where P ′ = P (1 + 4δ ln(2))−1 < P and δ > 0.
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Let U˜N , Y˜ N , Z˜N be sequences of i.i.d. Gaussian random variables U˜ , Y˜ and Z˜, respectively.
We can evaluate the leakage function ∆I(α) = I(U˜ ; Z˜)−I(U˜ ;V ) by calculating the correlation
coefficients %U˜Z˜ and %U˜V , and I(U˜ ; Z˜) and I(U˜ ;V ), respectively. By the definition of the
correlation coefficient,
%U˜Z˜ =
E[U˜ Z˜]
σU˜σZ˜
=
E[(X˜ + αV )(X˜ + V + η1 + η2)]
σU˜σZ˜
=
P + αQ
σU˜σZ˜
%2
U˜Z˜
=
(P + αQ)2
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)
.
Similarly,
%2
U˜V
=
E[(X˜ + αV )V ]2
σ2
U˜
σ2V
=
α2σ2V
σ2
U˜
=
α2Q
P + α2Q
.
By equation (2.11), we have
I(U˜ ; Z˜) =
1
2
log
[
1
1− %2
U˜Z˜
]
=
1
2
log
[
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αQ)2
]
(4.1)
I(U˜ ;V ) =
1
2
log
[
P + α2Q
(P + α2Q)− α2Q
]
=
1
2
log
[
P + α2Q
P
]
(4.2)
The leakage function is then
∆I(α) =
1
2
log
[
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αQ)2
]
− 1
2
log
[
P + α2Q
P
]
=
1
2
log
[
P (P +Q+N1 +N2)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αQ)2
]
. (4.3)
If the leakage function is positive, some information communicated between the encoder and
the recipient is leaked to the wiretapper; otherwise, the information is kept secret from the
wiretapper. Correspondingly, the camouflage mode is designed for the case when the leakage
is non-positive while the high-power mode for the case when the leakage is positive.
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4.3.3 Camouflage Mode
We now define the camouflage mode and prove that it can be used to achieve the rate-
equivocation pair (CM , 1) if ∆I(α) ≤ 0. Given an ² > 0, let ²UV and ²UZ be constants
associated with the codebook generating process, α and δ be constants associated with the en-
coding and decoding processes, and ξ be a constant associated with the wiretapper’s decoding
process to be specified later. For ∆I(α) ≤ 0,
1. Generating the codebook. Generate 2N [I(U˜ ;Y˜ )−²+²UV ] sequences uN according to the dis-
tribution p(uN ) =
∏N
i=1 p(ui), and p(ui) ∼ N (0, P ′ + α2Q) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Place the sequences uN randomly into 2N [I(U˜ ;Y˜ )−I(U˜ ;V )−²] bins, each of which con-
tains 2N [I(U˜ ;V )−I(U˜ ;Z˜)+²UV +²UZ ] subbins so that each subbin contains 2N [I(U˜ ;Z˜)−²UZ ]
sequences, and each bin contains 2N [I(U˜ ;V )+²UV ] sequences. Index each bin by j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 2NR}, and each subbin by w ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2N [I(U˜ ;V )−I(U˜ ;Z˜)+²UV +²UZ ]}, where
R = I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )− ². The codebook is given to the sender and the recipient.
2. Encoding. To send a message j through an interference vN , the sender looks for a sequence
uc in bin j such that (uc, v
N ) ∈ TNU,V (δ) and transmit xN = uc − αvN . If there is more
than one sequence uc that is jointly typical with v
N , randomly select one.
3. Decoding. To decode the received sequence for the message, the recipient finds a sequence
uc in the codebook that is jointly typical with the received sequence y
N , i.e., (uc, y
N ) ∈
TNU,Y (δ). Declare the index to the bin, in which the sequence is found as the received
message.
4. Wiretapper’s decoding. The wiretapper receives a sequence zN and finds a sequence uc in
the codebook that is jointly typical with the received sequence, i.e., (uc, z
N ) ∈ TNU,Z(ξ).
Declare the index to the bin, in which the sequence is found as the received message.
5. Probability of error. An error occurs in the coding process when a message j is to be
transmitted and one or more of the following events occurs.
• EV (j): in the encoding process, there is no sequence uc in bin j that is jointly typical
with the interference sequence.
• EX(j): in the encoding process, xN = uc−αvN does not satisfy the power constraint.
• EY 1(j): in the decoding process, there is no sequence uc that is jointly typical with
the received sequence.
• EY 2(j): in the decoding process, a sequence uc in bin i 6= j is jointly typical with
the received sequence.
Theorem 4.2 Given the camouflage mode of operation to be used in the Gaussian wiretap
channel with side information and average power constraint P , for any ² > 0 and
N2 > N1 +
N21
Q
,
0 ≤ P ≤ −N1 − Q
2
+
√
Q2 + 4QN2
2
,
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Number of bins = 2N [I(U˜ ,Y˜ )−I(U˜ ;V )−²]
2N [I(U˜ ;Z˜)−²UZ ] codewords per subbin
2N [I(U˜ ;V )+²UV ] codewords per bin
2N [I(U˜ ;V )−I(U˜ ;Z˜)+²UV +²UZ ] subbins per bin
2N [I(U˜ ;Y˜ )−²+²UV ] codewords per codebook
Figure 4.4: The codebook for the camouflage mode.
there exists an integer Nmin such that, for N ≥ Nmin,
H(SK)
N
≥ Rcam , 1
2
log
[
P +N1
N1
]
− ²
H(SK |ZN )
H(SK)
≥ 1− ²
Pe ≤ ².
Proof: This proof consists of three main parts: proof of the rate, proof of the probability of
error, and proof of the equivocation.
Proof of the Rate. The number of messages that can be sent is the number of bins in the
codebook, 2NRcam(α) = 2N [I(U˜ ;Y˜ )−I(U˜ ;V )−²]. We evaluate %U˜Y˜ , I(U˜ ; Y˜ ) and Rcam(α) =
[I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )− ²] in that order. The correlation coefficient is
%U˜Y˜ =
E[U˜ Y˜ ]
σU˜σY˜
=
E[(X˜ + αV )(X˜ + V + η1)]
σU˜σY˜
%2
U˜Y˜
=
(P + αQ)2
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)
1
1− %2
U˜Y˜
=
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2 ,
4.3. GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH SIDE INFORMATION 51
and
I(U˜ ; Y˜ )
(1)
=
1
2
log
[
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2
]
(4.4)
I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V ) (2)= 1
2
log
[
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2
]
−1
2
log
[
P + α2Q
P
]
=
1
2
log
[
P (P +Q+N1)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2
]
. (4.5)
(1) follows from equation (2.11). (2) follows from equation (4.2).
Hence,
Rcam(α) = I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )− ²
(3)
=
1
2
log
[
P (P +Q+N1)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2
]
− ². (4.6)
(3) follows from equation (4.5). We select the optimal α for this coding strategy by considering
dRcam(α)
dα
=
1
2 ln(2)
[
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2
P (P +Q+N1)
]
×
−
[
{P (P +Q+N1)}{2αQ(P +Q+N1)− 2Q(P + αQ)}
{(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2}2
]
= − 1
2 ln(2)
[
2αQ(P +Q+N1)− 2Q(P + αQ)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2
]
.
Setting dRcam(α)/dα = 0, we have
2αQ(P +Q+N1) = 2Q(P + αQ)
α(P +N1) + αQ = P + αQ
α = αcam =
P
P +N1
, (4.7)
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and
Rcam(αcam)
(4)
=
1
2
log
[
P (P +Q+N1)
(P + α2camQ)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αcamQ)2
]
− ²
=
1
2
log
[
P (P +N1)
2(P +Q+N1)
(P (P +N1)2 + P 2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P (P +N1) + PQ)2
]
− ²
=
1
2
log
[
(P +N1)
2
(P +N1)2 + PQ− P (P +Q+N1)
]
− ²
=
1
2
log
[
P +N1
(P +N1)− P )
]
− ²
=
1
2
log
[
P +N1
N1
]
− ². (4.8)
(4) follows from equation (4.6).
Proof of the probability of error. The probability of error is bounded by the probabilities
of {EV (1)} {EX(1)|EV (1)C}, {EY 1(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}, and {EY 2(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}, each of
which can be bounded in the following steps.
Denote the kth auxiliary codeword in bin j by uc(j, k) and the selected auxiliary codeword in bin
j, which is jointly typical with the interference, by uc(j, k
∗), where k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2N [I(U˜ ;V )+²UV ]}.
The transmitted codeword is then xN = uc(j, k
∗)− αvN .
Pe
(5)
≤
2NRcam(α)∑
j=1
Pr{SK = j}[Pr{EV (j)}+ Pr{EX(j)|EV (j)C}
+Pr{EY 1(j)|EX(j)CEV (j)C}+ Pr{EY 2(j)|EX(j)CEV (j)C}]
(6)
= Pr{EV (1)}+ Pr{EX(1)|EV (1)C}
+Pr{EY 1(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}+ Pr{EY 2(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}].
(5) follows from the union bound. (6) follows from the fact that error events don’t depend on
the message j. We now consider the four terms in the summation separately.
Pr{EV (1)}. By the code generating process, Uc and V N are independent. By equation (2.21),
Pr{(Uc, V N ) 6∈ TNU,V (δ)} ≤ 1− (1− δ)2−N [I(U ;V )+3δ]
Pr{EV (1)}
(7)
≤ [1− (1− δ)2−N [I(U ;V )+3δ]]2N[I(U˜;V )+²UV ]
(8)
≤ exp{−(1− δ)2−N [I(U ;V )+3δ]}2N[I(U˜;V )+²UV ]
= exp{−(1− δ)2N [I(U˜ ;V )−I(U ;V )+²UV −3δ]}
≤ ²/3
when δ < 1, and
I(U˜ ;V )− I(U ;V ) + ²UV − 3δ > 0 (4.9)
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and
(1− δ)2N [I(U˜ ;V )−I(U ;V )+²UV −3δ] ≥ ln
[
3
²
]
N [I(U˜ ;V )− I(U ;V ) + ²UV − 3δ] ≥ log
[
1
1− δ ln
[
3
²
]]
N ≥ L0,
where
L0 =
1
I(U˜ ;V )− I(U ;V ) + ²UV − 3δ
log
[
1
1− δ ln
[
3
²
]]
.
(7) follows from the fact that there are 2N [I(U˜ ;V )+²UV ] codewords in a bin. (8) follows from the
fact that ea ≥ 1 + a (Taylor’s expansion of ea) [18].
We now consider the condition when inequality (4.9) is satisfied as follows.
I(U ;V ) =
1
2
log
[
P ′ + α2Q
P ′
]
I(U˜ ;V )− I(U ;V ) = 1
2
log
[
P + α2Q
P
]
− 1
2
log
[
P ′ + α2Q
P ′
]
=
1
2
log
[
(P + α2Q)P ′
P (P ′ + α2Q)
]
=
1
2
log
[
(P + α2Q)
P + α2Q(1 + 4δ ln(2))
]
.
Let gLHS(δ) = I(U˜ ;V )− I(U ;V ), and gRHS(δ) = 3δ − ²UV . Then, gLHS(δ) and gRHS(δ) are
continuous functions since the equations
P + α2Q = 0
P + α2Q(1 + 4δ ln(2)) = 0
have no real solution for α when δ, P,Q > 0.
gLHS(0) = 0
lim
δ→∞
gLHS(δ) = −∞
dgLHS(δ)
dδ
=
[
1
2 ln(2)
][
P + α2Q(1 + 4δ ln(2))
P + α2Q
][
−(P + α2Q)(4 ln(2)α2Q)
{P + α2Q(1 + 4δ ln(2))}2
]
=
−2α2Q
P + α2Q(1 + 4δ ln(2))
< 0 for δ, P,Q > 0.
From the facts that gLHS(0) = 0, gRHS(0) = −²UV < 0, and gLHS(δ) is a monotonically
decreasing continuous function approaching −∞ while gRHS(δ) is a monotonically increasing
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continuous function approaching ∞ as δ increases, it follows that there exists a δ0 > 0 such
that gLHS(δ0) = gRHS(δ0) by the continuity of the functions [13]. Thus, gLHS(δ)− gRHS(δ) =
I(U˜ ;V )−I(U ;V )+²UV −3δ > 0 for 0 < δ < δ0, and Pr{EV (1)} ≤ ²/3 when 0 < δ < min{1, δ0}
and N ≥ L0.
Pr{EX(1)|EV (1)C}. If the event EV (1) does not occur, then we have that (uc(1, k∗), vN ) ∈
TNU,V (δ). By Lemma 2.12,
1
N
∑N
i=1 x
2
i ≤ P , and Pr{EX(1)|EV (1)C} = 0.
Pr{EY 1(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}. By Lemma 2.5 with ²1 = ²/3, there exists L1 for a given δ > 0 such
that Pr{(Uc, Y N ) ∈ TNU,Y (δ)} > 1 − ²/3 when N ≥ L1, which implies that Pr{EY 1(1)|EX(1)
C
EV (1)C} ≤ ²/3 a given δ > 0 and N ≥ L1.
Pr{EY 2(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}. By the code generating process, Uc(1, k∗) and Uc(i, k) are inde-
pendent, and so are Y N and Uc(i, k) for (i, k) 6= (1, k∗). By inequality (2.20), Pr{(Uc(i, k), Y N )
∈ TNU,Y (δ) < 2−N [I(U ;Y )−3δ] for (i, k) 6= (1, k∗). Hence,
Pr{EY 2(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}} <
∑
(i,k)6=(1,k∗)
2−N [I(U ;Y )−3δ]
(9)
≤ (2N [I(U˜ ;Y˜ )−²+²UV ] − 1)2−N [I(U ;Y )−3δ]
< 2−N [I(U ;Y )−3δ−I(U˜ ;Y˜ )+²−²UV ]
≤ ²/3,
when
I(U ;Y )− I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− 3δ + ²− ²UV > 0,
and
N [I(U ;Y )− I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− 3δ + ²− ²UV ] ≥ log
[
3
²
]
N ≥ L2,
where
L2 =
1
I(U ;Y )− I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− 3δ + ²− ²UV
log
[
3
²
]
.
(9) follows from the union bound.
Now, define λY (δ) = I(U ;Y )− I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− 3δ + ²− ²UV , and φ(δ) = (1 + 4δ ln(2))−1. We then
have that
λY (δ)
(10)
=
1
2
log
[
(Pφ(δ) + α2Q)(Pφ(δ) +Q+N1)
(Pφ(δ) + α2Q)(Pφ(δ) +Q+N1)− (Pφ(δ) + αQ)2
]
−1
2
log
[
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2
]
− 3δ + ²− ²UV
λY (0)
(11)
> 0 for ² > ²UV (4.10)
lim
δ→∞
λY (δ) = −∞ for finite α, P,Q,N1 (4.11)
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(10) follows from equation (4.4). (11) follows from the fact that φ(0) = 1.
Furthermore, λY (δ) is a continuous function because the equations
(Pφ(δ) + α2Q)(Pφ(δ) +Q+N1) = 0
(Pφ(δ) + α2Q)(Pφ(δ) +Q+N1)− (Pφ(δ) + αQ)2 = 0
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1) = 0
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2 = 0
have no real solutions for α when P,Q,N1, δ > 0.
Consequently, there exists the smallest δ1 > 0 such that λY (δ1) = 0 by the continuity of λY (δ)
[13]. Thus, λY (δ) = I(U ;Y ) − I(U˜ ; Y˜ ) − 3δ + ² − ²UV > 0 for 0 < δ < δ1 and ² > ²UV , and
Pr{EY 2(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C} ≤ ²/3 for 0 < δ < δ1, ² > ²UV and N ≥ L2.
Combining the four terms of the summation,
Pe ≤ ²/3 + 0 + ²/3 + ²/3 = ²,
for 0 < δ < min{1, δ0, δ1}, 0 < ²UV < ², and N ≥ max{L0, L1, L2}.
Proof of the equivocation. The equivocation of the secret message is expressed in term of
the probability of error in the wiretapper’s subbin decoding. In doing so, let W (w ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 2N [I(U˜ ;V )−I(U˜ ;Z˜)+²UV +²UZ ]}) be the random variable representing the outcome of the
subbin selecting process and consider the uncertainty of the secret message to the wiretapper
in three steps:
1. show that H(SK |ZN ) = N [I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)− I(U˜ ;V ) + I(U˜ ; Z˜)− ²UV − ²UZ ]
−H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN );
2. show that I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)− I(U˜ ;V ) + I(U˜ ; Z˜)− ²UV − ²UZ ≥ Rcam(α)(1− ²/2);
3. show that H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN )/Rcam(α)N ≤ ²/2.
Combining the above three steps,
H(SK |ZN )
H(SK)
=
N [I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)− I(U˜ ;V ) + I(U˜ ; Z˜)− ²UV − ²UZ ]
Rcam(α)N
−H(Uc|S
K ,W,ZN )
Rcam(α)N
≥ 1− ²/2− H(Uc|S
K ,W,ZN )
Rcam(α)N
≥ 1− ²/2− ²/2
= 1− ².
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We now proceed to step 1 by considering
H(SK |ZN ) = H(SK , ZN )−H(ZN )
= H(SK ,W,ZN )−H(W |SK , ZN )−H(ZN )
= H(SK ,W,Uc, Z
N )−H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN )−H(W |SK , ZN )−H(ZN )
= H(SK ,W |Uc, ZN ) +H(Uc|ZN )−H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN )−H(W |SK , ZN )
(12)
= H(Uc|ZN )−H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN )−H(W |SK , ZN )
(13)
≥ H(Uc|ZN )−H(Uc|Y N )−H(W |SK , ZN )−H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN )
= H(Uc, Z
N )−H(ZN )−H(Uc, Y N ) +H(Y N )−H(W |SK , ZN )
−H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN )
= [H(Uc) +H(Z
N |Uc)]−H(ZN )− [H(Uc) +H(Y N |Uc)] +H(Y N )
−H(W |SK , ZN )−H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN )
= H(ZN |Uc)− [H(UN , ZN )−H(UN |ZN )]−H(Y N |Uc) + [H(UN , Y N )
−H(UN |Y N )]−H(W |SK , ZN )−H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN )
= H(ZN |Uc)− [H(UN ) +H(ZN |UN )−H(UN |ZN )]−H(Y N |Uc)
+[H(UN ) +H(Y N |UN )−H(UN |Y N )]−H(W |SK , ZN )
−H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN )
(14)
= H(UN |ZN )−H(UN |Y N )−H(W |SK , ZN )−H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN )
= I(UN ;Y N )− I(UN ;ZN )−H(W |SK , ZN )−H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN )
(15)
≥ I(UN ;Y N )− I(UN ;ZN )−N [I(U˜ ;V )− I(U˜ ; Z˜) + ²UV + ²UZ ]
−H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN )
= N [I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)]−N [I(U˜ ;V )− I(U˜ ; Z˜) + ²UV + ²UZ ]
−H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN )
= N [I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)− I(U˜ ;V ) + I(U˜ ; Z˜)− ²UV − ²UZ ]
−H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN ),
where (12) follows from the fact that H(SK ,W |Uc, ZN ) = 0; (13) follows from the fact that
H(Uc|Y N ) ≥ 0; (14) follows from the fact that H(ZN |Uc) = H(ZN |UN ) and H(Y N |Uc) =
H(Y N |UN ). (15) follows since the number of subbins in a bin is 2N [I(U˜ ;V )−I(U˜ ;Z˜)+²UV +²UZ ].
In step 2, we note that Rcam(α) = I(U˜ ; Y˜ ) − I(U˜ ;V ) − ² and ∆I(α) = I(U˜ ; Z˜) − I(U˜ ;V ).
Then, Rcam(α)−∆I(α) = I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ; Z˜)− ². Furthermore, for δ = ² = ²UV = ²UZ = 0,
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z) = I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ; Z˜)
Rcam(α)(1− ²/2) + ²UV + ²UZ − I(U˜ ; Z˜) + I(U˜ ;V ) = Rcam(α)−∆I(α)
= I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ; Z˜).
Function Rcam(α)(1 − ²/2) = (I(U˜ ; Y˜ ) − I(U˜ ;V ) − ²)(1 − ²/2) is parabolic in ², with the
minimum at ² = 1 + [I(U˜ ; Y˜ ) − I(U˜ ;V )]/2, and Rcam(α)(1 − ²/2) = I(U˜ ; Y˜ ) − I(U˜ ;V ) when
² = 0 or 2 + I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V ). Hence, Rcam(α)(1− ²/2)−∆I(α) ≤ I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ; Z˜) when
² ∈ [0, 2 + I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )].
For a given ² ∈ (0, 2+I(U˜ ; Y˜ )−I(U˜ ;V )), impose the condition ²UV +²UZ < [I(U˜ ; Y˜ )−I(U˜ ;V )]−
Rcam(α)(1−²/2) to obtainRcam(α)(1−²/2)+²UV +²UZ−I(U˜ ; Z˜)+I(U˜ ;V ) < I(U˜ ; Y˜ )−I(U˜ ; Z˜).
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Now,
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)
=
1
2
log
[
(P ′ + α2Q)(P ′ +Q+N1)
(P ′ + α2Q)(P ′ +Q+N1)− (P ′ + αQ)2
]
−1
2
log
[
(P ′ + α2Q)(P ′ +Q+N1 +N2)
(P ′ + α2Q)(P ′ +Q+N1 +N2)− (P ′ + αQ)2
]
=
1
2
log
[
(P ′ +Q+N1){(P ′ + α2Q)(P ′ +Q+N1 +N2)− (P ′ + αQ)2}
(P +Q+N1 +N2){(P ′ + α2Q)(P ′ +Q+N1)− (P ′ + αQ)2}
]
.
Since the equations
(Pφ(δ) + α2Q)(Pφ(δ) +Q+N1 +N2)− (Pφ(δ) + αQ)2 = 0
(Pφ(δ) + α2Q)(Pφ(δ) +Q+N1)− (Pφ(δ) + αQ)2 = 0
have no real solutions for α when P,Q,N1, N2, δ > 0, I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z) is continuous in δ with
the value of I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ; Z˜) at δ = 0, and Rcam(α)(1− ²/2)+ ²UV + ²UZ − I(U˜ ; Z˜)+ I(U˜ ;V )
is continuous and constant in δ with the value less than I(U˜ ; Y˜ ) − I(U˜ ; Z˜). If the two curves
do not intersect, then there is no constraint on δ. However, if the two curves intersect, then
0 < δ < δ∗, where δ∗ is the smallest value such that the two curves intersect. Then the
condition on δ becomes 0 < δ < δ2, where δ2 = min{δ∗,∞}. Thus,
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)− I(U˜ ;V ) + I(U˜ ; Z˜)− ²UV − ²UZ ≥ Rcam(α)(1− ²/2),
when
² ∈ (0, 2 + I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )),
²UV + ²UZ < [I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )]−Rcam(α)(1− ²/2),
δ < δ2.
Note that for ² ≥ 2+ I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V ), I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )− ² < 0, 1− ² < 0, ² > 1, and there
is nothing to prove.
In step 3, the wiretapper’s decoding process is considered. In the wiretapper’s decoding process,
the wiretapper must select a parameter ξ for the joint typical decoder. If ξ 6= δ, the set
TNU (δ) 6= TNU (ξ), and the wiretapper’s decoder is not reliable. Hence, the wiretapper should
select ξ = δ, and that is what we will assume in the following analysis.
Firstly, the entropy of the codeword conditioned on bin j, subbin w and the wiretapper’s
observation is related to the probability of error PSB in the wiretapper’s subbin-decoding
process through the random variable χ defined as
χ =
{
1 if ψ(ZN ) 6= Uc
0 if ψ(ZN ) = Uc
,
where ψ(ZN ) is the wiretapper’s decoding function. Then, the probability of error in the wire-
tapper’s subbin-decoding process is bounded using the union bound, resulting in constraints
on δ and N .
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Now, the entropy of the codeword conditioned on bin j, subbin w and the wiretapper’s obser-
vation ZN is related to the probability of error in the subbin-decoding process.
H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN ) = H(χ,Uc|SK ,W,ZN )−H(χ|Uc, SK ,W,ZN )
= H(χ|SK ,W,ZN ) +H(Uc|χ, SK ,W,ZN )−H(χ|Uc, SK ,W,ZN )
(16)
≤ H(χ|SK ,W ) +H(Uc|χ, SK ,W,ZN )
=
2NRcam(α)∑
j=1
2N[I(U˜;V )−I(U˜;Z˜)+²UV +²UZ ]∑
w=1
Pr{SK = j,W = w}
[H(χ|SK = j,W = w)
+p(χ = 0|SK = j,W = w)H(Uc|ZN , SK = j,W = w,χ = 0)
+p(χ = 1|SK = j,W = w)H(Uc|ZN , SK = j,W = w,χ = 1)]
=
2NRcam(α)∑
j=1
2N[I(U˜;V )−I(U˜;Z˜)+²UV +²UZ ]∑
w=1
Pr{SK = j,W = w}[h(PSB)
+(1− PSB)H(Uc|ZN , SK = j,W = w,χ = 0)
+PSBH(Uc|ZN , SK = j,W = w,χ = 1)]
(17)
≤
2NRcam(α)∑
j=1
2N[I(U˜;V )−I(U˜;Z˜)+²UV +²UZ ]∑
w=1
Pr{SK = j,W = w}[h(PSB)
+PSB log(2
N [I(U˜ ;Z˜)−²UZ ] − 1)]
(18)
= h(PSB) + PSB log(2
N [I(U˜ ;Z˜)−²UZ ] − 1)
≤ h(PSB) + PSBN [I(U˜ ; Z˜)− ²UZ ]
≤ h(PSB) + PSBNI(U˜ ; Z˜)
H(Uc|SK ,W,ZN )
Rcam(α)N
≤ h(PSB) + PSBNI(U˜ ; Z˜)
Rcam(α)N
≤ ²/2,
for N ≥ L3 = 2h(PSB)/{Rcam(α)² − 2PSBI(U˜ ; Z˜)}, and PSB = p(χ = 1|SK = j,W = w) <
Rcam(α)²/2I(U˜ ; Z˜), where h(PSB) is the binary entropy function. (16) follows from the facts
that H(χ|SK ,W,ZN ) ≤ H(χ|SK ,W ) and H(χ|Uc, SK ,W,ZN ) = 0. (17) follows from the fact
that the number of the auxiliary codewords per bin is 2N [I(U˜ ;Z˜)−²UZ ]. (18) follows from the
fact that PSB is independent of the bin and the subbin.
To bound PSB , define the following events associated with the wiretapper’s subbin-decoding
process:
• EZ1(j, w): in the wiretapper’s subbin-decoding process, there is no sequence uc in bin j,
subbin w that is jointly typical with the received sequence zN .
• EZ2(j, w): in the wiretapper’s subbin-decoding process, a sequence uc 6= uc(j, k∗) is
jointly typical with the received sequence zN for uc in bin j, subbin w.
An error in the wiretapper’s subbin-decoding process occurs when at least one of the events
EZ1(j, w) and EZ2(j, w) occurs when there is no encoding error. Then the probability of
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wiretapper’s subbin-decoding error given the secret message is
PSB = p(χ = 1|SK = j,W = w)
≤ Pr{EZ1(j, w)|EX(j)CEV (j)C}+ Pr{EZ2(j)|EX(j)CEV (j)C}
= Pr{EZ1(1, 1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}+ Pr{EZ2(1, 1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}.
The probabilities Pr{EZ1(1, 1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C} and Pr{EZ2(1, 1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C} are evalu-
ated as follows:
Pr{EZ1(1, 1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}. By Lemma 2.5 with ²1 = Rcam(α)²/6I(U˜ ; Z˜), there exists L4
such that, for a given δ > 0, Pr{(Uc, ZN ) ∈ TNU,Z(δ)} > 1−Rcam(α)²/6I(U˜ ; Z˜) when N ≥ L4,
which implies that Pr{EZ1(1, 1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C} ≤ Rcam(α)²/6I(U˜ ; Z˜) for a given δ > 0 and
N ≥ L4.
Pr{EZ2(1, 1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}. By the code generating process, Uc(1, k∗) and Uc(1, k) are in-
dependent, and so are ZN and Uc(1, k) for k 6= k∗. By inequality (2.20), Pr{(Uc(1, k), ZN )
∈ TNU,Z(δ) < 2−N [I(U ;Z)−3δ] for k 6= k∗. Hence,
Pr{EZ2(1, 1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C} ≤
∑
k 6=k∗
2−N [I(U ;Z)−3δ]
(19)
≤ (2N [I(U˜ ;Z˜)−²UZ ] − 1)2−N [I(U ;Z)−3δ]
< 2−N [I(U ;Z)−3δ−I(U˜ ;Z˜)+²UZ ]
≤ Rcam(α)²/6I(U˜ ; Z˜),
when
I(U ;Z)− I(U˜ ; Z˜)− 3δ + ²UZ > 0,
and
N [I(U ;Z)− I(U˜ ; Z˜)− 3δ + ²UZ ] ≥ log
[
6I(U˜ ; Z˜)
Rcam(α)²
]
N ≥ L5,
where
L5 =
1
I(U ;Z)− I(U˜ ; Z˜)− 3δ + ²UZ
log
[
6I(U˜ ; Z˜)
Rcam(α)²
]
.
(19) follows from the union bound.
Now, define λZ(δ) = I(U ;Z)− I(U˜ ; Z˜)− 3δ+ ²UZ , and φ(δ) = (1+ 4δ ln(2))−1. We then have
that
λZ(δ)
(20)
=
1
2
log
[
(Pφ(δ) + α2Q)(Pφ(δ) +Q+N1 +N2)
(Pφ(δ) + α2Q)(Pφ(δ) +Q+N1 +N2)− (Pφ(δ) + αQ)2
]
−1
2
log
[
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αQ)2
]
− 3δ + ²UZ
λZ(0)
(21)
> 0 for 3δ < ²UZ (4.12)
lim
δ→∞
λY (δ) = −∞ for finite α, P,Q,N1, N2 (4.13)
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(20) follows from equation (4.4). (21) follows from the fact that φ(0) = 1.
Furthermore, λY (δ) is a continuous function because the equations
(Pφ(δ) + α2Q)(Pφ(δ) +Q+N1 +N2) = 0
(Pφ(δ) + α2Q)(Pφ(δ) +Q+N1 +N2)− (Pφ(δ) + αQ)2 = 0
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2) = 0
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αQ)2 = 0
have no real solutions for α when P,Q,N1, N2, δ > 0.
Consequently, there exists the smallest δ3 > 0 such that λZ(δ3) = 0. Thus, λZ(δ) > 0 for
0 < δ < δ3 and 3δ < ²UZ , and Pr{EZ2(1, 1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C} ≤ ²/3 for 0 < δ < min{δ3, ²UZ/3}
and N ≥ L5.
For the coding strategy to work, given an ² ∈ (0, 2+ I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )), pick 0 < ²UV < ² and
²UZ > 0 such that ²UV + ²UZ < [I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )]− Rcam(αcam)(1− ²/2), pick δ such that
0 < δ < min{1, δ0, δ1, δ2, δ3, ²UZ/3}, and pick N ≥ Nmin = max{L0, L1, L2, L3, L4, L5}.
Finally, we must ensure that ∆I(αcam) ≤ 0, where ∆I(αcam)
=
1
2
log
[
P (P +Q+N1 +N2)
(P + α2camQ)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αcamQ)2
]
=
1
2
log
[
P (P +Q+N1 +N2)(P +N1)
2
(P (P +N1)2 + P 2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P (P +N1) + PQ)2
]
=
1
2
log
[
(P +Q+N1 +N2)(P +N1)
2
((P +N1)2 + PQ)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− P (P +Q+N1)2
]
.
∆I(αcam) ≤ 0 when
(P +N1)
2(P +Q+N1 +N2) ≤ ((P +N1)2 + PQ)(P +Q+N1 +N2)
−P (P +Q+N1)2
0 ≤ PQ(P +Q+N1 +N2)− P (P +Q+N1)2
= P [PQ+Q2 +QN1 +QN2
−P 2 −Q2 −N21 − 2PQ− 2PN1 − 2QN1]
≥ P [P 2 + P (Q+ 2N1) +N21 +QN1 −QN2]
which is true when
0 ≤ P ≤ −N1 − Q
2
+
√
Q2 + 4QN2
2
.
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Finally, the upper bound on P is greater than 0 when
−N1 − Q
2
+
1
2
√
Q2 + 4QN2 > 0
Q2 + 4QN2 > (2N1 +Q)
2
N2 >
4N21 + 4QN1
4Q
= N1 +
N21
Q
.
¥
The system operating in the camouflage mode at the rate Rcam, with d ≥ 1 − ² and Pe ≤
² is optimal since the parameter α maximizes the rate while keeping the condition on the
equivocation and the probability of error satisfied. However, it cannot always be used due to
the condition on the leakage function. Next, the efficient camouflage mode is defined as an
alternative to the optimal camouflage mode.
The Efficient Camouflage Mode
We say that the system operates in the camouflage mode efficiently if the average information
leakage rate is zero, i.e., ∆I(α) = 0 or I(U˜ ; Z˜) = I(U˜ ;V ). Given the system parameters
P,Q,N1, and N2, the system operates efficiently if
α = α0 =
P
P +N1 +N2
[
1 +
√
P +Q+N1 +N2
Q
]
since, from equation (4.3), I(U˜ ; Z˜) = I(U˜ ;V ) when
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αQ)2 = P (P +Q+N1 +N2)
α2Q(P +Q+N1 +N2) = P
2 + 2αPQ+ α2Q2
α2Q(P +N1 +N2) = P
2 + 2αPQ
0 = α2Q(P +N1 +N2)− 2αPQ− P 2.
That is
α = α0 =
P
P +N1 +N2
[
1 +
√
P +Q+N1 +N2
Q
]
.
Hence, the efficient camouflage rate for the system with parameters P,Q,N1, N2, α = α0 is
Rcam(α0) =
1
2
log
[
P (P +Q+N1)
(P + α20Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + α0Q)2
]
The system can always operate in the efficient camouflage mode for non-zero α while the
optimal camouflage mode can be implemented for restricted P andN2. The efficient camouflage
mode is not optimal in term of rate of transmission but ensures that there is no leaking of the
secret message to the wiretapper.
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Figure 4.5: The rate of transmission as a function of α for the camouflage mode.
4.3.4 High-power Mode
Since the camouflage mode only works when ∆I(α) ≤ 0, we define the high-power mode for the
case ∆I(α) > 0 and prove an achievable rate at perfect secrecy with this mode of operation.
Given an ² > 0, let ²UZ be a constant associated with the codebook generating process, α
                                                      
Number of bins = 2N [I(U˜ ,Y˜ )−I(U˜ ;Z˜)−²]
2N [I(U˜ ;Y˜ )−²−²UZ ] codewords per codebook
2N [I(U˜ ;Z˜)−²UZ ] codewords per bin
Figure 4.6: The codebook for the high-power mode.
and δ be constants associated with the encoding and decoding processes, and ξ be a constant
associated with the wiretappers’s decoding process to be specified later. For ∆I(α) > 0,
1. Generating the codebook. Generate 2N [I(U˜ ;Y˜ )−²−²UZ ] sequences uN according to the dis-
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tribution p(uN ) =
∏N
i=1 p(ui), and p(ui) ∼ N (0, P ′ + α2Q) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Place the sequences uN randomly into 2N [I(U˜ ;Y˜ )−I(U˜ ;Z˜)−²] bins so that each bin con-
tains 2N [I(U˜ ;Z˜)−²UZ ] sequences. Index each bin by j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2NR}, where R =
I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ; Z˜)− ². The codebook is given to the sender and the recipient.
2. Encoding. To send a message j through an interference vN , the sender looks for a sequence
uc in bin j such that (uc, v
N ) ∈ TNU,V (δ) and transmit xN = uc − αvN . If there is more
than one sequence uc that is jointly typical with v
N , randomly select one.
3. Decoding. To decode the received sequence for the message, the recipient finds a sequence
uc in the codebook that is jointly typical with the received sequence y
N , i.e., (uc, y
N ) ∈
TNU,Y (δ). Declare the index to the bin, in which the sequence is found as the received
message.
4. Wiretapper’s decoding. The wiretapper receives a sequence zN and finds a sequence uc in
the codebook that is jointly typical with the received sequence zN , i.e., (uc, z
N ) ∈ TNU,Z(ξ).
Declare the index to the bin, in which the sequence is found as the received message.
5. Probability of error. An error occurs in the coding process when a message j is to be
transmitted and one or more of the following events occurs.
• EV (j): in the encoding process, there is no sequence uc in bin j that is jointly typical
with the interference sequence.
• EX(j): in the encoding process, xN = uc−αvN does not satisfy the power constraint.
• EY 1(j): in the decoding process, there is no sequence uc that is jointly typical with
the received sequence.
• EY 2(j): in the decoding process, a sequence uc in bin i 6= j is jointly typical with
the received sequence.
Theorem 4.3 Given the high-power mode of operation to be used in the Gaussian wiretap
channel with side information and average power constraint P , for any ² > 0 and
P > −Q
2
+
√
Q2 + 4Q(N1 +N2)
2
,
there exists an integer Nmin such that, for N ≥ Nmin,
H(SK)
N
≥ Rhigh , 1
2
log
[
(P +Q+N1)(N1 +N2)
(P +Q+N1 +N2)N1
]
− ²
H(SK |ZN )
H(SK)
≥ 1− ²
Pe ≤ ².
Proof: This proof consists of three main parts: proof of the rate, proof of the probability of
error, and proof of the equivocation.
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Proof of the Rate. The number of messages that can be sent is the number of bins in the
codebook, 2NRhigh(α) = 2N [I(U˜ ;Y˜ )−I(U˜ ;Z˜)−²]. Consequently, Rhigh(α)
= [I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ; Z˜)− ²]
(1)
=
1
2
log
[
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2
]
−1
2
log
[
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αQ)2
]
− ²
=
1
2
log
[
(P +Q+N1){(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αQ)2}
{(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2}(P +Q+N1 +N2)
]
− ²
(1) follows from equations (4.1) and (4.4). We select the optimal α for this coding strategy by
setting dRhigh(α)/dα to 0, resulting in
0 = [{(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2}(P +Q+N1 +N2)]×
[(P +Q+N1){2αQ(P +Q+N1 +N2)− 2Q(P + αQ)}]
−[(P +Q+N1){(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αQ)2}]×
[{2αQ(P +Q+N1)− 2Q(P + αQ)}(P +Q+N1 +N2)]
= [{(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2}]×
[{2αQ(P +Q+N1 +N2)− 2Q(P + αQ)}]
−[{(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αQ)2}]×
[{2αQ(P +Q+N1)− 2Q(P + αQ)}]
= [(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1){−2Q(P + αQ)}
−(P + αQ)2{2αQ(P +Q+N1 +N2)}]
−[(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2){−2Q(P + αQ)}
−(P + αQ)2{2αQ(P +Q+N1)}]
= N2(P + α
2Q){2Q(P + αQ)} −N2(P + αQ)2(2αQ)
= [2N2Q(P + αQ)]× [(P + α2Q)− α(P + αQ)]
= (P + αQ)(P − αP ).
Hence, dRhigh(α)/dα = 0 when α = 1,−P/Q. Rhigh(α) reaches its minimum value at α =
−P/Q and maximum value at α = αhigh = 1, and the maximum value is
Rhigh(1) =
1
2
log
[
(P +Q+N1){(P +Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P +Q)2}
{(P +Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P +Q)2}(P +Q+N1 +N2)
]
− ²
=
1
2
log
[
(P +Q+N1){(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P +Q)}
{(P +Q+N1)− (P +Q)}(P +Q+N1 +N2)
]
− ²
=
1
2
log
[
(P +Q+N1)(N1 +N2)
N1(P +Q+N1 +N2)
]
− ².
Proof of the probability of error. The probability of error is bounded by the probabilities
of {EV (1)} {EX(1)|EV (1)C}, {EY 1(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}, and {EY 2(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}, each of
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which can be bounded in the following steps.
Denote the kth auxiliary codeword in bin j by uc(j, k), where k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2N [I(U˜ ;Z˜)−²UZ ]}
and the selected auxiliary codeword in bin j, which is jointly typical with the interference, by
uc(j, k
∗). The transmitted codeword is then xN = uc(j, k
∗)− αvN .
Pe
(2)
≤
2NRhigh(α)∑
j=1
Pr{SK = j}[Pr{EV (j)}+ Pr{EX(j)|EV (j)C}
+Pr{EY 1(j)|EX(j)CEV (j)C}+ Pr{EY 2(j)|EX(j)CEV (j)C}]
(3)
= Pr{EV (1)}+ Pr{EX(1)|EV (1)C}
+Pr{EY 1(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}+ Pr{EY 2(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}].
(2) follows from the union bound. (3) follows from the fact that error events don’t depend on
the message j. We now consider the four terms in the summation separately.
Pr{EV (1)}. By the code generation process, Uc and V N are independent. By equation (2.21),
Pr{(Uc, V N ) 6∈ TNU,V (δ)} ≤ 1− (1− δ)2−N [I(U ;V )+3δ]
Pr{EV (1)}
(4)
≤ [1− (1− δ)2−N [I(U ;V )+3δ]]2N[I(U˜;Z˜)−²UZ ]
(5)
≤ exp{−(1− δ)2−N [I(U ;V )+3δ]}2N[I(U˜;Z˜)−²UZ ]
= exp{−(1− δ)2N [I(U˜ ;Z˜)−I(U ;V )−²UZ−3δ]}
≤ ²/3
when δ < 1, and
I(U˜ ; Z˜)− I(U ;V )− ²UZ − 3δ > 0 (4.14)
and
(1− δ)2N [I(U˜ ;Z˜)−I(U ;V )−²UZ−3δ] ≥ ln
[
3
²
]
N [I(U˜ ; Z˜)− I(U ;V )− ²UZ − 3δ] ≥ log
[
1
1− δ ln
[
3
²
]]
N ≥ L0,
where
L0 =
1
I(U˜ ; Z˜)− I(U ;V )− ²UZ − 3δ
log
[
1
1− δ ln
[
3
²
]]
.
(4) follows from the fact that there are 2N [I(U˜ ;Z˜)−²UZ ] codewords in a bin. (5) follows from the
fact that ea ≥ 1 + a (Taylor’s expansion of ea) [18].
We now consider the condition when inequality (4.14) is satisfied as follows.
I(U˜ ; Z˜)− I(U ;V )− ²UZ − 3δ = I(U˜ ; Z˜) + [−I(U˜ ;V ) + I(U˜ ;V )]− I(U ;V )− ²UZ − 3δ
= ∆I(α) + I(U˜ ;V )− I(U ;V )− ²UZ − 3δ
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Let gLHS(δ) = I(U˜ ;V ) − I(U ;V ), and gRHS(δ) = 3δ + ²UZ − ∆I(α). Then, gLHS(δ) and
gRHS(δ) are continuous functions. (See the proof of Theorem 4.2.)
Imposing the condition ∆I(α) > ²UZ , we have gRHS(0) < 0. From the facts that gLHS(0) = 0,
gRHS(0) = ²UZ −∆I(α) < 0, and gLHS(δ) is a monotonically decreasing continuous function
approaching −∞ while gRHS(δ) is a monotonically increasing continuous function approaching
∞ as δ increases, it follows that there exists a δ0 > 0 such that gLHS(δ0) = gRHS(δ0) by the
continuity of the functions [13]. Thus, gLHS(δ)− gRHS(δ) = I(U˜ ;V )− I(U ;V )− ²UZ − 3δ +
∆I(α) > 0 for 0 < δ < δ0 and ²UZ < ∆I(α), and Pr{EV (1)} ≤ ²/3 when 0 < δ < min{1, δ0},
²UZ < ∆I(α) and N ≥ L0.
Pr{EX(1)|EV (1)C}. If the event EV (1) does not occur, then we have that (uc(1, k∗), vN ) ∈
TNU,V (δ). By Lemma 2.12,
1
N
∑N
i=1 x
2
i ≤ P , and Pr{EX(1)|EV (1)C} = 0.
Pr{EY 1(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}. By Lemma 2.5 with ²1 = ²/3, there exists an integer L1 for a
given δ > 0 such that Pr{(Uc, Y N ) ∈ TNU,Y (δ)} > 1 − ²/3 when N ≥ L1, which implies that
Pr{EY 1(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C} ≤ ²/3 for a given δ > 0 and N ≥ L1.
Pr{EY 2(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}. By the code generating process, Uc(1, k∗) and Uc(1, k) are inde-
pendent, and so are Y N and Uc(1, k) for (i, k) 6= (1, k∗). By inequality (2.20), Pr{(Uc(i, k), Y N )
∈ TNU,Y (δ) < 2−N [I(U ;Y )−3δ] for (i, k) 6= (1, k∗). Hence,
Pr{EY 2(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}} ≤
∑
(i,k)6=(1,k∗)
2−N [I(U ;Y )−3δ]
(6)
≤ (2N [I(U˜ ;Y˜ )−²−²UZ ] − 1)2−N [I(U ;Y )−3δ]
< 2−N [I(U ;Y )−3δ−I(U˜ ;Y˜ )+²+²UZ ]
≤ ²/3
when
I(U ;Y )− I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− 3δ + ²+ ²UZ > 0,
and
N [I(U ;Y )− I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− 3δ + ²+ ²UZ ] ≥ log
[
3
²
]
N ≥ L2,
where
L2 =
1
I(U ;Y )− I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− 3δ + ²+ ²UZ
log
[
3
²
]
.
(6) follows from the union bound.
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Now, define λY (δ) = I(U ;Y )− I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− 3δ + ²+ ²UZ , and φ(δ) = (1 + 4δ ln(2))−1. We then
have that
λY (δ)
(7)
=
1
2
log
[
(Pφ(δ) + α2Q)(Pφ(δ) +Q+N1)
(Pφ(δ) + α2Q)(Pφ(δ) +Q+N1)− (Pφ(δ) + αQ)2
]
−1
2
log
[
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + αQ)2
]
− 3δ + ²+ ²UZ
λY (0)
(8)
> 0 (4.15)
lim
δ→∞
λY (δ) = −∞ for finite α, P,Q,N1 (4.16)
(7) follows from equation (4.4). (8) follows from the fact that φ(0) = 1.
Since λY (δ) is a continuous function (See the proof in Theorem 4.2), there exists the smallest
δ1 > 0 such that λY (δ1) = 0. Thus, λY (δ) = I(U ;Y ) − I(U˜ ; Y˜ ) − 3δ + ² + ²UZ > 0 for
0 < δ < δ1, and Pr{EY 2(1)|EX(1)C} ≤ ²/3 for 0 < δ < δ1 and N ≥ L2.
Combining the four terms of the summation,
Pe ≤ ²/3 + 0 + ²/3 + ²/3 = ²,
for 0 < δ < min{1, δ0, δ1}, 0 < ²UZ < ∆I(α), and N ≥ max{L0, L1, L2}.
Proof of the equivocation. This part of the proof is done in three steps:
1. show that H(SK |ZN ) = N [I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)]−H(Uc|SK , ZN );
2. show that I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z) ≥ Rhigh(α)(1− ²/2);
3. show that H(Uc|SK , ZN )/Rhigh(α)N ≤ ²/2.
Combining the above three steps,
H(SK |ZN )
H(SK)
=
N [I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)]−H(Uc|SK , ZN )
Rhigh(α)N
≥ 1− ²/2− H(Uc|S
K , ZN )
Rhigh(α)N
≥ 1− ²/2− ²/2
= 1− ².
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Proceeding to the first step,
H(SK |ZN ) = H(SK , ZN )−H(ZN )
= H(SK , Uc, Z
N )−H(Uc|SK , ZN )−H(ZN )
= H(Uc, Z
N ) +H(SK |Uc, ZN )−H(Uc|SK , ZN )−H(ZN )
(9)
= H(Uc|ZN )−H(Uc|SK , ZN )
(10)
≥ H(Uc|ZN )−H(Uc|Y N )−H(Uc|SK , ZN )
= H(Uc, Z
N )−H(ZN )−H(Uc, Y N ) +H(Y N )−H(Uc|SK , ZN )
= [H(Uc) +H(Z
N |Uc)]−H(ZN )− [H(Uc) +H(Y N |Uc)]
+H(Y N )−H(Uc|SK , ZN )
= H(ZN |Uc)−H(ZN )−H(Y N |Uc) +H(Y N )−H(Uc|SK , ZN )
= H(ZN |Uc)− [H(UN , ZN )−H(UN |ZN )]−H(Y N |Uc)
+[H(UN , Y N )−H(UN |Y N )]−H(Uc|SK , ZN )
= H(ZN |Uc)− [H(UN ) +H(ZN |UN )−H(UN |ZN )]−H(Y N |Uc)
+[H(UN ) +H(Y N |UN )−H(UN |Y N )]−H(Uc|SK , ZN )
(11)
= H(UN |ZN )−H(UN |Y N )−H(Uc|SK , ZN )
= I(UN ;Y N )− I(UN ;ZN )−H(Uc|SK , ZN )
= N [I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)]−H(Uc|SK , ZN )
where (9) follows from the fact that H(SK |Uc, ZN ) = 0. (10) follows from the fact that
H(Uc|Y N ) ≥ 0. (11) follows from the fact that H(ZN |Uc) = H(ZN |UN ) and H(Y N |Uc) =
H(Y N |UN ) since the realization of Uc is generated from UN .
In step 2, we note that the function Rhigh(α)(1 − ²/2) = (I(U˜ ; Y˜ ) − I(U˜ ; Z˜) − ²)(1 − ²/2) is
parabolic in ², with the minimum at ² = 1 + [I(U˜ ; Y˜ ) − I(U˜ ; Z˜)]/2, and Rhigh(α)(1 − ²/2) =
I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ; Z˜) when ² = 0 or 2+ I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ; Z˜). Hence, Rhigh(α)(1− ²/2) < I(U˜ ; Y˜ )−
I(U˜ ; Z˜) when ² ∈ (0, 2 + I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ; Z˜)).
Now, I(U ;Y ) − I(U ;Z) is continuous in δ with the value of I(U˜ ; Y˜ ) − I(U˜ ; Z˜) at δ = 0, and
Rhigh(α)(1− ²/2) is continuous and constant in δ with the value less than I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ; Z˜).
If the two curves do not intersect, then there is no constraint on δ. However, if the two curves
intersect, then 0 < δ < δ∗, where δ∗ is the smallest value such that the two curves intersect.
Then the condition on δ becomes 0 < δ < δ2, where δ2 = min{δ∗,∞}. Thus,
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z) ≥ Rhigh(α)(1− ²/2),
when
² ∈ (0, 2 + I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ; Z˜)),
δ < δ2.
Note that for ² ≥ 2+ I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ; Z˜), I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ; Z˜)− ² < 0, 1− ² < 0, ² > 1, and there
is nothing to prove.
In step 3, the wiretapper’s decoding process is considered. In the wiretapper’s decoding process,
the wiretapper must select a parameter ξ for the joint typical decoder. If ξ 6= δ, the set
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TNU (δ) 6= TNU (ξ), and the decoder is not reliable. Hence, the wiretapper should select ξ = δ,
and that is what we will assume in the following analysis.
Firstly, the entropy of the codeword conditioned on bin j and the wiretapper’s observation is
related to the probability of error PB in the wiretapper’s bin-decoding process through random
variable χ defined as
χ =
{
1 if ψ(ZN ) 6= Uc
0 if ψ(ZN ) = Uc
,
where ψ(ZN ) is the wiretapper’s decoding function. Then, the probability of error in the
wiretapper’s bin-decoding process is bounded using the union bound, resulting in constraints
on δ and N .
Now, the entropy of the codeword conditioned on bin j and the wiretapper’s observation ZN
is related to the probability of error in the bin-decoding process.
H(Uc|SK , ZN ) = H(χ,Uc|SK , ZN )−H(χ|Uc, SK , ZN )
= H(χ|SK , ZN ) +H(Uc|χ, SK , ZN )−H(χ|Uc, SK , ZN )
(12)
≤ H(χ|SK) +H(Uc|χ, SK , ZN )
=
2NRhigh(α)∑
j=1
Pr{SK = j}[H(χ|SK = j)
+p(χ = 0|SK = j)H(Uc|ZN , SK = j, χ = 0)
+p(χ = 1|SK = j)H(Uc|ZN , SK = j, χ = 1)]
≤
2NRhigh(α)∑
j=1
Pr{SK = j}[h(PB) + (1− PB)H(Uc|ZN , SK = j, χ = 0)
+PBH(Uc|ZN , SK = j, χ = 1)]
≤
2NRhigh(α)∑
j=1
Pr{SK = j}[h(PB) + PB log(2N [I(U˜ ;Z˜)−²UZ ] − 1)]
= h(PB) + PB log(2
N [I(U˜ ;Z˜)−²UZ ] − 1)
≤ h(PB) + PBN [I(U˜ ; Z˜)− ²UZ ]
≤ h(PB) + PBNI(U˜ ; Z˜)
H(Xc|SK , ZN )
Rhigh(α)N
≤ h(PB) + PBNI(U˜ ; Z˜)
Rhigh(α)N
≤ ²/2,
for N ≥ L3 = 2h(PB)/{Rhigh(α)²−2PBI(U˜ ; Z˜)}, and PB < Rhigh(α)²/2I(U˜ ; Z˜), where h(PB)
is the binary entropy function. (12) follows from the fact that H(χ|SK , ZN ) ≤ H(χ|SK) and
H(χ|Uc, SK , ZN ) = 0.
To bound PB , define the following events associated with the wiretapper’s bin-decoding process:
• EZ1(j): in the wiretapper’s bin-decoding process, there is no sequence uc in bin j that is
jointly typical the received sequence zN .
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• EZ2(j): in the wiretapper’s bin-decoding process, a sequence uc 6= uc(j, k∗) is jointly
typical with the received sequence zN for uc in bin j.
An error in wiretapper’s bin-decoding process occurs when at least one of the events EZ1(j)
and EZ2(j) occurs when there is no encoding error. Then, the probability of wiretapper’s
decoding error given the secret message is
PB = p(χ = 1|SK = j)
≤ Pr{EZ1(j)|EX(j)CEV (j)C}+ Pr{EZ2(j)|EX(j)CEV (j)C}
= Pr{EZ1(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}+ Pr{EZ2(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}.
The two probabilities Pr{EZ1(j)|EX(j)CEV (1)C} and Pr{EZ2(j)|EX(j)CEV (1)C} are evaluated
as follows:
Pr{EZ1(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}. By Lemma 2.5 with ²1 = Rhigh(α)²/6I(U˜ ; Z˜), there exists L4
such that Pr{(Uc, ZN ) ∈ TNU,Z(δ)} > 1− Rhigh(α)²/6I(U˜ ; Z˜) for a given δ > 0 when N ≥ L4,
which implies that Pr{EZ1(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C} ≤ Rhigh(α)²/6I(U˜ ; Z˜) for a given δ > 0 and
N ≥ L4.
Pr{EZ2(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C}. By the same analysis as in the evaluation of the probability
Pr{EZ2(1, 1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C} in the proof of Theorem 4.2 with a replacement of Rcam(α)
by Rhigh(α), Pr{EZ2(1)|EX(1)CEV (1)C} ≤ ²/3 for 0 < δ < min{δ3, ²UZ/3} and N ≥ L5.
For the coding strategy to work, given an ² ∈ (0, 2+I(U˜ ; Y˜ )−I(U˜ ; Z˜)), pick 0 < ²UZ < ∆I(1),
and δ such that 0 < δ < min{1, δ0, δ1, δ2, δ3, ²UZ/3}, and pick N ≥ Nmin = max{L0, L1, L2, L3,
L4, L5}.
Finally, we must ensure that ∆I(αhigh) > 0, where ∆I(αhigh)
=
1
2
log
[
P (P +Q+N1 +N2)
(P + α2highQ)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αhighQ)2
]
=
1
2
log
[
P (P +Q+N1 +N2)
(P +Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P +Q)2
]
∆I(αhigh) > 0 when
P (P +Q+N1 +N2) > (P +Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P +Q)2
0 > Q(P +Q+N1 +N2)− P 2 − 2PQ−Q2
< P 2 + PQ−Q(N1 +N2)
which is true when
P > −Q
2
+
√
Q2 + 4Q(N1 +N2)
2
.
¥
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4.4 Performance Comparisons
4.4.1 Behavior of the Leakage Function
Given the system parameters P,Q,N1 and N2, the leakage function associated with the pa-
rameters can be derived. Based on the leakage function, the parameter α can be selected
appropriately to optimize the rate of transmission while maintaining the perfect secrecy. Be-
low, the behavior of the leakage function is examined in details by looking at some of its
properties.
Definition of the leakage function for GWCSI.
∆I(α) = I(U˜ ; Z˜)− I(U˜ ;V )
=
1
2
log
[
P (P +Q+N1 +N2)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αQ)2
]
.
The leakage function is positive when α = 0
∆I(0) =
1
2
log
[
P (P +Q+N1 +N2)
P (P +Q+N1 +N2)− P 2
]
=
1
2
log
[
P +Q+N1 +N2
Q+N1 +N2
]
> 0
The value of the leakage function is zero at α = α0, where
α0 =
P
P +N1 +N2
[
1 +
√
P +Q+N1 +N2
Q
]
.
The leakage function has its maximum value at α = αw.
d∆I(α)
dα
=
1
2 ln(2)
[
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αQ)2
P (P +Q+N1 +N2)
]
×
−
[
P (P +Q+N1 +N2){2αQ(P +Q+N1 +N2)− 2Q(P + αQ)}
{(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αQ)2}2
]
= − 1
ln(2)
[
αQ(P +Q+N1 +N2)−Q(P + αQ)
(P + α2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− (P + αQ)2
]
.
Setting d∆I(α)/dα = 0,
α(P +Q+N1 +N2) = P + αQ
α = αw =
P
P +N1 +N2
< α0.
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The leakage function has a positive value at α = 0 and increases to its maximum value at
α = αw then decreases to 0 at α = α0. The leakage of the secret message to the wiretapper
is therefore maximized if α = αw. Note here that when α = αw, the capacity of the combined
main-wiretap channel is reached and is equal to 12 log[
P+N1+N2
N1+N2
] while the secret message rate
in the main channel is below the capacity of the main channel ( 12 log[
P+N1
N1
]), which is achieved
when α = αcam.
There are three types of the leakage function characterized by the parameter α0. The first type
of the leakage function has 0 < α0 ≤ αcam. In this situation, the leakage function becomes
non-positive when α ≥ α0 as seen in Figure 4.7. The second type of the leakage function has
αcam < α0 ≤ 1; the values of the function are positive at α = αcam and non-positive at α = 1,
respectively. See Figure 4.8. The third type has α0 > 1, with a positive value of the function
at α = 1. See Figure 4.9. This characterization will be useful for selecting mode of operation
that is appropriate for a given set of the parameters as described in the next section.
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Figure 4.7: A leakage curve for the optimal camouflage mode.
4.4.2 A Characterization of GWCSI
We define Pcam and Phigh for the characterization of GWCSI as
Pcam = −N1 − Q
2
+
√
Q2 + 4QN2
2
Phigh = −Q
2
+
√
Q2 + 4Q(N1 +N2)
2
.
The characterization of the channel can be done based on the analysis of the leakage function
and the proposed modes of operation, given a set of parameters P,Q,N1 and N2, into:
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Figure 4.8: A leakage curve for the efficient camouflage mode.
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Figure 4.9: A leakage curve for the high-power mode.
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1. The channel that is suitable for the optimal camouflage mode. The parameters associated
with the channel of this type must satisfy the condition: 0 < P ≤ Pcam.
2. The channel that is suitable for the high-power mode. The parameters associated with
the channel of this type must satisfy the condition: P > Phigh.
3. The channel that is suitable for the efficient camouflage mode. The parameters associated
with the channel of this type must satisfy the condition: Pcam < P ≤ Phigh
Hence, a mode of operation together with an appropriate α can be selected by comparing the
given parameter P to Pcam and Phigh calculated from Q,N1 and N2.
If the system parameters are adjustable, the channel can be tuned so that the desired mode
of operation can be employed. For instance, if P is adjustable and Pcam > 0, all of the three
modes of operation can be used based on the selection of P ; thereby allowing the tradeoff
between the average power constraint and the rate of transmission while maintaining perfect
secrecy as illustrated in Figure 4.10. The rate corresponding to P ≤ Pcam is Rcam(αcam) in
the optimal camouflage mode. The rate corresponding to Pcam ≤ P ≤ Phigh is Rcam(α0) in
the efficient camouflage mode. The rate corresponding to P > Phigh is Rhigh(αhigh) in the
high-power mode.
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Figure 4.10: The power-rate tradeoff curve when Pcam > 0 at perfect secrecy.
On the other hand, if P is adjustable and Pcam ≤ 0, either the efficient mode or the high power
mode can be selected based on the average power constraint P , and the tradeoff between the
average power constraint and the rate of transmission while maintaining perfect secrecy is
illustrated in Figure 4.11.
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Figure 4.11: The power-rate tradeoff curve when Pcam ≤ 0 at perfect secrecy.
The curves in Figure 4.10 and 4.11 are continuous and can be described as follows. The
power-rate tradeoff relation at perfect secrecy is
Rate =

1
2 log
[
P+N1
N1
]
for 0 ≤ P ≤ Pcam and α = αcam
1
2 log
[
P (P+Q+N1)
(P+α20Q)(P+Q+N1)−(P+α0Q)
2
]
for Pcam ≤ P ≤ Phigh and α = α0
1
2 log
[
(P+Q+N1)(N1+N2)
(P+Q+N1+N2)N1
]
for Phigh ≤ P and α = αhigh
,
The curve is continuous since at P = Pcam, α0 = αcam while α0 = αhigh at P = Phigh.
4.5 An Achievable Region for GWCSI
Based on the camouflage and the high-power modes and the time-sharing lemma (Lemma
4.13), we prove an achievable region for the GWCSI. The achievability of a rate-equivocation
pair is defined in the same way as in the case of GWC. Before proving the achievable region,
we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.14 For the Gaussian wiretap channel with side informatin with the parameters
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(P,Q,N1, N2), the pair (CM , dC) is achievable, where
CM =
1
2
log
[
P +N1
N1
]
dC = 1− 1
2CM
log
[
(P (P +N1)
2 + P 2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)
(P (P +N1)2 + P 2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− P 2(P +Q+N1)2
]
.
Proof: The main channel is the dirty-paper channel; hence the rate CM is the capacity of the
main channel and is achievable for arbitrarily small probability of error by the coding strategy
proposed by Costa in [3]. Only the equivocation is left to be proved. We will use the same
notation as that in the description of the camouflage mode and show that, at α = αcam,
1. H(SK |ZN ) ≥ N [I(U ;Y )− I(U˜ ;V )− I(U ;Z)− ²UV ];
2. I(U ;Y )− I(U˜ ;V )− I(U ;Z)− ²UV ≥ (CM − ²)
[
1− I(U˜ ;Z˜)
I(U˜ ;Y˜ )−I(U˜ ;V )
− ²
]
.
Combining the two steps,
H(SK |ZN )
H(SK)
≥ 1
(CM − ²)NN [I(U ;Y )− I(U˜ ;V )− I(U ;Z)− ²UV ]
≥ 1
(CM − ²)N (CM − ²)N
[
1− I(U˜ ; Z˜)
I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V ) − ²
]
= 1− I(U˜ ; Z˜)
CM
− ²
= dC − ²
since
dC = 1− I(U˜ ; Z˜)
CM
= 1− 1
2CM
log
[
((P +N1)
2 + PQ)(P +Q+N1 +N2)
((P +N1)2 + PQ)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− P (P +Q+N1)2
]
CM = I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )
=
1
2
log
[
P
P +N1
]
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Proceeding to the first step,
H(SK |ZN ) = H(SK , ZN )−H(ZN )
= H(SK , Uc, Z
N )−H(Uc|SK , ZN )−H(ZN )
= H(SK |Uc, ZN ) +H(Uc|ZN )−H(Uc|SK , ZN )
(1)
= H(Uc|ZN )−H(Uc|SK , ZN )
(2)
≥ H(Uc|ZN )−N [I(U˜ ;V ) + ²UV ]
(3)
≥ H(Uc|ZN )−H(Uc|Y N )−N [I(U˜ ;V ) + ²UV ]
= [H(Uc, Z
N )−H(ZN )]− [H(Uc, Y N )−H(Y N )]−N [I(U˜ ;V ) + ²UV ]
= [H(Uc) +H(Z
N |Uc)−H(ZN )]− [H(Uc) +H(Y N |Uc)−H(Y N )]
−N [I(U˜ ;V ) + ²UV ]
(4)
= [H(ZN |Uc)−H(ZN |UN )−H(UN ) +H(UN |ZN )]
−[H(Y N |Uc)−H(Y N |UN )−H(UN ) +H(UN |Y N )−N [I(U˜ ;V ) + ²UV ]
(5)
= H(UN |ZN )−H(UN |Y N )−N [I(U˜ ;V ) + ²UV ]
= I(UN ;Y N )− I(UN ;ZN )−N [I(U˜ ;V ) + ²UV ]
= N [I(U ;Y )− I(U˜ ;V )− I(U ;Z)− ²UV ].
(1) follows from the fact that H(SK |Uc, ZN ) = 0. (2) follows from the fact that there are
2N [I(U˜ ;V )+²UV ] auxiliary codewords in a bin. (3) follows from the fact that H(Uc|Y N ) ≥ 0.
(4) follows from the fact that H(ZN ) = H(UN ) + H(ZN |UN ) − H(UN |ZN ) and H(Y N ) =
H(UN ) +H(Y N |UN ) −H(UN |Y N ). (5) follows from the fact that H(Y N |Uc) = H(Y N |UN )
and H(ZN |Uc) = H(ZN |UN ).
Proceeding to the second step, define gLHS(δ) = I(U ;Y )− I(U˜ ;V )− I(U ;Z) + I(U˜ ; Z˜)− ²UV
and gRHS(δ) = CM (1 − ²) = [I(U˜ ; Y˜ ) − I(U˜ ;V )](1 − ²). Imposing the condition I(U˜ ; Y˜ ) −
I(U˜ ;V )− ²UV > CM (1− ²), then
gLHS(0) = I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )− ²UV
gRHS(δ) = CM (1− ²) < gLHS(0).
Hence, gLHS(δ) is continuous in δ with the value of I(U˜ ; Y˜ ) − I(U˜ ;V ) − ²UV at δ = 0 while
gRHS(δ) is continuous and constant in δ with the value less than I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )− ²UV . If
the two curves do not intersect, then there is no constraint on δ. However, if the two curves
intersect, then we have the constraint 0 < δ < δ∗, where δ∗ is the smallest value such that the
two curves intersect. Then the condition on δ becomes 0 < δ < δ0, where δ0 = min{δ∗,∞}.
Consequently,
I(U ;Y )− I(U˜ ;V )− I(U ;Z) + I(U˜ ; Z˜)− ²UV ≥ [I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )][1− ²],
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and
I(U ;Y )− I(U˜ ;V )− I(U ;Z)− ²UV
≥ [I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )][1− ²]− I(U˜ ; Z˜)
= [I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )]
[
1− I(U˜ ; Z˜)
I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V ) − ²
]
> [I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V )− ²]
[
1− I(U˜ ; Z˜)
I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V ) − ²
]
= (CM − ²)
[
1− I(U˜ ; Z˜)
I(U˜ ; Y˜ )− I(U˜ ;V ) − ²
]
when
²UV < I(U˜ , Y˜ )− I(U˜ , V )− CM (1− ²) = ²CM
δ < δ0.
The theorem follows by setting appropriate constants ²UV and δ. ¥
Theorem 4.4 For the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information, a rate-equivocation
pair (R, d) is achievable if
R ≤ CM
d ≤ 1
Rd ≤

CM 0 < P ≤ Pcam
min{CMdC , R1} Pcam < P ≤ Phigh
min{CMdC , R2} P > Phigh
where
CM =
1
2
log
[
P
P +N1
]
dC = 1− 1
2CM
log
[
(P (P +N1)
2 + P 2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)
(P (P +N1)2 + P 2Q)(P +Q+N1 +N2)− P 2(P +Q+N1)2
]
R1 =
1
2
log
[
P (P +Q+N1)
(P + α20Q)(P +Q+N1)− (P + α0Q)2
]
R2 =
1
2
log
[
(P +Q+N1)(N1 +N2)
(P +Q+N1 +N2)N1
]
α0 =
P
P +Q+N1
[
1 +
√
P +Q+N1 +N2
Q
]
.
Proof: For 0 < P ≤ Pcam, the optimal camouflage mode can be used to achieve the pair
(CM , 1). Using codes that perform worse than that in the camouflage mode achieve the pairs
dominated by (CM , 1).
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For Pcam < P ≤ Phigh, if R1 ≤ CMdC , time-share the code in the efficient camouflage mode
with the code achieving the pair (CM , R1/CM ). Otherwise, time-share the codes achieving the
pairs (CMdc, 1) and (CM , dC).
For P > Phigh, if R2 ≤ CMdC , time-share the code in the high-power mode with the
code achieving the pair (CM , R2/CM ). Otherwise, time-share the codes achieving the pairs
(CMdc, 1) and (CM , dC). ¥
4.5.1 Bounds on the Rate at Perfect Secrecy
The rate of transmission at perfect secrecy depends only on the average power constraint
parameter P when Q,N1 and N2 are given. An upper bound on the rate can be obtained when
considering the following:
H(SK |ZN )
(1)
≤ H(SK |ZN ) + [H(SK |Y N )−H(SK |ZN , Y N )]
(2)
≤ H(SK |ZN ) + [H(SK |SˆK)−H(SK |ZN , Y N )]
(3)
≤ H(SK |ZN ) + [f(Pe)−H(SK |ZN , Y N )]
= H(SK |ZN )−H(SK |ZN , Y N ) + f(Pe) = I(SK ;Y N |ZN ) + f(Pe)
(4)
= H(SK |ZN )−H(SK |Y N ) + f(Pe)
= I(SK ;Y N )− I(SK ;ZN ) + f(Pe)
where
f(Pe) = −Pe log(Pe)− (1− Pe) log(1− Pe) +KPe log(|S|).
(1) follows from the fact that H(SK |Y N ) − H(SK |ZN , Y N ) ≥ 0. (2) follows from the data
processing inequality. (3) follows from Fano’s inequality. (4) follows from the fact that ZN is
a degraded version of Y N .
The simplest upper bound follows from the fact that I(SK ;ZN ) ≥ 0.
H(SK |ZN ) ≤ I(SK ;Y N ) + f(Pe)
≤ 1
2
log
[
P +N1
N1
]
+ f(Pe).
If there exists a code for a reliable communication at rate H(SK)/N , f(Pe) tends to 0 as N
approaches ∞. This upper coincides with the capacity of the dirty-paper channel when the
noise in the main channel has variance N1.
A lower bound can be obtained by considering the interference as an additional noise in the
main channel unknown to the sender. Accordingly, this is the case of Gaussian wiretap channel
with σ2η1 = Q+N1 as opposed to N1. At perfect secrecy, the rate of transmission is
I(X˜; Y˜ )− I(X˜; Z˜) = 1
2
log
[
(P +Q+N1)(Q+N1 +N2)
(Q+N1)(P +Q+N1 +N2)
]
.
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Figure 4.12: Bounds on power-rate tradeoff curve when Pcam > 0 at perfect secrecy.
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Figure 4.13: Bounds on power-rate tradeoff curve when Pcam ≤ 0 at perfect secrecy.
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As a reference, we consider the case of Gaussian wiretap channel with parameters σ2X ≤
P +Q, σ2η1 = N1 and σ
2
η2 = N2. The rate of transmission of this case is
I(X˜; Y˜ )− I(X˜; Z˜) = 1
2
log
[
(P +Q+N1)(N1 +N2)
(N1)(P +Q+N1 +N2)
]
.
From Figures 4.12 and 4.13, we see that the curve of the proposed strategy coincides with the
upper bound for 0 < P ≤ Pcam, and coincides with the reference curve when P ≥ Phigh, and
is considerable higher than the lower bound.
4.6 Remarks
In this chapter, the interference-free mode based on the code-partitioning concept is proposed
as a specific coding strategy for the Gaussian wiretap channel. It is extended to the camouflage
and the high-power modes for the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information.
The introduction of leakage functions leads to a characterization of the GWCSI. The leakage
functions can be used as a basis for selecting a mode of operation for a specific GWCSI. With
this tool, a designer with flexible average power constraint can trade between the power and the
rate of transmission using the camouflage mode and the high-power mode while maintaining
asymptotic perfect secrecy.
The power-rate tradeoff at perfect secrecy curve is then compared to the upper and the lower
bounds, which indicates that the system performs significantly better when the interference is
known to the encoder in advance as opposed to treating it as noise in the channel.
Additionally, an achievable region for the GWCSI is derived based on time-sharing different
codes, but the capacity region is still unknown.
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Chapter 5
An Application of GWCSI
5.1 Introduction
The coding strategy for the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information finds it application
in information hiding with the main concern in the secrecy of the information. The coding
strategies proposed in the previous chapter can asymptotically achieve the perfect secrecy
with tremendous complexity of the random coding technique. Although the random coding
technique is rather impractical, it provides a limit of how far one can goes and, often enough,
a clue of how a practical scheme may be implemented. In this chapter, an implementation
of the coding strategy for the dirty-paper channel proposed by Eggers et al. in [8] for image
watermarking is reviewed. The implementation is straightforwardly extended to augment the
secrecy of the message against the wiretapper in the situation of the Gaussian wiretap channel
with side information.
5.2 Information Embedding Based on Structured
Codebooks
In [8], Eggers et al. introduced a blind watermarking scheme based on structured codebooks.
The scheme is based on the random coding strategy for the dirty-paper channel discussed in
the previous chapter and employs a lattice-structured codebook to reduce the complexity. The
watermarking scheme aims to embed information in a medium, which can be regarded as the
interference in the dirty-paper channel. The medium is known to the encoder in advance and
can be used as side information in the encoding process. A case of binary-alphabet messages
of the scheme is reviewed here.
Let S represent a message such that S ∈ {0, 1} to be communicated over a dirty-paper channel
with interference V ∼ N (0, Q) and noise η1 ∼ N (0, N1) under an average power constraint P .
Let U0 and U1 be sets of codewords corresponding to the message ”0” and ”1,” respectively.
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The sets are constructed as uniform quantizers with cell width αω so that
U0 = {u = iαω : i are integers} (5.1)
U1 = {u = iαω + αω
2
: i are integers}. (5.2)
The parameters α and ω will be specified later. The entire codebook, C = U0 ∪U1, is given to
αω
h h h hﬀ -
ﬀ -ﬀ- codewords
αω/2
h
Figure 5.1: The codebook consists of the quantization points in U0 and U1.
both the sender and the recipient. In Figure 5.1, the points on the axis marked by the circles
are the codewords in U0 representing the message ”0,” and the points of the axis marked by
the vertical lines are the codewords in U1 representing the message ”1.”
Given an interference value v and a message s, the encoder uses the quantizer Us/α to quantize
the interference so that the output of the quantizer and the quantizer error respectively are
vq = Q(v, Us
α
)
e = vq − v. (5.3)
The encoder transmits αe. The recipient receives y = αe + v + η1 from the channel and
decodes for the message by quantizing y with both U0/α and U1/α to obtain the corresponding
quantization errors e0 and e1. The recipient declares ”0” as the received message if |e0| ≤ |e1|;
otherwise, declares ”1” as the received message.
e0 = y −Q(y, U0
α
) (5.4)
e1 = y −Q(y, U1
α
) (5.5)
The parameters ω and α are used to adjust the average input power and optimizing the
transmission rate. The scaled quantization error is the input to the channel. It has been
shown that, for a uniform quantizer, the mean squared error is E[e2] = (αω)
2
12 . To achieve
the average power constraint, let (αω)
2
12 = P . Given the interference variance Q and the noise
variance N1, the optimal ω that optimizes the rate is estimated numerically in [8] to be
ω =
√
12(P + 2.71N1). (5.6)
The corresponding α is
α = αq =
√
P
12(P + 2.71N1)
. (5.7)
The procedures for generating the codebook, encoding and decoding are summarized as follows:
1. Generating the codebook. Given an average power constraint P and noise variance N1,
calculate ω and αq according to equations (5.6), and (5.7), respectively. Construct two
uniform quantizers U0 and U1 according to equations (5.1) and (5.2). Distribute αq to
the sender and the two quantizers U0/αq and U1/αq to the sender and the recipient.
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2. Encoding. To send a message s through a channel with interference v, calculate the
quantization error of v with respect to Us/αq according to equation (5.3). Transmit αqe.
3. Decoding. The recipient receives y = αqe+ v + η1 and calculates the quantization errors
e0 and e1 of y with respect to U0/αq and U1/αq, respectively. Declare ”0” as the received
message if |e0| ≤ |e1|; otherwise, declares ”1” as the received message.
This information embedding scheme is implemented as a basis for the extension to be described
in the next section. The probability of error at the recipient depends on the Watermark-
to-Noise Ratio (WNR) defined in [8] as 10 log10(P/N1). The performance of the system is
simulated, and the result is similar to what was obtained in [8] as plotted in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Performance of the information embedding scheme based on structured codebooks
as a function of WNR.
An experiment of using the scheme with an image is performed on the 256-level gray-scaled
image of Lena (Figure 5.3). The image is used as a medium for information embedding and is
considered as the interference in the dirty-paper model. It consists of 256×256 pixels, and the
variance of the pixel intensity is measured to be 0.0352. In a baseline experiment, 256 × 256
bits of information are embedded into the image, and the probability of error in detecting the
information and the degradation of the image is observed. We fix the average power constraint
P at 0.0001 and WNR at 12 dB, which implies that N1 = 6.3096× 10−6.
The resulting image at the recipient is shown in Figure 5.4. The recipient sees the image with
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) 34.3296 dB and can detect embedded information with probability
of error 4.1199 × 10−4. In the next section, we will enhance the secrecy of the embedded
information when there is an adversary observing the image being transmitted based on the
GWCSI model.
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The Original Image
Figure 5.3: The orignal image, with 256-level gray scale and 256 × 256 pixels, used in the
experiments.
The Embeded Image (P = 0.0001, WNR = 12).
SNR = 34.3296 dB.
Figure 5.4: Information embedded image based on a structured codebook.
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5.3 Information Embedding with Secrecy in Images
The information embedding scheme reviewed in the previous section can be extended based
on the model of Gaussian wiretap channel with side information to enhance the secrecy of the
information embedded. Two approaches of the extension are considered. The direct approach
makes use of a key that is regarded as the noise in the wiretap channel while the indirect
approach uses an interference mismatch as the noise in the wiretap channel.
5.3.1 Direct Approach
A direct extension of the information embedding scheme based on structured codebooks is done
by introducing a key that is known to both the sender and the recipient. The key is perceived
as an additional noise by the wiretapper. This can be straightforwardly implemented by adding
the key to αqe before the transmission; hence, what the recipient observes is y = αqe+η2+v+η1,
where η2 is the key available to the sender and the recipient. Before the detection, the recipient
subtracts the key from the received value and decodes for the message. If the variance of the
key is high enough, the perfect secrecy of the message is asymptotically possible as shown in
the case of the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information in the previous chapter. The
procedure for binary message embedding using this extended scheme is described below.
1. Generating the codebook. Construct the two uniform quantizers U0 and U1 as before.
Generate a key sequence ηN2 of the same length as that of the message i.i.d. according
to N (0, N2). Distribute αq to the sender, the key sequence ηN2 and the two quantizers
U0/αq and U1/αq to the sender and the recipient.
2. Encoding. To send a message s through a channel with interference v, calculate the
quantization error of v with respect to Us/αq according to equation (5.3). Transmit
αqe+ η2.
3. Decoding. The recipient observes y = αqe+ η2 + v + η1 and calculates the quantization
errors e0 and e1 of y − η2 with respect to U0/αq and U1/αq, respectively. Declare ”0” as
the received message if |e0| ≤ |e1|; otherwise, declares ”1” as the received message.
Implementing the direct approach with WNR = 12 dB P = 0.0001 and Q = 0.1, the probability
of error at the wiretapper is plotted as a function of the key power as multiples of the average
power constraint on the codewords in Figure 5.5. Note that, for a fixed WNR, the probability
of error tends to 0.5 as the key power increases.
For a fixed key power N2 = 3P , the equivocation of the message at the wiretapper increases as
the power of the noise in the main channel approaches 0 i.e., WNR approaches ∞. However,
the increase of the equivocation is not monotonic as shown by a simulation result in Figure
5.6.
We conjecture that the dip in the probability of error results from the fact that the codebook
parameters ω and α are optimized for the rate of transmission, not for the equivocation. As
seen in the analysis of the equivocation in the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information
case, the codebook parameters crucially influence the equivocation at the wiretapper.
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Figure 5.5: Performance of the secrecy-enhanced information embedding scheme based on
structured codebooks as a function of key power at WNR = 12 dB.
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Figure 5.6: Performance of the direct approach secrecy-enhanced information embedding
scheme based on structured codebooks as a function of WNR.
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Applying the direct approach of the extension of the implementation to Lena image with a key
sequence of generated i.i.d. from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 0.0003, the
recipient detects the embedded information with probability of error 3.2043 × 10−4 while the
wiretapper detects the embedded information with probability of error 0.4870. The transmitted
image however suffers a severe degradation (SNR = 28.1982 dB) due to the direct addition of
the key since the output of the channel is y = αe+ η2 + v + η1. See Figure 5.7.
Direct Approach (P = 0.0001, N2 = 0.0003, WNR = 12).
SNR = 28.1982 dB.
Figure 5.7: Direct approach secrecy-enhanced embedded image.
This straightforward extension increases the secrecy of the message at the cost of the degra-
dation of the interference. In the next section, an indirect approach is proposed so that the
quality of the image does not degrade as much as that in the direct approach.
5.3.2 Indirect Approach
An alternative extension integrates the key η2 as part of the interference. The coding procedure
is as described before except the encoding and the decoding processes since the interference
does not affect the codebook generating process.
1. Encoding. To send a message s through a channel with interference v, calculate e, the
quantization error of v + η2 with respect to Us/αq, where e = Q(v + η2, Usαq ) − v − η2.
Transmit αqe.
2. Decoding. The recipient observes y = αe+ v + η1 and calculates the quantization errors
e0 and e1 of y + η2 with respect to U0/αq and U1/αq, respectively. Declare ”0” as the
received message if |e0| ≤ |e1|; otherwise, declare ”1” as the received message.
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Figure 5.8: Comparison of the performances of the direct/indirect approach secrecy-enhanced
information embedding scheme based on structured codebooks as a function of WNR.
Indirect Approach (P = 0.0001, N2 = 0.0003, WNR = 12).
SNR = 34.1037 dB.
Figure 5.9: Indirect approach secrecy-enhanced embedded image.
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We compare the performances by simulation in term of the probability of error as a function
of WNR of the indirect approach and the direct approach in Figure 5.8, which indicates that
there is virtually no difference in the performance of the two approaches.
Applying the indirect approach of the extension of the implementation to the Lena image with a
key sequence generated i.i.d. from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 0.0003,
the recipient detects the embedded information with probability of error 0.0003 while the
wiretapper detects the embedded information with probability of error 0.4906. The transmitted
image suffers a small degradation (SNR = 34.1037 dB). See Figure 5.9.
5.4 Remarks
The Gaussian wiretap channel model is used for secret embedding in an image via extensions
of a simple watermarking scheme based on the quantization technique. The direct extension
adds the key sequence, available to only the sender and the recipient, directly to the image
after the secret embedding process. The indirect extension regards the key sequence as another
interference known to the encoder and uses it as side information in the encoding process to
mitigate the degradation of the image.
The results of the experiments show that as the WNR increases, the equivocation of the
embedded information improves while the power of the key sequence is fixed. On the contrary,
the equivocation does not monotonically increase as the power of the key sequence increases.
This situation may be improved by taking the equivocation into consideration when calculating
the parameters α and ω.
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Chapter 6
Wiretap Channel II with Side
Information
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we revisit the wiretap channel II briefly introduced in Chapter 3 and relate the
concept of Inverse/Dimension Length Profile (IDLP) to the coding strategy based on linear
block codes used in [16] by Ozarow and Wyner to prove the achievability of the capacity region
of the channel. This relationship provides a linkage between the performance of a system
designed based on a generator matrix of a linear block code and a structure of the matrix,
which can be used as a guideline for designing a good system for the channel based on a
finite-length linear block code.
The wiretap channel II model is then considered under the hypothesis that the wiretapper
has a capability to obtain a part of the uncoded message in addition to his capability to
wiretap the main channel. The performance of the code designed for the wiretap channel II
can be analyzed for the more capable wiretapper by employing the concept of Inverse Relative
Dimension/Length Profile proposed by Luo et al. in [15] as an extension to the concept of
IDLP.
Based on the concepts of IDLP and IRDLP, a guideline for designing good finite-length codes
for the wiretap channel II and the wiretap channel II with side information are obtained.
6.2 A Coding Strategy for the Wiretap Channel II
Let SK be the information to be kept secret, XN be the output of the system encoder, τ c ⊆
{0, 1, 2, . . . , N} be an index set of size µ, and the wiretapped bits are Zµ = XNτc , where S,X,
and Z ∈ {0, 1}. The information source is assumed to be memoryless binary symmetric, that is
Pr{S = 0} = Pr{S = 1} = 1/2. Let A be a K ×N parity-check matrix known to the encoder,
the decoder and the wiretapper. The coding strategy for the wiretap channel II as described
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in Chapter 3 is called the coset coding method based on linear block codes and is summarized
as follows:
1. Generating the codebook. Given a rank-K K × N binary parity-check matrix A, solve
the equation AxT = sT for each of the 2K possible messages sT . Generate 2K bins and
uniquely associate each bin with a message. Put the 2N−K solutions corresponding to
each sT into the bin associated with the message. Distribute the bins of length-N vectors
as a codebook to the sender and the recipient.
2. Encoding. To send a message sT , randomly select a vector in the bin associated with the
message and transmit the vector through the channel.
3. Decoding. The recipient observes the transmitted vector without error and declares the
message associated with the bin containing the received vector as the received message.
The rate of this code is related to the dimension of the matrix A by R = K/N , and the
probability of error is zero if there exists such a matrix. The equivocation of the message at
the wiretapper can also be linked to the matrix A. With the knowledge of A and zµ = xτc , the
wiretapper can resolve the problem of determining the message into finding the set of solutions
to the linear equation corresponding to each possible message sT :
Aτx
T
τ +Aτcx
T
τc = s
T
Aτx
T
τ = s
T +Aτcx
T
τc , (6.1)
where Aτ denotes the submatrix of A consisting of columns of A indexed by τ ; xτ denotes
the subvector of x consisting of components of x indexed by τ , and τ c = {1, 2, . . . , N} \ τ .
Equation (6.1) suggests that the number of possible messages sT after observing xτc is 2
Λ,
where Λ = rank(Aτ ).
Furthermore, for each possible sT , there are 2N−µ−Λ valid solutions to the equation out of
2N−µ possible xTτ . Due to the coding strategy, all x
T are equally likely; hence, the probability
that each message occurs is 2N−µ−Λ/2N−µ = 2−Λ, and the uncertainty of the message is
H(SK |Zµ) = Λ for a given τ . Therefore, the best that the wiretapper can do is to select the
subset τ c such that Λ is minimized so that the equivocation is
∆ = min
τc:|τc|=µ
H(SK |Zµ) = min
τ :|τ |=N−µ
rank(Aτ ). (6.2)
On the contrary, a system designer should seek to maximize the equivocation ∆ by searching for
a good matrix A. To help the search, the concept of Inverse Dimension/Length Profile (IDLP)
is brought in to link the equivocation of the message to the matrix as shown in the section 6.4.
Next, we outline the important parts of the proof of the achievability of the capacity region of
the wiretap channel II.
6.3 Capacity Region of the wiretap channel II
Ozarow and Wyner established the capacity region of the wiretap channel II in [16] to be the
set of (R,α, d) such that R ≥ 0, α ≤ 1, and
0 ≤ d ≤
{
1, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1−R,
1−α
R , for 1−R ≤ α ≤ 1.
(6.3)
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The important parts of the proof of achievability are to show that the points (R, 1 − R, 1) is
achievable for 0 ≤ R ≤ 1 and (R,α, (1−α)/R) is achievable for 0 ≤ R ≤ 1 and 1−R ≤ α ≤ 1.
These two parts are outlined here for they are crucial in understanding the analysis of the case,
in which there is side information available to the wiretapper. The second part is the result of
the following lemma.
Lemma 6.15 ([16]) Suppose that we are given an encoder/decoder pair with parameters N,K
and Pe. Suppose that there are two wiretappers who have parameters µ = µ1, µ2 and ∆ =
∆1,∆2, respectively. If µ2 ≥ µ1, then ∆2 ≥ ∆1 − (µ2 − µ1).
Proof: Let τ c1 ⊆ τ c2 ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N} where |τ c1 | = µ1, |τ c2 | = µ2. Let Zi = Zµi = XNτc
i
be the
vector containing the components of XN indexed by τ ci . Then,
H(SK |Z2)−H(SK |Z1) = H(SK |Z2, Z1)−H(SK |Z1)
= −I(SK ;Z2|Z1)
≥ −H(Z2|Z1) ≥ −(µ2 − µ1),
where the last inequality follows from τ c1 ⊆ τ c2 . Thus
H(SK |Z2) ≥ H(SK |Z1)− (µ2 − µ1)
≥ ∆1 − (µ2 − µ1) (6.4)
from the definition of ∆. Minimizing (6.4) over all τ c2 with |τ c2 | = µ2, yields
∆2 ≥ ∆1 − (µ2 − µ1).
¥
Lemma 6.15 implies that
∆2
K
≥ ∆1
K
− µ2/N − µ1/N
K/N
,
from which we conclude that (R,α1, δ1) is achievable implies that (R,α2, δ2) is achievable where
α2 ≥ α1 and
δ2 ≥ δ1 −
(
α2 − α1
R
)
.
The achievability proof of the triple (R, 1 − R, 1) for 0 ≤ R ≤ 1 is based on the properties of
large binary random matrices given by Lemma 6.16 and Lemma 6.17 below.
Lemma 6.16 [16] Let 1 ≤ K ≤ N , and let the K × N matrix A over GF (2) be chosen
at random with uniform distribution on the set of 2KN binary K × N matrices. Then, for
1 ≤ L ≤ K, Pr{rank(A) < K − L} ≤ 2−(L+1)(N−K)+N .
Proof: See Lemma 5 in [16]. ¥
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Lemma 6.17 [16] Let 1 ≤ K ≤ N , and let K×N matrix A over GF(2) be chosen at random
with uniform distribution on the set of 2KN binary K ×N matrices. Then
Pr{rank(A) = K} =
K−1∏
j=0
(1− 2j−N ) ≥ 1− K2
K−1−N
1− 2K−1−N .
Proof: See Lemma 6 in [16]. ¥
It was shown that there exists a K×N matrix A such that, for ² > 0 and sufficiently large N ,
1. rank of any K + ²N columns of A is close to K, and
2. rank of A is K.
Hence, the matrix A can be used to generate a codebook for the wiretap channel II that
achieves the triple (R, 1−R, 1).
Combining the two parts, the achievable region of the wiretap channel II is obtained. It seems
that to attain good tradeoffs, large matrices (large N) are required. In the following sections,
the characteristics of the matrices good for the wiretap channel II are investigated. It turns
out that there also exist good matrices of small sizes for the channel, but only for certain rates
(K/N).
6.4 Equivocation and IDLP
In [9], Forney introduced concepts associated with linear block codes used to analyze their
trellis complexity. One of the concepts called Inverse Dimension/Length Profile of an (N,K)
linear block code C, demonstrates the dependency of the equivocation on the structure of the
matrix A generating the code. Denoted by k˜(C), the IDLP of C is defined as a sequence of
length N + 1 with components
k˜i(C) = min
τ
{k[Pτ (C)] : |τ | = i}, 0 ≤ i ≤ N,
where Pτ (C) is the projection of C onto τ . The projection of a code C onto an index set
τ ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , N} is defined as the code C whose all codewords’ components indexed by the
members of τ c are set to 0, and k[Pτ (C)] is the dimension of the projection.
Denoted by a set consisting of its codewords, a (3,2) code C = {000, 011, 101, 110} is used in an
example to calculate the sequence k˜(C). There are four terms in the sequence corresponding
to four possible cardinalities of τ . There is one way of selecting τ for |τ | = 0 or 3, and there
are three ways of selecting τ for |τ | = 1 or 2. Hence,
k˜0(C) = min{0} = 0
k˜1(C) = min{1, 1, 1} = 1
k˜2(C) = min{2, 2, 2} = 2
k˜3(C) = min{2} = 2,
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and k˜(C) = {0, 1, 2, 2}. In the case that a code C is generated by a matrix A, k[Pτ (C)] =
rank(Aτ ). Then,
k˜i(C) = min
τ
{rank(Aτ ) : |τ | = i}, 0 ≤ i ≤ N. (6.5)
Equations (6.2) and (6.5) imply that if a matrix A is used to generate a codebook for the
wiretap channel II according to the procedure described in section 6.2, and it is a generator
matrix for a code C, then the ith component k˜i(C) of the IDLP is the equivocation of the
message encoded by the system using the matrix A, given any N − i bits of a transmitted
vector being wiretapped. k˜(C) can be used as a performance index of the code generated from
a matrix for the wiretap channel II.
The (3,2) code C = {000, 011, 101, 110} is generated from the matrix:
A =
[
1 0 1
0 1 1
]
.
Hence, if the matrix A is used for generating the codebook for the wiretap channel II, then
the k˜(C) = {0, 1, 2, 2} indicates that the equivocations of the message are 0, 1, 2 and 2 if the
wiretapper can respectively choose 3, 2, 1, 0 bit(s) from the transmitted vector while the rate
is 2/3 with zero probability of error.
6.5 An Upper Bound on Equivocation
The matrix A generating the codebook for the wiretap channel II determines the performance
of the system in that the dimension of A signifies the rate (K/N), and k˜(C) indicates the
equivocation sequence. Given a fixed rate K/N , a system designer seeks to find a K × N
matrix so that each component of the associated IDLP is as high as possible. An upper bound
on IDLP is given by Forney in [9] as
k˜i(C) ≤ UP (k˜) =
{
K, K ≤ i ≤ N,
i, 0 ≤ i ≤ K. (6.6)
If the upper bound UP (k˜) is written in term of µ (i = N − µ) and normalized by the message
length K, and let α = µ/N , then
UP (k˜) =
{
K, 0 ≤ µ ≤ N −K
N − µ, N −K ≤ µ ≤ N
UP (k˜)
K
=
{
1, 0 ≤ µN ≤ N−KN
N−µ
K ,
N−K
N ≤ µN ≤ 1
=
{
1, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1−R
1−α
R , 1−R ≤ α ≤ 1
which coincides with (6.3) – the boundary of the capacity region of the wiretap channel II.
Note that UP (k˜) depends on K and N . Hence, at a given rate R = K/N , perfect secrecy of
the message can be maintained if µ ≤ N −K and there exists a code that achieves the upper
bound. However, if µ > N −K, there is no way to maintain perfect secrecy.
98 CHAPTER 6. WIRETAP CHANNEL II WITH SIDE INFORMATION
If the sender knows exactly the number of bits µ that the wiretapper can choose to observe, he
can try to find a matrix such that k˜N−µ(C) meets the upper bound. When µ is unknown to
the sender, a matrix that allows the IDLP to meets the upper bound at all points is desired.
The sufficient and necessary condition for the IDLP of a code to achieve the upper bound at all
points shown in [9] is that the code is MDS, which is defined as an (N,K) code with minimum
distance of N −K + 1. Unfortunately, there are only 3 types of binary MDS codes:
• (N, 1) code: A = [1 1 1 . . . 1];
• (N,N − 1) code: A = [u I], where u is the all-one vector, and I is the identity matrix;
• (N,N) code: A = I.
We further note that performing the elementary row operations on the matrix A does not
change its IDLP structure as shown in the example in the following section.
6.6 An Example of Rate 2/3 Binary Codes
Consider the rate 2/3 code C = {000, 011, 101, 110} used in section 6.4 generated by the matrix
A =
[
1 0 1
0 1 1
]
.
Since the minimum distance of C is 2 = 3-2+1, C is an MDS code. We also note that A is also
a parity-check matrix of the code C⊥ = {000, 111}. The codebook generated from the matrix
A is
s transmitted vectors
00 000,111
01 010,101
10 011,100
11 001,110
Table 6.1: Rate 2/3 codebook for the wiretap channel II
In section 6.4, k˜(C) was calculated to be {0, 1, 2, 2}. According to equation (6.6), the upper
bound on the equivocation for rate 2/3 codes is {0, 1, 2, 2}. The IDLP of the code C then
meets the upper bound, and the code for the wiretap channel II generated from the matrix
A is the most robust rate 2/3 binary code because it provides maximum equivocation for all
possible µ.
6.7 A Wiretapper with Side Information
Now that the properties of good binary codes for the wiretap channel II are identified, we
investigate the situation, in which the wiretapper has an additional capability of obtaining a
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part of the uncoded message as side information. We are interested in how well the coding
strategy described in section 6.2 performs in this situation.
Let ρ be an index set such that ρ ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,K} and |ρ| = a2. The wiretapper can select the
set ρ to index a2 components of S
K as side information. Let Sa11 = S
K
ρc and S
a2
2 = S
K
ρ , where
a1 + a2 = K. Under this circumstance, a system designer seeks to maximize the conditional
equivocation
∆S1|S2,Z = min
τc:|τc|=µ
ρ:|ρ|=a2
H(Sa11 |Sa22 ,Zµ).
Employing the same coding strategy with a parity-check matrix A as before with a more
capable wiretapper, the task of the wiretapper in extracting the message becomes simpler.
The wiretapper now needs to solve fewer sets of simultaneous equations with fewer unknowns:[
A1τ
A2τ
]
xTτ =
[
sT1
sT2
]
+
[
A1τc
A2τc
]
xTτc ,
where
A =
[
A1
A2
]
and Aτ =
[
A1τ
A2τ
]
,
and rank(A1) = a1; rank(A2) = a2. The goal of the designer then becomes maximizing
∆S1|S2,Z = min
τc:|τc|=µ
ρ:|ρ|=a2
H(Sa11 |Sa22 ,Zµ)
= min
τc:|τc|=µ
ρ:|ρ|=a2
{H(Sa11 ,Sa22 |Zµ)−H(Sa22 |Zµ)}
= min
τ:|τ|=N−µ
ρ:|ρ|=a2
{rank(Aτ )− rank(A2τ )}. (6.7)
To study the characteristics of good codes for this wiretap channel II with side information,
we make a connection, in the following sections, between the equivocation and the concept of
Inverse Relative Dimension/Length Profile (IRDLP) introduced in [15].
6.8 Equivocation and IRDLP
Motivated by the communication situation of the multiuser wiretap channel, the concept of
IDLP associated with a linear block code was extended to Inverse Relative Dimension/Length
Profile (IRDLP) of a linear block code and its subcodes in [15]. IRDLP of an (N,K) code
C1 and its subcode C2 is defined as the sequence K˜(C1, C2) with components K˜i(C
1, C2) =
minτ{k[Pτ (C1)] − k[Pτ (C2)] : |τ | = i}, 0 ≤ i ≤ N , where C2 is an a2-dimensional linear
subspace of C1.
If the code C1 is generated by the matrix A, and the code C2 is generated by the submatrix
A2 defined in the previous section, then the C
2 is a subcode of C1, and
K˜i(C
1, C2) = min
τ :|τ |=i
{k[Pτ (C1)]− k[Pτ (C2)]}
= min
τ :|τ |=i
{rank(Aτ )− rank(A2τ )}
= min
τc:|τc|=N−i
{H(Sa11 ,Sa22 |Zµ)−H(Sa22 |Zµ)}.
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K˜(C1, C2), the structure of the specific code/subcode pair (C1, C2), is the minimization over all
possible τ while the equivocation is the minimization over all possible τ and ρ. Consequently,
the ith component K˜i(C
1, C2) of the IRDLP is the equivocation of the information given any
N − i bits of a transmitted vector being wiretapped and that Sa22 corresponding to C2 is given
to the wiretapper as side information. Therefore, IRDLP of a linear block code, C1, and its
subcode, C2, is the sequence of equivocation of the information when the matrix A is used
to encode SK , and A2 corresponds to the side information given to the wiretapper, and µ
bits are wiretapped, where µ runs from N down to 0. An upper bound for the IRDLP and
characteristics of a code/subcode pair achieving the upper bound are discussed in the next
section.
6.9 An Upper Bound on the Performance
In [15], an upper bound on the IRDLP associated with an (N,K) code C1 and its a2-
dimensional subcode C2 is proved to be
K˜(C1, C2) ≤ UP (K˜) = {0, . . . , 0, 1, 2, . . . ,K − a2, . . . ,K − a2},
where max{i : K˜i(C1, C2) = 0} = a2. Equivalently,
K˜i(C
1, C2) ≤ UP (K˜) =

0, 0 ≤ i ≤ a2,
i− a2, a2 ≤ i ≤ K,
K − a2, K ≤ i ≤ N.
For i = N − µ,
K˜N−µ(C
1, C2) ≤

0, N − a2 ≤ µ ≤ N,
N − µ− a2, N −K ≤ µ ≤ N − a2,
a1, 0 ≤ µ ≤ N −K.
(6.8)
The upper bound indicates that, for rate K/N , and Sa22 corresponding to C
2 is given to the
wiretapper as side information, the system can guarantee that the wiretapper can be ignorant
of the information Sa11 if the number of bits being wiretapped is less than or equal to N−K, and
there exists a code/subcode pair achieving the upper bound, but nothing can be guaranteed if
the number of bits being wiretapped is more than or equal to N − a2.
In the case that the set ρ and the parameter µ are known in advance, the system designer
can look for a code/subcode pair (C1, C2) such that K˜N−µ(C
1, C2) meets the upper bound
UP (K˜) to attain the optimum equivocation. The set ρ and the parameter µ are however not
necessarily known to the system designer beforehand. It is therefore desirable to have a code
C1 such that the upper bound is achieved for all possible ρ and µ. The theorem below provides
a sufficient condition for a code and its subcode to meet the upper bound on IRDLP.
Theorem 6.5 If C1 is an MDS code, then for any C2 being a subcode of C1, K˜(C1, C2) =
UP (K˜).
Proof: Let C1 be an (N,K) MDS code under the hypothesis. Let C2 be an (N, a2) subcode
of C1 and A2 be an a2×N generator matrix of C2. Now, construct a K×N generator matrix
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A of C1 by appending K − a2 length-N row vectors to A2. Because C1 is an MDS code,
k˜(C1) = UP (k˜), i.e.,
min
τ :|τ |=i
rank(Aτ ) = UP (k˜) =
{
i if 0 ≤ i ≤ K
K if K < i ≤ N.
Any i columns of the matrix A are independent for i ≤ K, which implies that rank(A) depends
only on |τ | = i, and is independent of a specific τ , yielding minτ :|τ |=i rank(Aτ ) = min{i,K}.
Hence,
K˜i(C
1, C2) = min
τ :|τ |=i
{rank(Aτ )− rank(A2τ )}
=
{
i−maxτ :|τ |=i rank(A2τ ) if 0 ≤ i ≤ K,
K −maxτ :|τ |=i rank(A2τ ) if K ≤ i ≤ N
=

i− i if 0 ≤ i ≤ a2,
i− a2 if a2 ≤ i ≤ K,
K − a2 if K ≤ i ≤ N.
= UP (K˜),
and the theorem follows. ¥
This theorem suggests that when a generator matrix of an (N,K) MDS code exists and is used
to generate a codebook for the wiretap channel II with side information, the codebook is the
most robust codebook for rate K/N with zero probability of error since the codebook allows
the maximum equivocation for such coding strategy for all possible ρ and µ.
Consider the code C1 = {000, 011, 101, 110} used as a rate 2/3 example in section 6.6. If
|ρ| = a2 = 1, then UP (K˜) = {0, 0, 1, 1} for N = 3,K = 2 and a2 = 1. Let the matrix
A =
[
1 0 1
0 1 1
]
.
be the generator matrix of C1 and be used to generate the codebook for the wiretap channel
II with side information. Assume that µ = 1. Two sets of ρ’s are possible. If ρ = {1}, the
corresponding submatrix for the side information is A2 = [1 0 1], and the corresponding C
2 is
{000, 101}. As a result,
K˜0(C
1, C2) = min{0} = 0
K˜1(C
1, C2) = min{0, 1, 0} = 0
K˜2(C
1, C2) = min{1, 1, 1} = 1
K˜3(C
1, C2) = min{1} = 1,
and K˜(C1, C2) = {0, 0, 1, 1} = UP (K˜).
Similarly, if If ρ = {2}, the corresponding submatrix for the side information is A2 = [0 1 1],
and the corresponding C2 is {000, 011}. As a result,
K˜0(C
1, C2) = min{0} = 0
K˜1(C
1, C2) = min{1, 0, 0} = 0
K˜2(C
1, C2) = min{1, 1, 1} = 1
K˜3(C
1, C2) = min{1} = 1,
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and K˜(C1, C2) = {0, 0, 1, 1} = UP (K˜). The implication is that the one bit of the message is
kept secret from the wiretapper if the other bit of the message and one bit of the codeword
are given to the wiretapper.
Although it is shown that using generator matrix of an MDS code C1 to construct a codebook
for the wiretap channel II with side information is sufficient for the IRDLP of a code/subcode
pair (C1, C2) to meet the upper bound, it is not necessary as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.6 Let C be an (N,K) binary MDS code generated by a matrix M, and l be
[1 0 0 . . . 0]T of length N . Let C1 be the code generated by the matrix A = [l M] used in the
encoding/decoding processes, and C2 be generated by A2 being the last K − 1 rows of A. Then
K˜(C1, C2) = UP (K˜).
Proof: By hypothesis of the theorem, rank(M) = K, and rank of the last K − 1 rows of M
is K − 1. rank(A2) = K − 1 since A2 is the last K − 1 rows ofM prepended by a zero vector.
Then, UP (K˜) = {0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1}, where max{i : UP (K˜)i = 0} = K − 1. To compute
K˜(C1, C2), first consider the first K terms in the sequence. For 0 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, we can select
τ ⊆ {2, 3, . . . , N} such that |τ | = i and k[Pτ (C1)] − k[Pτ (C2)] = i − i = 0 since C is MDS;
hence, K˜i(C
1, C2) = 0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ K − 1. To compute the ith = Kth term in the sequence, we
consider the following three cases.
• case 1: 1 6∈ τ ,
* k[Pτ (C
1)]− k[Pτ (C2)] = K − k[Pτ (C2)] ≥ 1 since C is MDS;
• case 2: 1 ∈ τ and k[Pτ0(C1)]− k[Pτ0(C2)] = 0 where τ0 = τ \ {1},
* k[Pτ0(C
2)] = k[Pτ0(C
1)] = K − 1 since C is MDS;
* k[Pτ (C
2)] = k[Pτ0(C
2)] = K − 1 by construction;
* k[Pτ (C
1)] = k[Pτ (C
2)] + 1 = K by construction;
* hence, k[Pτ (C
1)]− k[Pτ (C2)] = 1;
• case 3: 1 ∈ τ and k[Pτ0(C1)]− k[Pτ0(C2)] = 1 where τ0 = τ \ {1},
* k[Pτ (C
1)]− k[Pτ (C2)] = k[Pτ (C1)]− k[Pτ0(C2)] by construction;
* k[Pτ (C
1)]− k[Pτ0(C2)] ≥ k[Pτ0(C1)]− k[Pτ0(C2)] = 1;
* k[Pτ (C
1)]− k[Pτ (C2)] ≤ 1;
* hence, k[Pτ (C
1)]− k[Pτ (C2)] = 1.
Hence, K˜K(C
1, C2) = 1. For K < i ≤ N , K˜(C1, C2) is a non-decreasing sequence (from [15]),
and K˜i(C
1, C2) ≤ UP (K˜)⇒ K˜i(C1, C2) = 1, and the theorem follows. ¥
As an example, let’s construct a codebook for the wiretap channel II with side information
based on Theorem 6.6. Let C be the MDS code {000, 011, 101, 110} and ρ = {2}. Then the
matrix A is constructed to be
A =
[
1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1
]
,
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s transmitted vectors
00 0000,0111,1100,1011
01 0010,0101,1110,1001
10 0011,0100,1000,1111
11 0001,0110,1010,1101
Table 6.2: Rate 1/2 codebook for the wiretap channel II with side information.
and the corresponding A2 is [0 0 1 1]. Then, C
1 = {0000, 1101, 0011, 1110}, and C2 =
{0000, 0011}, and the codebook constructed based on the matrix A is
The terms in the IRDLP sequence are
K˜0(C
1, C2) = min{0} = 0
K˜1(C
1, C2) = min{1, 1, 0, 0} = 0
K˜2(C
1, C2) = min{1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1} = 1
K˜3(C
1, C2) = min{1, 1, 1, 1} = 1
K˜4(C
1, C2) = min{1} = 1,
and K˜(C1, C2) = {0, 0, 1, 1, 1} = UP (K˜). However, for ρ = {1}, A2 = [1 1 0 1], and C2 =
{0000, 1101}. The terms in the IRDLP sequence are
K˜0(C
1, C2) = min{0} = 0
K˜1(C
1, C2) = min{0, 0, 1, 0} = 0
K˜2(C
1, C2) = min{0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1} = 0
K˜3(C
1, C2) = min{1, 1, 1, 1} = 1
K˜4(C
1, C2) = min{1} = 1,
and K˜(C1, C2) = {0, 0, 0, 1, 1} ≤ {0, 0, 1, 1, 1} = UP (K˜).
If the codebook in Table 6.2 is employed, the rate of transmission is 1/2, and the equivocation
sequence meets the upper bound UP (K˜) for all possible µ when ρ = {2}. However, for ρ = {1},
the equivocation does not meet the upper bound for µ = 2. This codebook makes the first bit
of the message more vulnerable. In contrast to using this codebook, the codebook in Table 6.1
allows the equivocation to meet the upper bound for all possible ρ and µ.
From the examples above, the coset coding method based on linear block codes allows perfect
secrecy for the communication through the wiretap channel II with/without side information.
Nevertheless, to achieve the perfect secrecy, there are certain strong restrictions on the rate of
transmission and the difference in the secret sensitivity of the message bits to the parameter ρ.
If arbitrarily small deviation from the perfect secrecy is allowed, it is shown in the next section
that there exist good linear block codes for the coset coding method at all rates smaller than
one.
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6.10 An Achievable Region
In this section, an achievable region for the wiretap channel II with side information is proved
based on the same strategy as that used in [16]. A quadruple (R,R1, α, δ) is said to be
achievable if, for all ² < 0, there exists an encoder/decoder pair with parameters N ≥ N0 such
that
K ≥ (R− ²)N,
a1 ≥ (R1 − ²)N,
µ ≥ (α− ²)N,
∆S1|S2,Z ≥ (δ − ²)a1
Pe ≤ ²,
where
∆S1|S2,Z = min
τc:|τc|=µ
ρ:|ρ|=a2
H(Sa11 |Sa22 , Zµ)
Pe =
1
K
K∑
k=1
Pr{Sk 6= Sˆk},
K is length of the message, a2 is length of the side information given to the wiretapper,
a1 = K − a2, and µ is the number of wiretapped bits.
To prove the achievable region of the wiretap channel II with side information, we make a
direct use of the properties of binary random matrices as in the proof of the capacity region
of the wiretap channel II (Lemmas 6.16 and 6.17) and extend Lemma 6.15 to Lemma 6.18 in
order to accommodate the side information.
Lemma 6.18 Suppose that a parity-check matrix AK×N is used with the coset coding method
for the wiretap channel II with side information, and there are two wiretappers who have
parameters (τ c1 ,∆S1|S2,Z1) and (τ
c
2 ,∆S1|S2,Z2), where τ
c
1 and τ
c
2 are the index sets used to
identify the components of the transmitted vectors observed by the wiretappers. If |τ c2 | = µ2 ≥
|τ c1 | = µ1, then
∆S1|S2,Z2 ≥ ∆S1|S2,Z1 − (µ2 − µ1).
Proof: From equation (6.7), the equivocation is related to the matrix A by
∆S1|S2,Z = min
τ:|τ|=N−µ
ρ:|ρ|=a2
{rank(Aτ )− rank(Aρτ )}.
Let τ1, τ2 and ρ1 ρ2 respectively be the index sets to the codeword components and message
components so that |τ c1 | = µ1, |τ c2 | = µ2, |ρ1| = |ρ2| = a2 and
∆S1|S2,Z1 = rank(Aτ1)− rank(Aρ1τ1)
∆S1|S2,Z2 = rank(Aτ2)− rank(Aρ2τ2).
Let’s consider the relation of the equivocations in two cases: when τ2 ⊆ τ1 and when τ2 6⊆ τ1.
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case 1 : τ2 ⊆ τ1
Consider the matrices Aτ2 and Aρ2τ2 , with the fact that τ2 ⊆ τ1, we have the relations:
rank(Aτ1)− (µ2 − µ1) ≤ rank(Aτ2) ≤ rank(Aτ1) (6.9)
rank(Aρ2τ1)− (µ2 − µ1) ≤ rank(Aρ2τ2) ≤ rank(Aρ2τ1). (6.10)
Hence,
∆S1|S2,Z2 = rank(Aτ2)− rank(Aρ2τ2) ≥ rank(Aτ1)− (µ2 − µ1)− rank(Aρ2τ1)
≥ rank(Aτ1)− (µ2 − µ1)− rank(Aρ1τ1)
= ∆S1|S2,Z1 − (µ2 − µ1).
case 2 : τ2 6⊆ τ1
Let τ∗ ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N} be an index set to columns of A such that τ2∩τ∗ = ∅ and |τ∗| = µ2−µ1.
Since appending columns of A indexed by τ ∗ to the matrix Aτ2 increases the equivocation at
most µ2 − µ1,
∆S1|S2,Z2 + (µ2 − µ1) ≥ rank(Aτ2∪τ∗)− rank(Aρ2(τ2∪τ∗))
≥ rank(Aτ1)− rank(Aρ1τ1) = ∆S1|S2,Z1
∆S1|S2,Z2 ≥ ∆S1|S2,Z1 − (µ2 − µ1).
Combining the two cases results in the theorem. ¥
We are now ready to prove the achievable region for the wiretap channel II with side information
based on the coset coding method with linear block codes in the following Theorem.
Theorem 6.7 If the coset coding method is used with linear block codes for the wiretap channel
II with side information , (R,R1, α, δ) is achievable if R ≥ 0, 0 ≤ R1 ≤ R,α ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ δ ≤

1, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1−R,
1−α−(R−R1)
R1
, 1−R ≤ α ≤ 1− (R−R1),
0, 1− (R−R1) ≤ α ≤ 1.
Proof: Given R ≥ 0, 0 ≤ R1 ≤ R, we first show that (R,R1, 1 − R, 1) is achievable for all
² > 0. The rest follows from Lemma 6.18.
Let A be a K × N matrix to be used with the coset coding method for the wiretap channel
II with side information. The rate of transmission then is K/N and R1 = (K − a2)/N . For a
given ², let µ = N −K − ²N so that α = µ/N = 1−R− ². We will show that there exists at
least a matrix that can be used as the matrix A so that δ ≥ 1− ².
Define an indicator function of the matrix A as
Ψ(A) =
{
1 if minτ:|τ|=N−µ
ρ:|ρ|=a2
{rank(Aτ )− rank(Aρτ )} < a1 − L or rank(A) < K,
0 otherwise,
for 0 ≤ L ≤ a1, where a1 = K − a2 and Aρτ is the submatrix of A consisting of rows indexed
by members of ρ and columns indexed by members of τ . We must then show that there exists
a matrix A with Ψ(A) = 0.
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Ψ(A) is upper bounded by
Ψ(A) ≤
∑
τ:|τ|=N−µ
ρ:|ρ|=a2
Φ(A, τ, ρ) + Φ0(A),
where
Φ0(A) =
{
1 if rank(A) < K,
0 otherwise,
and
Φ(A, τ, ρ) =
{
1 if rank(Aτ )− rank(Aρτ ) < a1 − L,
0 otherwise.
Now if the matrix AK×N is selected at random from all possible 2
KN matrices, we have, for
given τ such that |τ | = N − µ, ρ such that |ρ| = a2, a1 = K − |ρ| and 0 ≤ L ≤ a1,
Pr{rank(Aτ )− rank(Aρτ ) < a1 − L} = Pr{rank(Aτ ) < a1 − L+ rank(Aρτ )}
≤ Pr{rank(Aτ ) < a1 − L+ a2}
= Pr{rank(Aτ ) < K − L}
≤ 2N−µ2−(L+1)(N−µ−K).
The last inequality follows from applying Lemma 6.16 to the K × (N − µ) matrix Aτ . For
Φ(A, τ, ρ) is an indicator function, E[Φ(A, τ, ρ)] = Pr{rank(Aτ ) − rank(Aρτ ) < a1 − L} ≤
2N−µ2−(L+1)(N−µ−K).
Furthermore, from Lemma 6.17,
E[Φ0(A)] = Pr{rank(A) < K} ≤ K2
K−1−N
1− 2K−1−N ≤
K2K−N
1− 2K−N .
Since there are no more than 2N possible τ ’s and 2N possible ρ’s,
E[Ψ(A)] ≤ 22N2−(L+1)(N−µ−K)+(N−µ) + K2
K−N
1− 2K−N
For µ = N −K − ²N and K = RN ,
E[Ψ(A)] ≤ 2−L²N+3N + RN2
−(1−R)N
1− 2−(1−R)N .
For sufficiently large N1 and L ≥ 4/², E[Ψ(A)] < 1. Since Ψ(·) is an integer-valued function,
there must exist a K ×N matrix A∗ such that Ψ(A∗) = 0 so that
rank(A∗) = K, and
a1δ = ∆S1|S2,Z
= min
τ:|τ|=N−µ
ρ:|ρ|=a2
{rank(A∗τ )− rank(A∗2τ )}
≥ a1 − L.
For any ² > 0 and N0, pick L ≥ 4/², N ≥ max{N0, N1, L/R1²}. Then δ ≥ 1−L/R1N ≥ 1− ².
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Under the same assumption of using the coset coding method with linear block codes, the
converse to Theorem 6.7 is also true. That is if (R,R1, α, δ) is achievable, R ≥ 0, 0 ≤ R1 ≤ R,
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and
δ ≤

1, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1−R,
1−α−(R−R1)
R1
, 1−R ≤ α ≤ 1− (R−R1),
0, 1− (R−R1) ≤ α ≤ 1.
since
∆S1|S2,Z = min
τc:|τc|=µ
ρ:|ρ|=a2
H(Sa11 , S
a2
2 |Zµ)−H(Sa22 |Zµ)
= min
τ:|τ|=N−µ
ρ:|ρ|=a2
[rank(Aτ )− rank(A2τ )]
≤

a1, 0 ≤ µ ≤ N −K,
N − µ− a2, N −K ≤ µ ≤ N − a2,
0, N − a2 ≤ µ ≤ N.
due to equation (6.7) and the upper bound (6.8).
6.11 Remarks
We have seen that the generator matrices of MDS codes can be used in conjunction with
the coset coding method to construct the most robust codes for the wiretap channel II as
suggested by the linkage between the performance of the coding strategy and the associated
Inverse Dimension/Length Profile. Furthermore, applying the analysis of the extended concept
of Inverse Relative Dimension/Length Profile to the wiretap channel II with side information
suggests that the generator matrices of MDS codes can be used to construct the most robust
codes for this model, too. However, there are other types of codes that perform as robust but
require the knowledge of the side information at the encoder as show in Theorem 6.6.
An achievable region for the wiretap channel II with side information is derived based on the
coset coding method with linear block codes. However, we believe that it is possible to enlarge
the region if the coding strategy is not restricted to the coset coding method based on linear
block codes.
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Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks
7.1 Summary of the Work
Motivated by the covert communication scenario, the code-partitioning technique is closely
examined in an information theoretic framework. In particular, it can be used to accomplish
different objectives for different communication situations. For the broadcast channel, it is
used for simultaneous transmission of different messages to different recipients. For the wiretap
channel, it is used to keep the secret message from the adversary. For the dirty-paper channel,
it is used to mitigate the effect of the interference in the channel known to the sender in
advance.
The new model of the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information is introduced as a
theoretical base for the covert communication application. The model is analyzed based on
the leakage function, which can be used to classify the channel. The camouflage mode of
operation is more power-effective, but it is only suitable for some channels. The high-power
mode uses the input power to confuse the adversary and to send the message at the same time
and is less power-effective. Based on the proposed coding strategy, an achievable region is
proved.
The model is adapted for information embedding in an image by considering the image as
an interference in the model known in advance to the sender. We also extend a quantization-
based watermarking scheme developed from the dirty-paper channel model. Two extensions are
proposed to enhance the secrecy of the message embedded in the image. The direct approach
enhances the secrecy of the message at the cost of the degradation of the image while the
indirect approach enhances the secrecy of the message at the cost of much smaller degradation.
The question of the use of side information by the adversary is investigated under the wiretap
channel II with side information model based on the optimal coding strategy proposed for the
wiretap channel II. The performance of the codes are linked to the structures called IDLP and
IRDLP, suggesting the characteristics of good codes for the wiretap channel II and the wiretap
channel II with side information. An achievable region for the wiretap channel II with side
information is then proved based on the coding strategy.
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7.2 Possible Directions for Further Work
The Gaussian wiretap channel with side information model is a promising candidate for the
information hiding application as illustrated in Chapter 5 even though the implementation
is not fully optimized for the secrecy of the message. The capacity region of the Gaussian
wiretap channel with side information remains unknown. A theoretical challenge is to enlarge
the achievable region or finding the capacity region.
On the application side, we have illustrated that a simple implementation of the idea is possible
by the direct and indirect approaches of extension. However, the fundamental differences
between the two approaches have not been analyzed. Further analysis is necessary to improve
and fine tune the performance of the purposed implementation. In addition, the question of
secrecy when the key sequence is used repeatedly has not been coped with.
Finally, the analysis of the coset coding method based on linear block codes provides an insight
into the use of matrices in constructing robust codes for the wiretap channel II with and without
side information. However, the capacity region of the wiretap channel II with side information
still remains unknown. Allowing other types of codes may be able to enlarge the achievable
region.
Bibliography
[1] Patrick P. Bergmans. Random coding theorem for broadcast channels with degraded
components. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, IT-19(2):197–207, March 1973.
[2] Patrick P. Bergmans. A simple converse for broadcast channels with additive white gaus-
sian noise. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, pages 279–280, March 1974.
[3] Max H. M. Costa. Writing on dirty paper. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
IT-29(3):439–441, May 1983.
[4] Thomas M. Cover. Broadcast channels. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, IT-
19(1):2–14, January 1972.
[5] Thomas M. Cover. Comments on broadcast channels. IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, IT-44(6):2524–2530, October 1998.
[6] Thomas M. Cover and Joy A. Thomas. Elements of Information Theory. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., N. Y., 1991.
[7] Wilbur B. Davenport, Jr. Probability and Random Processes. McGraw-Hill Book Com-
pany, Inc., 1970.
[8] J. J. Eggers, J. K. Su, and B. Girod. A blind watermarking scheme based on structured
codebooks. Secure Images and Image Authentication, IEE Colloquium, pages 4/1–4/6,
April 2000.
[9] G. David Forney, Jr. Dimension/length profiles and trellis complexity of linear block
codes. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 40(6):439–441, November 1994.
[10] R. G. Gallager. Information Theory and Reliable Communication. John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., N. Y., 1965.
[11] R. G. Gallager. Capacity and coding for degraded broadcast channels. Probl. Inform.
Transm., pages 185–193, July-Sept. 1974.
[12] S. I. Gel’fand and M. S. Pinsker. Coding for channel with random parameters. Problems
of Control and Information Theory, 9(1):19–31, 1980.
[13] Steven R. Lay. Analysis with an Introduction to Proof, Second Edition. Prentice-Hall,
Inc., New Jersey, 1990.
[14] S. K. Leung-Yan-Cheong and Martin E. Hellman. The gaussian wire-tap channel. IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, IT-24(4):451–456, July 1978.
111
112 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[15] Yuan Luo, Chaichana Mitrpant, and A. J. Han Vinck. The multi-user wire-tap channel
of type ii using coset coding method. 2003.
[16] L. H. Ozarow and A. D. Wyner. Wire-tap channel ii. AT&T Bells Laboratories Technical
Journal, 63(10):2135–2157, December 1984.
[17] C. E. Shannon. A mathematical theory of communication. The Bell System Technical
Journal, 27:379–423, July 1948.
[18] M. R. Spiegel. Schaum’s Mathematical Handbook. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,
1968.
[19] John M. Wozencraft and Irwin Mark Jacobs. Principles of Communication Engineering.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965.
[20] A. D. Wyner. The wire-tap channel. The Bell System Technical Journal, 54(8):1355–1387,
October 1975.
Appendix A
Background Theorems
The Weak Law of Large Number
Theorem A.1 Let XN be a sequence of independent identically distributed random variables
with mean m and variance σ2X , for any ² > 0,
Pr
{∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
Xi −m
∣∣∣∣ < ²} > 1− σ2XN²2 . (A.1)
Proof: See [19]. ¥
The Union Bound
Theorem A.2 Let Ai, i ∈ {1, . . . , N} be events of interest of an experiment. Then
Pr
{ N⋃
i=1
Ai
}
≤
N∑
i=1
Pr{Ai}.
Proof: See [7] and [19]. ¥
Fano’s Inequality
Theorem A.3 For discrete random variables X,Y, Xˆ such that X → Y → Xˆ forms a Markov
chain. Define the probability of error Pe = Pr{Xˆ 6= X}. Then h(Pe) = Pe log(|X| − 1) ≥
H(X|Y ).
Proof: See [6]. ¥
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Appendix B
Abbreviations and Notations
Abbreviations
AEP Asymptotic equipartition properties
AWGN Additive white Gaussian noise
BSC Binary symmetric channel
DMC Discrete memoryless channel
GWC Gaussian wiretap channel
GWCSI Gaussian wiretap channel with side information
i.i.d. Independent identically distributed
IDLP Inverse Dimension/Length Profile
IRDLP Inverse Relative Dimension/Length Profile
WLLN Weak law of large numbers
WT2CSI Wiretap channel II with side information
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Notations
α, δ, ², ω, ξ constants
(a, b) open interval between a and b
[a, b] closed interval between a and b
A matrix
Aρτ submatrix of A whose columns are indexed by members of τ , whose
rows are indexed by members of ρ
|A| determinant of A
C channel capacity
CAWGN capacity of AWGN channel
C1, C2, Caux, Csat codes
∆ equivocation
E[X] expectation of X
h(p) binary entropy function with cross-over probability p
H(X) (differential) entropy of X
H(X,Y ) joint (differential) entropy of X and Y
I(X;Y ) mutual information between X and Y
k[C] dimension of a code C
k˜(C) IDLP of a code C
K˜(C1, C2) IRDLP of a code/subcode pair (C1, C2)
K covariance matrix
p cross-over probability
p(x) probability mass (density) function
p(x, y) joint probability mass (density) function
p(x|y) conditional probability mass (density) function
Pτ (C) projection of a code C on to an index set τ
Q(·) quantization operator
% correlation coefficient
σ2X variance of X
τ, ρ index sets
τ c complement of a set
TNX (²) set of typical sequences of length N with respect to a probability den-
sity function p(x) and a constant ²
TNX,Y (²) set of pairs of typical sequences of length N with respect to a joint
probability density function p(x, y) and a constant ²
U quantization set
UP (k˜) upper bound on IDLP
UP (K˜) upper bound on IRDLP
x vector
xN vector of length N
xT transpose of vector x
X,Xc, X˜, Xˆ, χ random variables
X ∼ N (0, σ2X) X has normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2X
X set of all possible alphabets of X
∅ empty set
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